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Foreword 
 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) is one of the fastest growing waste 
streams, mirroring the growth in new product sales and diversity. This is driven by our 
reliance, in our business and personal lives, on technology, its functionality and the 
innovative features it can provide. 
 
These products can contain valuable materials as well as substances that are considered to 
be hazardous. The European Union considers WEEE to be one their priority waste streams 
given its potential impact on the environment. 
 
The present WEEE Directive, to be superseded by the recast WEEE Directive, focuses on 
producer responsibility as the key policy mechanism for ensuring that producers continue to 
bear the costs of collection, sorting or treatment and recycling or recovery.  
 
Whilst producers must bear the responsibility for their products as an extension of the 
‘polluter pays principle’, it is recognised in policy terms that producers should have some 
flexibility and discretion available to them in how they can fulfil this responsibility. 
 
Collective producer responsibility (CPR) is an established and understood concept and 
practice. Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) on the other hand still remains a policy 
ambition. 
 
The IPR Working Group (WG) was set up by the WEEE Advisory Body (WAB) to examine 
and bring forward a policy recommendation for IPR that could work within a UK context. The 
role of the WAB came to an end in September 2010 and a transition plan was agreed with 
BIS at that time. This enabled the WG and its existing members to continue to work on this 
important objective with oversight from BIS as opposed to the WAB previously.  
 
From the evidence and case studies that the WG has gathered and evaluated since setting 
out on its journey, there are very few IPR systems in operation that constitute full IPR as 
intended. This report aims to presents the background and evidence on IPR in a 
straightforward manner and then sets out to evaluate the potential options from a UK 
perspective.  It makes recommendations to BIS, as the sponsoring Government department 
for WEEE, on how an IPR system could be practically and realistically implemented in the 
UK. 
 
The IPR Working Group consisted of the following members, all of whom volunteered their 
time freely to contribute to this process. I would like to pay special tribute to them for their 
commitment, contribution and determination to see this through to completion.  
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important related issues. In particular, we would like to thank Stephane Arditi, Atalay Atasu, 
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Executive Summary 
The IPR Working Group (IPR WG) was set up by the Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE) Advisory Body to look into, examine and bring forward a policy 
recommendation for IPR that could practically and realistically work within a UK context.  
This report presents their findings. 
What is IPR? 
Under an Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) system, producers are individually 
responsible (financially or financially and physically) for their own products at end of life.  
The allocation of individual financial responsibility to a producer for his/her own products is 
intended to create an economic and/or commercial incentive for producers to adapt the 
design of their products for easier repair, upgrading, reuse or recycling and end of life 
treatment. It implements the polluter pays principle with respect to their products. 
Each producer does not have to have separate take-back systems within an IPR system; 
collective collection channels can still be used and this is an important point.  The key 
focus is the financing mechanism.  In an IPR system, the costs borne by the producer 
should relate to the actual costs of dealing with their own products at end of their life 
(EOL). 
The alternative to IPR is Collective Producer Responsibility (CPR) which allocates 
collective financial responsibility e.g. the costs of collecting and treating mixed brand 
WEEE arising are shared between producers currently existing on the market, based on 
their current market share.  Critics argue that CPR provides producers no incentive to 
improve the design of their products in terms of repair, upgrading, reuse or recycling as 
any resulting EOL cost benefits are shared between producers.  
IPR within the European WEEE Directive and UK WEEE Regulations 
The WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC is a producer responsibility Directive which aims to 
promote the reuse, recycling and recovery of WEEE in order to reduce the disposal of 
such wastes to landfill. The Directive requires producers (product manufacturers or 
importers) to become responsible for the costs of the collection, treatment, re-use and 
recycling of end of life products and in addition sets specific targets and treatment 
requirements for the recovery and recycling of WEEE. 
The WEEE Directive sets different financing requirements for WEEE from private 
households and WEEE from ‘users other than private households’: 
 Article 9 for WEEE from users other than private households (B2B WEEE) - the 
financing requirements have in built flexibility and IPR is not mandated.   
 Article 8 for WEEE from private households - IPR is mandated for products put on the 
market after 13th August 2005 (termed ‘new’ WEEE).  For ‘new’ WEEE, each producer 
must finance the end of life costs relating to the waste from his own products. The 
producer can choose to fulfil this obligation either via individual or collective take-back 
or treatment systems. 
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The UK, along with a number of other EU Member States, has not fully transposed all 
aspects of Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive.  The UK WEEE Regulations currently 
specify a CPR model for all WEEE whereby producers pay for a proportion of mixed brand 
WEEE arising based on current market share.  As a result, IPR is not mandated in the UK 
for separately collected WEEE from private households. 
When examining the role of IPR within the WEEE Directive, the IPR WG recognised the 
wider legislative context of the Waste Framework Directive and other related legislation 
which affects WEEE( e.g. the RoHS Directive and the Eco-Design Directive). 
Key long term goals for the UK WEEE system 
In line with the key outcomes that the WEEE Directive and Article 8.2 in particular intends 
to achieve, the IPR WG considers that an IPR approach within the UK WEEE system 
should encompass the following long term goals: 
 Producers pay costs relating to their own new household WEEE in accordance 
with Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive.  
 Provides incentives or payback for DfRR (design for easier repair, upgrading, 
reuse or recycling).  
 Producers should have the option to manage their own WEEE compliance 
directly (with appropriate regulatory safeguards to ensure controls are applied 
as per PCSs). 
However, the IPR WG also recognises that it may not be possible to make the transition to 
‘full’ IPR in one step.  The introduction of IPR needs to be retrofitted onto the existing 
infrastructure rather than designed onto a blank canvas.  Any approach must work within 
the framework of the recast WEEE Directive as well the definition of ‘producer’ (amongst 
other things) and must be both practical and realistic for the UK. This is in line with the IPR 
WG’s terms of reference.  Given this context, the IPR WG concluded that a strategy of 
evolution (through a series of interim steps) rather than revolution ( in one step) is the most 
appropriate route to take at this point in time.   
 
Shortlisted Options 
Following an intensive review of evidence, incorporating published literature, country case 
studies and direct stakeholder input, the IPR WG identified a wide range of possible 
options.  Each was evaluated and discussed by the Group, ultimately resulting in a short-
list of 3 potential options for the UK which meet the strategy of evolution not revolution.  
These are: 
 A DfRR weighting mechanism which applies an increase/decrease to obligated 
tonnages based on the current actual treatment costs and the characteristics of 
products being POM1.   
                                            
1 This option was derived by the consultants, building on concepts such as the French bonus/malus system 
& proposals outlined in Fair and Efficient Implementation of Product Take-Back Legislation with Collective 
Producer Responsibility, L. Gui, A. Atasu, O. Ergun, B. Toktay. Georgia Tech. Working Paper, 2012. 
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 Return share based on brand sampling with the option for producers to separate out 
their own brand WEEE at own cost.  Some states in the USA currently implement this 
model. 
 Front end payment for WEEE arising – producers pay according to the current costs 
of collecting, treating, and recycling the sub-category of EEE being put on the market. 
As the amount and composition of WEEE arising will not be the same as that sold a 
balancing mechanism is introduced2.   
Key Principles  
Bearing in mind the current political and economic climate and the need to implement an 
approach which is both practical and realistic, the IPR WG recommends that the following 
key principles are applied.  The UK WEEE system should:  
 Move towards producers paying costs relating to their own WEEE in accordance 
with Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive and in doing so also incorporate effective 
DfRR incentives; 
 Be based on a strategy of evolution not revolution.  The UK has an established 
WEEE system and infrastructure which should be modified, through a series of interim 
evolutionary steps, to progress towards the policy aims of IPR as set out in Article 8.2; 
 Avoid any double-payment period.  Given the current economic pressures on 
producers, it is advisable to avoid any mandatory double-payment period (i.e. where 
producers pay for WEEE arising at the same time as paying for Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment being put on the market (POM).      
                                            
2 This model was developed by K. Mayers, R. Lifset. K. Bodenhoefer, and L. N. Wassenhove in their paper 
Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment through 
improved cost allocation, Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012. Note the shortlisted option 
is version 1 of their model and does not involve future estimated cost. 
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Primary Recommendations  
The IPR WG makes 2 primary recommendations as follows: 
Recommendation 13 
Three options for moving towards Article 8.2 should be presented by BIS within 
the forthcoming stakeholder consultation on possible changes to the UK WEEE 
Regulations.  This will enable the validity of the analysis undertaken in Section 9 to 
be tested and for the commercial and environmental merits of each to be properly 
determined.   
 
These 3 options4 are: 
 DfRR Weighting Mechanism 
 Return Share based on brand sampling 
 Front End payment for WEEE arising. 
By a slim majority, the IPR WG concluded that the DfRR Weighting Mechanism was the 
preferred option for the UK at this time but there were dissenting views.  The IPR WG 
recommend by overall consensus that all 3 options and their commercial and 
environmental merits should be presented for consultation. 
 
Recommendation 2 
The UK WEEE system should fully enable and encourage producers wishing to 
undertake their own direct take-back activities for household WEEE whilst putting 
in place safeguards to ensure that the proper collection, treatment and recycling still 
occurs.   
This is in order to (i) facilitate the move towards IPR (ii) address specific demands from 
producers and (iii) meet the WEEE Directive’s requirement that producers are allowed 
to set up and operate individual and/or collective take-back systems for WEEE from 
private households5.  
 
                                            
3 Recommendation 1 sets out the first step in a series of interim steps towards a full IPR system. An 
approach agreed by the IPR WG and as set out in Section 9.3 
4 See Section 9.4 
5 Article 5(2)d in the recast WEEE Directive. 
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Secondary Recommendations  
The secondary recommendations are intended to inform both the Government and 
relevant authorities on other related matters that have come to the IPR WG’s attention 
during the preparation of this report.  In the main, these are of a practical nature and due 
consideration should be given to them because they either a) highlight potential areas of 
risk and/or opaqueness in the present system or b) they have an impact on the effective 
implementation of the Primary Recommendations as set out above. 
Recommendation 3: Next Steps 
The Government, through BIS should take this window of opportunity to engage with the 
industry and the wider sector on the recommendations arising from this report. This will 
ensure that a phased implementation plan can be formulated that converges, in terms of 
any medium term regulatory changes required, with the transposition of the recast WEEE 
Directive but also allows time for the development and consideration of further longer term 
improvements and enhancements which might be considered in future. 
The Government, through BIS, should continue to have oversight of the UK’s IPR policy 
and its effective implementation. Guidance should then be provided to the Environment 
Agencies by BIS to enable them to advise the PCSs of the changes required so that these 
changes and/or requirements can be accommodated within the present PCS operational 
plans. The contractual relationship between the PCS and their producer members remains 
unchanged. Thereafter, the Environment Agencies will still remain responsible for 
monitoring and effective enforcement. 
Recommendation 4: On-going evaluation 
The Government, through BIS should ensure that regular reviews are undertaken on the 
effective implementation of the UK’s policy on IPR to ensure that the intended aims of the 
WEEE Directive are being met. To this extent, minimum review intervals of 3 years appear 
appropriate in the circumstances.  This review process should take the opportunity to 
identify further evolution towards a full IPR approach taking into consideration 
developments in collection, treatment and recycling infrastructure, financial guarantee 
options, product identification (e.g. RFID tagging), policy development (e.g. Eco-Design 
Directive) and the nature of EEE being placed on the market and WEEE arising. 
Recommendation 56:  
Depending on the IPR option ultimately decided upon by Government from the three set 
out in this report, the Government, through BIS, will need to consider what additional 
measures will be required in order to implement the option.  
                                            
6 The IPR Working Group recognises the Government’s light touch regulatory agenda. Where specific 
expertise is required and this expertise is not within the relevant Government Departments, then there is a 
policy precedent in place for these types of specialist committees. Recommendation 5 is set within this 
context. 
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By way of an example, BIS might have to establish an arm’s length advisory committee 
comprised of representatives from the producer community (all relevant categories and 
PCSs), collection and treatment industry, academia, enforcement authorities and NGOs, 
as applicable. A committee would need clear terms of reference to help advise the 
Government on an impartial basis on various aspects of implementation such as: 
 In relation to the DfRR Weighting Option: the possible product differentials and the 
relevant percentages to be adopted as well as more general issues regarding the 
future policy direction of IPR.  
 In relation to the Front End Payment Option: the possible WEEE sub-categories 
and likely return rates for these sub-categories of WEEE as well as more general 
issues regarding the future policy direction of IPR. 
 In relation to Return Share option: the sampling methodology to be undertaken and 
related guidance to help inform the actual sampling process as well as potential 
changes to the sampling methodology. 
Recommendation 6: Categorisation of UEEE and WEEE 
The Government should review, as necessary, the present guidance and/or decision tree 
regarding the identification and categorisation of UEEE as opposed to WEEE in order to 
ensure that implications for all take-back systems are clear and remove any unnecessary 
regulatory burdens from the producers.  
Recommendation 7: IAS 37 
The Government should engage, through BIS with the relevant professional accountancy 
bodies (such as the Accounting Regulatory Committee ‘ARC’)7 to make them aware of the 
potential challenges arising from IAS 37 and to see what amendments can be realistically 
accommodated without, at the same time, giving rise to any presentation risk in so far as 
the financial statements are concerned.  
Recommendation 8: Devolved Administrations 
In order to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under the WEEE directive and that 
producers, PCSs and AATFs continue to benefit from a common implementation model, 
the Coalition Government is urged to work closely with the Devolved Administrations.  
Where there is a desire to have a bespoke requirement in one nation in the UK, the 
Governments should have regard to relative cost and benefit of the proposal and, if it goes 
ahead, ensure that it can be accommodated within the structure of the overall UK 
approach.  
                                            
7 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/committees/index_en.htm 
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Recommendation 9: Financial Resources Checks 
The Government should take this opportunity to review this risk and then through BIS, 
determine any enhancements to the Financial Resources checks8 to be put in place and 
their frequency for both the PCS schemes and for their producer members. Under 
guidance from BIS, the requirements for any financial resources checks can be provided 
for within the present operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and 
the registered PCS schemes. 
In the event that there is any doubt raised about the solvency of either a PCS or a 
producer member, appropriate action should be taken by the authorities to address this. 
This action could include by way of example, additional capital being injected into a PCS, 
transfer of its producer members to another scheme or in the case of the producer 
member, security being taken to support their guarantee commitment. Under guidance 
from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present operational plans as 
agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS schemes. 
The Government, through BIS, should ensure that any specific financial guarantee funds 
held by the PCS on behalf of its members are properly ring fenced, separately accounted 
for in their management accounts and/or financial statements and safeguarded from the 
day to day operations undertaken by the PCS via a separately designated bank account. 
Under guidance from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present 
operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS 
schemes.  
Recommendation 10: Financial Guarantees 
The Government, through BIS should take this opportunity to engage with the European 
Commission to determine what flexibility and/or discretion exists with the Directive for the 
provision of alternative financial instruments from producers (in addition to those already 
set out) that still provide for and meet the intended outcomes required. 
Subject to this proviso, the Government, through BIS should determine the exceptional 
circumstances in which it will allow producers to bring forward their own alternative 
solutions that are convenient and appropriate to them and which are wholly acceptable to 
BIS.  Under guidance from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present 
operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS 
schemes.  
Recommendation 11: WEEE Data 
The Government should take the opportunity, through BIS, to review the present data set, 
the way in which the data is captured and that the inadvertent classification of items of 
equipment is minimised so as to ensure that it can effectively manage and monitor the 
UK’s performance as a whole. 
                                            
8 These tests could mirror those that are standard practices such as a) audited financial statements and a 
clean audit on the scheme operator b) turnover c) profitability d) EBITDA and e) balance sheet strength. 
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Recommendation 12: Enforcement 
The Government, through BIS should take this opportunity to review the present 
enforcement regime to determine what is effective and what is not and the reasons as to 
why. Thereafter, it should ensure that it, the Environment Agencies (in consultation with 
Defra) and the VCA adopt a proactive risk based enforcement policy that targets specific 
parties and/or specific elements within the sector as a whole in order to promote 
compliance and tackle serious infringement of the regulations. 
Recommendation 13: Use of voluntary agreements on DfRR 
The Government should investigate, possibly through WRAP, whether there is the 
potential to extend the use of voluntary agreements into such areas as a) product light 
weighting, b) common polymers in plastics amongst others. 
Recommendation 14: Dissemination of this report 
The Government, through BIS should give consideration to making this report, in its 
entirety, a publicly available document at the earliest opportunity via a hyperlink on the BIS 
website.    
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1 Introduction to EPR & IPR 
This section introduces the concepts of Extended Producer 
Responsibility (EPR) and Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR). 
1.1 Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) 
The term ‘Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)’ was first used and defined by 
Lindhqvist in a report for the Swedish Ministry of the Environmental and Natural Resources 
in 1990.  The English translation of the definition reads as follows: 
“Extended Producer Responsibility is an environmental protection strategy to reach an 
environmental objective of a decreased total environmental impact from a product, by 
making the manufacturer of the product responsible for the entire life-cycle of the 
product and especially for the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product. The 
Extended Producer Responsibility is implemented through administrative, economic and 
informative instruments. The composition of these instruments determines the precise 
form of the Extended Producer Responsibility.” 1 
 
Key to EPR is the allocation of responsibilities, to whom (e.g. producers, local authorities, 
consumers) and how (e.g. collectively or individually).  Responsibilities are categorised by 
Lindhqvist2 as liability, economic (financial) responsibility, physical responsibility, 
informative responsibility and ownership. These are further described as follows3: 
 Liability refers to a responsibility for proven environmental damages caused by the 
product in question. The extent of the liability is determined by legislation and may 
embrace different parts of the life-cycle of the product, including usage and final 
disposal; 
 Economic (financial) responsibility means that the producer will cover all or part of 
the costs for e.g. the collection, recycling or final disposal of the products at end of 
life. These costs could be paid for directly by the producer or by a special fee; 
 Physical responsibility is used to characterise the systems where the manufacturer 
is involved in the actual physical management of the products or of the effects of 
the products; 
                                            
1 Lindhqvist, Thomas. Extended Producer Responsibility, 1992. In Lindhqvist, T., Extended Producer 
Responsibility as a Strategy to Promote Cleaner Products (1-5). Lund: Department of Industrial 
Environmental Economics, Lund University. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Lindhqvist, Thomas. 1998. What is Extended Producer Responsibility? In: Extended Producer 
Responsibility as a Policy Instrument – what is the Knowledge in the Scientific Community? Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
IPR Working Group Report 
 
2 
 
 Informative responsibility requires the producer to supply information on the 
environmental properties of their products. 
 Ownership - the manufacturer may also retain the ownership of his products 
throughout their life cycle (e.g. product service provision via a lease system) and 
consequently also be linked to the environmental problems of the product. 
The emergence of the concept of EPR reflected several general trends in environmental 
policy development at that time. Most notably, the prioritisation of preventative measures 
over end-of-pipe approaches, enhancement of life cycle thinking and a shift from the so-
called command-and-control approach to a non-prescriptive, goal-oriented approach.  EPR 
reflects these trends via two fundamental features4: 
1) Making producers more responsible for the entire life cycle of their products.  A 
principal rationale for allocating responsibility to producers is their capacity to make 
changes at source (i.e. at the design phase) in order to reduce the environmental 
impacts of their product throughout its life cycle; 
2) Allowing implementation via a range of policy tools and instruments in different 
combinations e.g. to provide both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’.  EPR aims to incentivise 
industry to continuously improve their products and processes in terms of 
minimising environmental impact.   
Figure 1.1:  EPR – examples of policy tools & instruments across the product lifecycle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further studies on EPR, for example by the OECD, narrowed the scope to focus 
exclusively on the end of life phase.  The OECD defines EPR as “an environmental policy 
approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the post-
consumer stage of a product’s life cycle”5.  Under EPR, “producers accept significant 
responsibility (financial and/or physical) for the treatment or disposal of post-consumer 
products”6. 
                                            
4 Extended Producer Responsibility as a driver for design change: Utopia or reality?  N. Tojo, IIIEE, 2004 
5 Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments, OECD, 2001 
6 Ibid. 
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EPR sets the context within which Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) was 
subsequently developed.  As the diagram above illustrates, EPR can be made up of 
multiple policy instruments acting at each stage of the product lifecycle.  In contrast, IPR is 
a more specific policy tool, as explained in Section 1.2. 
1.2 Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) 
There is no single accepted definition of Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) but at its 
essence IPR means that producers are made individually responsible (financially or 
financially and physically) for their own products at end of life.  In addition to implementing 
general producer responsibility, the theory behind IPR is to establish an economic 
incentive for producers to adapt the design of their products for easier repair, upgrading, 
reuse or recycling (DfRR) which should in turn lead to reduced environmental impact at 
end of life (EOL)7.  The intention is that if a product has been designed to reduce its EOL 
impacts and this results in lower EOL costs, this cost reduction is passed back to the 
individual producer who made the DfRR investment, thus providing a payback mechanism. 
The alternative to IPR is Collective Producer Responsibility (CPR) which, as the name 
suggests, is a mechanism for producers to meet their responsibilities (financial or financial 
and physical) collectively as groups of producers.  The most typical example is where the 
costs of collecting and treating mixed brand WEEE (Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment) arising are shared between producers currently existing on the market, based 
on their current market share.  Critics argue that CPR gives producers no incentive to 
improve the design of their products in terms of repair, upgrading, reuse or recycling as 
any resulting EOL cost benefits are shared between producers. 
It is important to differentiate between IPR, CPR and the physical process of product take-
back. IPR and CPR can both be applied purely as financial responsibility - the 
responsibility does not have to be physical.  So, for example:  
 An individual take-back or recycling system managed by only one producer does 
not necessarily equate to IPR. Such a system could operate under IPR or CPR 
financing mechanisms. 
 A collective take-back or recycling system organised by several producers working 
together to manage WEEE does not necessarily equate to CPR. Such a system 
could operate under IPR or CPR financing mechanisms. 
This means that a producer can be made individually financially responsible for their own 
products at end of life but can fulfil this via a collective collection system.  Each producer 
does not have to have separate take-back systems within an IPR system.  The key issue 
is how the financing mechanism allocates costs between producers.  In an IPR system, 
the costs borne by the producer should relate to the costs of dealing with that producer’s 
own products at end of life. 
                                            
7 When divided over product lifetime. 
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1.3 Summary 
Under an Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) system, producers are made individually 
responsible (financially or financially and physically) for their own products at end of life.  
The allocation of individual financial responsibility to a producer for his/her own products is 
intended to create an economic incentive for producers to adapt the design of their 
products for easier repair, upgrading, reuse or recycling and end of life treatment. It 
implements the polluter pays principle with respect to products. 
Each producer does not have to have separate take-back systems within an IPR system; 
collective collection channels can still be used.  The key issue is how the financing 
mechanism allocates costs between producers.  In an IPR system, the costs borne by the 
producer should relate to the costs of dealing with that producer’s own products at end of 
life. 
The alternative is Collective Producer Responsibility (CPR) which allocates collective 
financial responsibility e.g. the costs of collecting and treating mixed brand WEEE arising 
are shared between producers currently existing on the market, based on their current 
market share.  Critics argue that CPR gives producers no incentive to improve the design 
of their products in terms of repair, upgrading, reuse or recycling as any resulting EOL cost 
benefits are shared between producers. 
Section 2.1 discusses the application of IPR and CPR within the European Directive on 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (‘the WEEE Directive’). 
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2 The WEEE Directive 
This section provides an overview of the Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment Directive 2002/96/EC  and the application of IPR and CPR 
within the legislation, both at European and UK level. 
2.1 The WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC 
The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive 2002/96/EC is a 
producer responsibility Directive which aims to promote the reuse, recycling and recovery 
of WEEE in order to reduce the disposal of such wastes to landfill. The Directive requires 
producers (e.g. product manufacturers or importers8) to become responsible for the costs 
of the collection, treatment, recovery and disposal of end of life products9 and in addition 
sets specific targets and treatment requirements for the recovery and recycling of WEEE. 
The existing Directive has been in force since February 2003.  Proposals for a recast were 
issued by the European Commission in December 2008 and the final version of the 
revised Directive (2012/19/EU) was published in the Official Journal (OJ) on 24th July 
201210.  Member States have until 14 February 2014 to transpose its requirements into 
their domestic legislation.  Throughout this report, Article numbers and legal text are taken 
from the original WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC unless otherwise specified. 
Financing requirements within the WEEE Directive: IPR and CPR 
“I am particularly happy we could convince Member States to strengthen the individual 
responsibility of producers for the waste from their products. This will be an important 
incentive for producers to take environmental consequences into account already when 
they stand around the design table”  
M. Wallstrom, October 2002,European Commission Press Release 
 
The WEEE Directive sets different financing requirements for WEEE from private 
households (Article 8) and WEEE from ‘users other than private households’ (Article 9): 
 For WEEE from users other than private households (B2B WEEE) the financing 
requirements have in built flexibility and IPR is not mandated.   
                                            
8 The definition of ‘Producer’ under the WEEE Directive covers those who: (i) manufacture and sell EEE on 
‘own brand’ basis (ii) resell EEE manufactured by others under its ‘own brand’ (iii) imports or exports EEE 
into a MS on a professional basis.  This is the definition of producer used from here on within this report. 
9 Producers should finance at least the collection from collection facilities, and the treatment, recovery and 
disposal of WEEE.   
10 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:197:0038:0071:EN:PDF 
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 For WEEE from private households IPR is mandated for products put on the market 
after 13th August 2005. 
As a result, this report is focused on how to apply IPR to WEEE from private 
households, whilst being mindful of any implications for B2B WEEE. 
Article 8 of the WEEE Directive distinguishes between ‘new’ and ‘historic’ WEEE from 
private households.  
Figure 2.1: Financing Requirements for WEEE from Private Households as established by 
Article 8 of the European WEEE Directive 
 
The Directive states that producers should be collectively responsible for financing historic 
WEEE i.e. waste arising from products put on the market (POM) before 13th August 2005.  
The rationale being that (a) it is not possible for producers to influence the design of 
products that have already been produced and (b) individual responsibility should not be 
applied retrospectively.  The Directive therefore established Collective Producer 
Responsibility (CPR) for historic WEEE, for example based on current market share. 
Financing WEEE from Private Households: ‘Historic’ WEEE 
Article 8.3 
The responsibility for the financing of the costs of the management of WEEE from 
products put on the market before [13/08/2005] … (historical waste) shall be 
provided by one or more systems to which all producers, existing on the market 
when the respective costs occur, contribute proportionately, e.g. in proportion to their 
respective share of the market by type of equipment. 
 
For ‘new’ WEEE, the rationale was that design changes could make future products easier 
to disassemble, more recyclable and reduce their environmental impact.  Therefore Article 
8.2 of the WEEE Directive established Individual Producer Responsibility (IPR) for ‘new’ 
WEEE (products POM on or after 13th August 2005), obliging producers to finance the 
costs relating to their own products.  
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Financing WEEE from Private Households: ‘New’ WEEE 
Article 8.2 
For products put on the market later than 13 August 2005, each producer shall be 
responsible for financing [at least the collection, treatment, recovery and 
environmentally sound disposal of WEEE from private households deposited at 
collection facilities] relating to the waste from his own products. The producer can 
choose to fulfil this obligation either individually or by joining a collective scheme. 
 
Member States shall ensure that each producer provides a guarantee when placing a 
product on the market showing that the management of all WEEE will be financed and 
that producers clearly mark their products in accordance with Article 11(2). This 
guarantee shall ensure that the operations referred to in paragraph 1 relating to this 
product will be financed. The guarantee may take the form of participation by the 
producer in appropriate schemes for the financing of the management of WEEE, a 
recycling insurance or a blocked bank account. 
 
Article 8.2 can be fulfilled by: 
 setting up an individual system e.g. whereby the producer establishes its own 
system for returning their products for re-use/ recycling/ recovery; or 
 a collective system organised by multiple producers working together but with a 
mechanism whereby each producer finances the costs relating to the collection, 
treatment, re-use, recycling and recovery of their own products.  
Producers have a choice between establishing individual or collective take-back systems. 
As Article 8(2) allocates individual financial responsibility for ‘new’ WEEE, it indicates that 
producers are not obliged to pay for costs relating to other producers’ WEEE e.g. in the 
case of orphan products (belonging to producers that have gone out of business or 
withdrawn from the market) or free riders (products from producers who are evading 
compliance).  To ensure that orphan products are covered, an additional requirement for 
financial guarantees is mandated.  This is discussed in more detail in Section 6.8. 
The WEEE recast text makes no changes to the existing Article 8 requirements on 
financing WEEE from private households.  It does add an additional clause (Article 12(6)) 
which states “The Commission is invited to report, by 14 August 2015, on the possibility of 
developing criteria to incorporate the real end-of-life costs into the financing of WEEE by 
producers, and to submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the 
Council if appropriate”. 
Eco-design requirements within the WEEE Directive 
The WEEE Directive explicitly refers to its use of IPR as a driver for encouraging DfRR 
(Design for Re-use, Repair, Upgrade and/or Recycling):  
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WEEE Directive Preamble 
 
(12) “The establishment, by this Directive, of producer responsibility is one of the means 
of encouraging design and production of EEE which take into full account and facilitate 
its repair, possible upgrading, re-use, disassembly and recycling” 
(20) “In order to give maximum effect to the concept of producer responsibility, each 
producer should be responsible for financing the management of the waste from his own 
products.” 11 
 
However, other DfRR-related elements within the original WEEE Directive are generally 
restricted to broad principles and statements of encouragement, rather than specific 
requirements: 
 Paragraph (18) in the preamble reiterates the waste hierarchy – where appropriate 
priority should be given to re-use of WEEE and its components over recycling and 
recovery; 
 Paragraph (18) also states that “producers should be encouraged to integrate 
recycled material in new equipment”; 
 Article 4 on Product Design – Member States (MS) should “encourage the design 
and production of electrical and electronic equipment which take into account and 
facilitate dismantling and recovery, in particular the reuse and recycling of WEEE, 
their components and materials. In this context, Member States shall take 
appropriate measures so that producers do not prevent, through specific design 
features or manufacturing processes, WEEE from being reused …”12. 
These statements of encouragement appear to have had little direct impact or uptake 
within Member State legislation.  The text of the recast WEEE Directive maintains the 
same broad principles and statements on DfRR as the original Directive, but also 
potentially introduces some additional DfRR-related elements as follows: 
 Preamble (11) “Ecodesign requirements facilitating the re-use, dismantling and 
recovery of WEEE should be laid down in the framework of measures implementing 
Directive 2009/125/EC.  In order to optimise re-use and recovery through product 
design, the whole life cycle of the product should be taken into account.”13;  
 Preamble (23) “Collective schemes could provide for differentiated fees based on 
how easily products and the valuable secondary raw materials they contain could 
be recycled”; 
                                            
11 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0096:20080321:EN:PDF 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Section 1.3 for further discussion of the Eco-Design Directive 
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 Article 11(6) “ the Commission will examine the possibility of setting separate 
targets for WEEE to be prepared for re-use”; 
 Article 4  “Member States shall take appropriate measures so that the eco-design 
requirements facilitating re-use and treatment of WEEE established in the 
framework of Directive 2009/125/EC are applied “. 
Other key requirements within the WEEE Directive 
Other key elements of the WEEE Directive which need to be taken into consideration 
when examining possible IPR systems are listed below.  Each of these is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.3. 
 Product Scope 
 Product and Collection Categories 
 Collection Targets 
 Historic versus New WEEE 
 Definition of Producer 
 Producer marking & Brand identification 
 Financial Guarantees 
 Accruals 
2.2 Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive: transposition in other EU 
Member States 
The transposition of Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive, which mandates IPR for new 
WEEE from private households, has not been straightforward.  A review undertaken by 
Okopol et al in a study for the European Commission in 2007 found that only a minority of 
Member States had clearly stipulated individual financing for new WEEE within their 
national regulations: 
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Table 2.1: Transposition of Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive by EU Member States14  
EU Member State Transposition of Article 8.2 
Belgium (Brussels, 
Flanders) 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Pattern 1: Financing the management of waste from 
their own products for new WEEE 
The legal text clearly distinguishes that producers are 
required to finance the waste from their own products placed 
on the market after 13 August 2005. 
Austria 
Belgium (Wallonia) 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
 
Pattern 2: Variations of 8(2) or Ambiguous Interpretation 
The following countries have not formulated their legal text in 
such a way that an explicit individual financial responsibility 
is assigned.  That is, in many cases producers 
responsibilities for products placed on the market after 13 
August 2005 are mentioned in the plural form which makes 
for an ambiguous interpretation that producers in general are 
responsible for financing waste from their products.   
There are other variations of Article 8(2), such as in the case 
of Germany and Austria, where producers are given the 
choice to decide whether or not they are individually or 
collectively responsible financially for products placed on the 
market after 13 August 2006.  Additionally, in the case of 
Ireland, producers that are members of an ‘approved body’ 
are exempt from Article 16 on financing WEEE from private 
households which clearly assigns an individual financial 
responsibility for new WEEE. 
Bulgaria 
Denmark 
Finland 
France15 
Pattern 3: Individual Financial Responsibility for New 
WEEE missed 
MS have transposed Article 8(2) in such a way that for new 
WEEE the provision that producers should be individually 
                                            
14 Directly from ‘Transposition of The Producer Responsibility Principle of the WEEE Directive, August 2007, 
Okopol, IIIEE and RPA’ and represents the views of those authors.  A similar review was undertaken by the 
industry-NGO coalition IPR Works also in 2007 and reached similar results, see page 15 in ‘Individual 
Producer Responsibility: a review of practical approaches to implementing individual producer responsibility 
for the WEEE Directive’, http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
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EU Member State Transposition of Article 8.2 
Greece 
Latvia 
Slovenia 
UK 
responsible for the waste from their own products appears to 
be ignored.  In many of the countries listed, allocation of 
financial responsibility for new WEEE is to be determined by 
current market share when costs are incurred, as in the 
historical WEEE financing mechanism. 
 
In addition, when referring to the overall transposition of the producer responsibility 
principle by Member States, the Okopol report highlights that “there are differences in what 
is happening in practice compared to what the legal text suggests”.  For this reason, it is 
beneficial to conduct detailed case studies on specific countries in order to identify both 
the current legal context and practical implementation.  To our knowledge, there has been 
no updated analysis of how MS have transposed Article 8.2 within their national legislation 
since the Okopol report16.  A full review of all Member States national legislation was not 
feasible within the context of the IPR Working Group, however, detailed case studies on 
France, Germany and Sweden were conducted and can be viewed in Annex A. 
2.3 The UK WEEE Regulations 
The UK Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Regulations 2006 17 (as 
amended) implement the main provisions of the original European WEEE Directive.  The 
main requirements and obligations on producers and distributors of EEE came into effect 
in the UK from 1 July 2007. 
Following the recast at European level, the UK will be required to transpose the new 
WEEE Directive within 18 months of its publication in the Official Journal (OJ).  To inform 
this process, the UK Government plans to undertake a consultation process in late 2012. 
IPR within the context of the UK WEEE Regulations 
The UK, along with a number of other EU Member States, has not fully transposed all 
aspects of Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive. As a result, IPR is not currently 
mandated in the UK for WEEE from private households. 
The current UK system for household WEEE is based on Collective Producer 
Responsibility (CPR).  All producers, existing on the market when the respective costs 
occur, collectively fund the costs of treating and recycling all separately collected WEEE 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Note that subsequent to this analysis which was published in 2007, changes have been made to the 
French system as described in Annex A. 
16 In November 2007, the European Commission commented on the lack of conformity with Article 8.2 of the 
WEEE Directive by some Member States but no further action was taken to our knowledge.  See statement 
by Mr Dimas at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=P-2007-
4971&language=EN 
17 Further information on the UK WEEE Regulations can be found here: http://www.bis.gov.uk/weee 
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from private households and these costs are allocated to producers based on current 
market share.  These requirements are set out in Part 3, Article 8 of the UK Regulations: 
The amount of the relevant WEEE for which each producer shall be responsible … shall 
be calculated in relation to each of the categories of EEE as follows, 
(A ÷ B) x C 
Where: 
‘A’ is the total amount in tonnes of EEE intended for use by private households and 
falling within one of the categories of EEE that has been put on the market in the UK by 
that producer in a particular compliance period; 
 
‘B’ is the total amount in tonnes of EEE intended for use by private households and 
falling within the relevant category that has been put on the market in the UK by all 
producers in the same compliance period used in ‘A’; and 
 
‘C’ is the total amount in tonnes of WEEE from private households which is waste from 
electrical or electronic products that fall within the relevant category and is deposited at 
a designated collection facility and returned under regulation 32 in the same compliance 
period used in ‘A’. 
 
To give a worked example using theoretical values:  
 Producer R puts 10 tonnes of small household appliances (SHA) on the UK market, 
Producer S 30 tonnes of SHA and Producer T 60 tonnes of SHA.  A total of 100 
tonnes of SHA was therefore put on the UK market during the compliance period.   
 Over the same compliance period, 50 tonnes of SHA WEEE arising is separately 
collected from the UK market.  So:  
o Producer R must pay for 5 tonnes of SHA WEEE arising [(10÷100) x 50 = 5];    
o Producer S must pay for 15 tonnes of SHA WEEE arising [(30÷100) x 50 = 
15]; and  
o Producer T must pay for 30 tonnes of SHA WEEE arising [(60÷100) x 50 = 
30]. 
The Current UK WEEE system 
The current UK WEEE system is characterised by the following elements: 
 Producers must join a Producer Compliance Scheme (PCS), this is a mandatory 
requirement. (It is possible for a producer to set up his own scheme so long as he is 
able to meet the legal requirements placed on a PCS).  Approximately 34 PCSs 
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covering WEEE from private households are currently approved in the UK18 and 
producers are free to select which PCS to join. Producers also have the option of 
establishing their own PCS which can be just for them or open to other producers too; 
 The PCSs register their Producer members with the UK authorities, report tonnage 
data on EEE put on the UK market, arrange the financing of any costs of collection, 
treatment, recovery and disposal of WEEE in line with their notified obligation and 
declare this, supported by evidence, to the appropriate authorities; 
 Only Approved Authorised Treatment Facilities (AATFs) are able to issue evidence of 
WEEE treatment and recovery.  This evidence is required by PCSs to offset their 
members' producer obligations and is facilitated via the WEEE Settlement Centre19.  
The trading of evidence between PCSs has been an issue of significant controversy.  
According to a report commissioned by HP, there was “ransom’ price profiteering in 
2007” and although these extremes have now been reduced the price paid by 
producers for evidence still “relates primarily to perceived trading values rather than 
actual costs”.20 
 Producers can undertake their own take-back activities but must have the collected 
WEEE treated by an AATF and the evidence notes issued to their PCS.  The PCS can 
then discount the volumes from this member’s obligation and may charge an 
administration fee for doing so.  All producers, even those undertaking their own take-
back activities, must be a member of a PCS or set up their own PCS. 
 Consumers have the ability to deposit WEEE at specific civic amenity (CA) sites and 
other locations across the UK free of charge.  These are termed Designated Collection 
Facilities (DCFs).  There may also be further collection facilities available locally.  Local 
authorities generally offer a pre-bookable service for the collection of bulky WEEE (e.g. 
LDA) from householders at a fee. 
 Distributors (e.g. retailers) are required to provide a take-back service to householders 
enabling them to return their WEEE free of charge.  However, the UK WEEE 
Regulations allow distributors to offer ‘in-store’ take-back, participate in the nationwide 
Distributor Take-back Scheme (DTS) (which helps to fund the national network of 
Designated Collection Facilities (DCFs)) or provide an alternative system for free take-
back of WEEE from householders.  In other words, physical in-store take-back is not 
currently mandatory although it is the default requirement. 
 Producers are required to report the weight of EEE placed on the UK market using the 
13 EEE categories. These are the 10 set out in the WEEE Directive, namely: Large 
household appliances; Small household appliances; IT & Telecomms equipment; 
Consumer equipment; Lighting equipment; Electrical & Electronic Tools; Toys, Leisure 
                                            
18 For 2012, the following number of PCSs covering WEEE from private households were approved by: the 
Environment Agency (26), the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (6) and the Northern Ireland 
Environment Agency (2).  For a full list please see: http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/Approved_WEEE_Compliance_Schemes_-_2012.pdf 
19 https://www.weee-sc.org.uk/default.aspx 
20 ‘Cost impact of WEEE evidence trading’, 2012, Project Report for Hewlett Packard by 360 Environmental 
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& Sports equipment; Medical Devices; Monitoring & Control Instruments; Automatic 
Dispensers plus an additional 3 sub-categories which include some items that are 
classed as hazardous and some which are not. These sub-categories are display 
equipment, cooling appliances and gas discharge lamps.  This gives a total of 13 
reporting categories in the UK.  In contrast, WEEE is usually collected at DCFs in 5 
collection categories: Cold (e.g. refrigerators, air conditioning units), Display (e.g. TVs, 
monitors), LDA (Large Domestic Appliances e.g. washing machines), Mixed WEEE, 
and Gas Discharge Lamps)     
2.4 Summary 
The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive 2002/96/EC is a 
producer responsibility Directive which aims to promote the reuse, recycling and recovery 
of WEEE in order to reduce the disposal of such wastes to landfill. The Directive requires 
producers (product manufacturers or importers) to become responsible for the costs of the 
collection, treatment, re-use and recycling of end of life products and in addition sets 
specific targets and treatment requirements for the recovery and recycling of WEEE. 
The WEEE Directive sets different financing requirements for WEEE from private 
households and WEEE from ‘users other than private households’: 
 Article 9 for WEEE from users other than private households (B2B WEEE) - the 
financing requirements have in-built flexibility and IPR is not mandated.   
 Article 8 for WEEE from private households - IPR is mandated for products put on the 
market after 13th August 2005 (termed ‘new’ WEEE).  For ‘new’ WEEE, each producer 
must finance the end of life costs relating to the waste from his own products. The 
producer can choose to fulfil this obligation either via individual or collective take-back 
or treatment systems. 
The UK, along with a number of other EU Member States, has not fully transposed all 
aspects of Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive.  The UK WEEE Regulations currently 
specify a CPR model for all household WEEE whereby producers pay for a proportion of 
mixed brand WEEE arising based on current market share.  As a result, IPR is not fully 
enabled in the UK as a practical compliance option for WEEE from private households. 
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3 Wider Legislative Context 
When examining the role of IPR within the European WEEE Directive, it 
is helpful to be aware of: 
(a) the high level context set by the Waste Framework Directive;  
(b) other legislation which affects the impact of electrical and electronic 
equipment at end of life e.g. RoHS, Eco-Design Directive. 
 
3.1 Waste Framework Directive 2008/98/EC 
The revised Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC) lays down the EU-wide definition of 
waste, provides for a European Waste List, and introduces the need to consider life cycle 
thinking when applying the waste hierarchy in terms of management of specific waste 
streams.  
This revised Directive also includes, for the first time, the concept of EPR.  Article 8 of the 
Directive allows Member States to take legislative or non-legislative measures to ensure 
extended producer responsibility. 
Any such measures may encourage design to reduce the environmental impact and 
generation of waste.  The text also refers to measures which may encourage designing 
products which are technically durable, suitable for multiple use and the proper and safe 
recovery at point of disposal.  Any such measures must not prejudice existing product 
specific legislation (e.g. the WEEE Directive). 
The preamble of the Directive also refers to the Commission being able to adopt 
guidelines to specify in certain cases when objects become waste and refers specifically to 
electrical and electronic products in this context. 
3.2 Eco-Design Directive 2009/125/EC 
The EuP Directive 2005/32/EC established a framework for setting eco-design 
requirements for energy-using products21.  It was recast in 2009 as the Eco-Design 
Directive (2009/125/EC) and its scope widened to include other energy related products22.   
It aims to improve the environmental performance of products throughout their life-cycle 
via the integration of environmental aspects within the product design phase.  The original 
EuP Directive was transposed into UK law under Statutory Instrument (SI 2007 No:2037) 
                                            
21 Energy-using products (EuPs), which use, generate, transfer or measure energy (electricity, gas, fossil 
fuel), such as boilers, computers, televisions, transformers, industrial fans, industrial furnaces etc. 
22 Energy-related products (ERPs) which do not use energy but have an impact on energy use e.g. windows, 
insulation material, shower heads etc. 
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and came into force on 11 August 2007.  The recast Eco-Design Directive was transposed 
by Statutory Instrument (SI 210 No: 2617) which came into force on 20 November 2010. 
Eco-Design Directive 2009/125/EC 
(13) “Considering at the design stage a product’s environmental impact throughout 
its whole life cycle has a high potential to facilitate improved environmental 
performance in a cost effective way, including in terms of resource and material 
efficiency” 
(14) “Although a comprehensive approach to environmental performance is 
desirable, greenhouse gas mitigation through increased energy efficiency should 
be considered a priority environmental goal” 
 
Specific eco-design requirements are set via implementing measures (IMs) usually 
targeting specific products or groups of products but they may also include horizontal 
measures such as standards of performance for standby modes of operation.  To date, 
IMs have taken the form of EU Regulations and as such are directly applicable in the UK 
and all other Member States without the need for transposition at the Member State level.  
However, other forms are possible, including voluntary agreements.   
Article 15 of the Directive sets out the criteria under which an IM can be adopted.  Its 
scope potentially enables eco-design requirements to be set for any life-cycle impact 
(including end of life), the two main factors being that the product shall: 
a) have a significant environmental impact within the Community, as specified in the 
Community strategic priorities as set out in Decision No 1600/2002/EC23; and 
b) the product shall present significant potential for improvement in terms of its 
environmental impact without entailing excessive costs. 
However, Article 16 subsequently states that the first 3-year working plan, setting out an 
indicative list of product groups which are considered as priorities for the adoption of IMs, 
should focus on standby losses and products with a high potential for cost-effective 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  As a result, the Regulations24 adopted so far 
have focused primarily on energy use and there have been no implementing measures 
covering end of life impacts, with the possible exceptions of non-directional lighting which 
                                            
23 Decision No 1600/2002/EC laying down The Sixth Community Environment Action Programme sets 
environmental priorities in the following 4 areas: climate change, nature and biodiversity, environment and 
health and quality of life, natural resources and wastes. 
24 To date, 13 Eco-Design Regulations have been adopted under Directive 2009/125/EC.  These cover 
Electrical and electronic household and office equipment, External power supply units, Simple set top boxes, 
Non directional lighting, Tertiary lighting, Household refrigerating appliances, Electric motors, Glandless 
circulators, Fans, Air conditioners, Televisions, Household washing machines and Household dishwashers.  
They variously set requirements on power consumption, energy efficiency and provision of consumer 
information. 
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includes lamp lifetime (i.e. product durability) and tertiary lighting which includes lamp 
survival amongst the functionality requirements.   
It is possible that this may change in future given new stimulus from the recast WEEE 
Directive which states that “Ecodesign requirements facilitating the re-use, dismantling and 
recovery of WEEE should […] be laid down in the framework of measures implementing 
Directive 2009/125/EC.” 
3.3 RoHS Directive 2002/95/EC & 2011/65/EU 
Directive 2002/95/EC on the Restriction of the use of Hazardous Substances in electrical 
and electronic equipment (RoHS 1) came into force in February 2003.  It sets strict limit 
values for the presence of lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium and the flame 
retardants polybrominated biphenyls (PBB) and polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDE) in 
most categories of electrical and electronic equipment covered by the WEEE Directive.  A 
specified list of exemptions enables continued use of these substances in applications 
where no satisfactory alternative is available.   
According to the European Commission, “The [RoHS] legislation has prevented thousands 
of tonnes of banned substances from being disposed of and potentially released into the 
environment. It has led to important changes in product design in the European Union and 
worldwide, and has also served as a model for similar laws outside the European 
Economic Area.”25 
The original RoHS Directive will be repealed on 3 January 2013 and replaced by the new 
RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU (known as RoHS 2).  Key features of the RoHS recast are an 
expansion of scope to cover all electrical and electronic equipment (EEE), cables and 
spare parts, with a view to full compliance by 2019 and a review of the list of banned 
substances by July 2014, and periodically thereafter. The RoHS Recast Directive was 
published in the Official Journal on 1 July 2011. 
3.4 Landfill Tax 
Landfill Tax is payable on waste that is disposed of at landfills.  It aims to encourage waste 
producers to produce less waste and to recover more value from waste e.g. via recycling.  
Landfill Tax applies to all waste disposed of at a licensed landfill site on or after 1 October 
1996 unless the waste is specifically exempt.  The tax is charged by weight and there are 
two rates: (i) active waste (ii) inert or inactive waste.  The Tax is regulated by HM Revenue 
and Customs.   
Rates for 2012/13 are: 
    Active waste - £64/tonne (+VAT) 
                                            
25 European Commission press release, Fewer risks from hazardous substances in electrical and electronic 
equipment, 20/07/2011. 
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    Inert waste - £2.50/tonne (+VAT) 
The Government announced in the Budget 2010 that the rate for active waste will continue 
to escalate by £8 per year until at least 2014/15, when it will reach £80 per tonne.  There 
will be a floor under the active waste rate, so that the rate will not fall below £80 per tonne 
from 2014-15 to 2019-2026.  
3.5 Conclusions 
When examining the role of IPR within the WEEE Directive, it is helpful to be aware of (a) 
the high level context set by the Waste Framework Directive and (b) other legislation which 
affects the impact of electrical and electronic equipment at end of life e.g. the RoHS 
Directive and the Eco-Design Directive. 
The RoHS Directive has mandated significant reductions in the use of the specified 6 
substances within EEE with resulting impacts on end of life treatment.  In comparison, 
although there is scope within the framework of the Eco-Design Directive 2009/125/EC to 
address end of life (EOL) environmental impacts, to date it has focused on setting 
minimum requirements for energy consumption and energy efficiency.  However, its 
application to EOL impacts could be given new stimulus from the recast WEEE Directive 
which states that “Ecodesign requirements facilitating the re-use, dismantling and recovery 
of WEEE should be laid down in the framework of measures implementing 
Directive 2009/125/EC.” 
Sector experts are divided in their opinions on the policy interactions between IPR, the 
Eco-Design Directive and the RoHS Directive in Europe.  Some believe that incorporating 
IPR within the WEEE Directive in order to try to incentivise and achieve DfRR goals is 
ineffectual and inefficient27.  They propose instead that the RoHS Directive and Eco-
Design Directive should be the primary tools for mandating DfRR changes in those cases 
where sufficient environmental benefits can be demonstrated.  Conversely, others see 
these 3 key pieces of European legislation for EEE as working together in a 
complementary approach to achieve DfRR improvements.  In this scenario, IPR is the ‘pull’ 
or ‘carrot’ for early adopters and RoHS/Eco-Design the ‘push’ or ‘stick’ to eventually level 
the playing field as follows: 
 In cases where DfRR changes are justified (i.e. result in significant environmental 
benefits from a life cycle perspective) and achievable, the RoHS and Eco-Design 
Directives can be used to mandate minimum standards and raise the baseline 
performance of EEE on the EU market; 
 IPR is then used within the WEEE Directive to reward producers for DfRR changes 
and to incentivise markets to adopt DfRR changes which due to technology, cost, 
supply availability or other reasons cannot be mandated for all products on the 
market. 
                                            
26 Notice LFT1, A General Guide to Landfill Tax, HMRC, April 2011 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/downloadFile?contentID=HMCE_CL_000509 
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4 Evidence Review 
This section summaries the approach taken by the IPR Working Group 
to review existing evidence and case studies on IPR. 
4.1 The Review Process 
The IPR Working Group’s Terms of Reference state that the objectives of the Group are 
to: 
1.   Seek and obtain evidence (including relevant case studies) from a wide range of 
external stakeholders, including IPR experts about IPR systems and how they 
currently operate across the world.  
2.   Review the evidence (including any case studies) for IPR and consider how a 
system could work within the UK, to help meet Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive.  
3.   Bring forward recommendations for how IPR could be practically, realistically and 
fairly implemented in the UK. 
To fulfil the first two objectives, the following activities were undertaken:  
1. Evidence and opinions were gathered from Sector Experts via structured interviews 
(primarily phone or face to face) and from Stakeholders via written questionnaires; 
2. A desk based review of relevant literature covering: Country Case Studies, 
Academic Papers, Industry and NGO Reports, EU and UK Legislation. 
Interviews with Sector Experts and Stakeholder Questionnaires 
Beginning in 2010, structured interviews (primarily phone or face to face) were held with 
sector experts and written questionnaires were sent to producers and other stakeholders.   
The objective was to compile opinions and evidence by asking structured questions under 
the following key themes.  
 To investigate the commercial and environmental benefits of implementing IPR; 
 To identify the potential systems available to achieve IPR together with their 
advantages and disadvantages; 
 To identify what additional policy and/or regulatory measures and/or economic 
measures and/or mechanisms will be required to underpin IPR adoption in the UK; 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.   
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 To identify any operational issues that may arise if IPR was implemented in the UK.  
A further round of stakeholder questionnaires was undertaken in early 2012.   
The IPR WG would like to thank all stakeholders who provided input, which was invaluable 
in building this report.  
Desk Based Review 
A desk based review of relevant literature was undertaken which examined: Country Case 
Studies, Academic Papers, Industry and NGO Reports, EU and UK Legislation. 
The review process identified and assessed the key themes and challenges which 
frequently arise in the IPR debate.   
A number of countries or regions with experience of IPR type systems were identified for 
further research.  The IPR working Group looked in detail at: France, Germany, Austria 
and Sweden (see Annex A).  Relevant information on experiences in the Netherlands, 
Japan and the US States of Maine and Washington were also examined and are 
presented in Section 5. 
4.2 Key Studies and Initiatives 
There are a number of key research papers and reports on IPR.  These examine the 
complexities involved in implementing IPR and provide fuller details of country case 
studies than can be provided in this report.  They are recommended reading for those 
wishing to gain a deeper understanding of the issues although it should be stated that the 
IPR WG do not necessarily endorse or agree with all the information contained therein:  
 Lost in Transposition: a study of the implementation of IPR in the WEEE Directive, 
IIIEE, 2006.28 
 Where are WEEE now? Lessons from WEEE: Will EPR work for the US?  J. 
Huisman and F.Magalini, 2006.29 
 Extended Producer Responsibility: An examination of its impact on innovation and 
greening products, C Van Rossem, N Tojo, T Lindhqvist, IEEE for Greenpeace 
International, FoEE and EEB, 2006.30 
 The Producer Responsibility Principle of the WEEE Directive, Okopol, IIIEE and 
RPA for the European Commission, 2007.31   
                                            
28 Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2006/10/lost-in-
transposition.pdf 
29 Available at: http://www.weee-
forum.org/sites/default/files/documents/2006_where20are20weee20now_huisman.magalini1.pdf 
30 Available at: http://www.productpolicy.org/ppi/attachments/EPR-and-Eco-Design_2006.pdf 
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 Individual Producer Responsibility in the WEEE Directive: From theory to practice? 
Chris van Rossem, Doctoral dissertation IIIEE, 2008.32   
 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer 
Responsibility for the WEEE Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working 
Paper, 2010.33 
 Extended Producer Responsibility for E-Waste: Individual or Collective Producer 
Responsibility? Atalay Atasu & Ravi Subramanian, 201234 
Papers proposing possible new models include:  
 Developing a Practical Solution to the Implementation of Individual Producer 
Responsibility for the WEEE Directive in the UK published by ERP UK in December 
2007; 
 Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment through improved cost allocation, K. Mayers, R. Lifset. K. Bodenhoefer, 
and L. N. Wassenhove.  Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012; 
 Fair and Efficient Implementation of Product Take-Back Legislation with Collective 
Producer Responsibility, L. Gui, A. Atasu, O. Ergun, B. Toktay. Georgia Tech. 
Working Paper, 2012. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/final_rep_okopol.pdf 
32 Available at: http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1266797&fileOId=1266800 
33 Available at: http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
34 Forthcoming in Production and Operations Management, 2012.  Available at: 
http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~aatasu3/index_files/AS11.pdf 
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5 IPR within the context of existing 
WEEE systems 
This section provides an introduction to the different types of WEEE 
systems which exist in countries or regions around the world.  It 
provides a brief analysis of the extent to which these different systems 
incorporate IPR elements or provide incentives or rewards for DfRR.  
5.1 Types of WEEE Systems 
Following the evidence review, the IPR WG found it helpful to classify existing financing 
models for WEEE as follows:  
 Market Share Approaches 
 Return Share Approaches 
 Payment for Own WEEE - ‘Pure’ IPR 
 Hybrid Approaches 
It is important to understand that: 
 Every system has unique features and there are no official or definitive means of 
classifying or grouping WEEE models; and 
 Some options described below are theoretical and have not been tested in practice.    
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5.2 Market Share Approach 
Under a market share approach, the costs of WEEE arising in the waste stream are paid 
for by producers currently putting products on the market.  The costs of WEEE arising are 
allocated between the producers currently active on the market using their market share 
percentage.  Producers who previously had a large percentage of the market but have 
subsequently lost market share, have the benefit of not remaining responsible for legacy 
costs when their share shrinks.  The current WEEE system for household WEEE in the UK 
(as well as Germany, Sweden, Austria and France detailed in Annex A) is an example of a 
market share approach.     
How is financial responsibility allocated? 
The amount of the relevant WEEE for which each producer is responsible is calculated 
as follows: 
(A ÷ B) x C = D 
Where: 
 ‘A’ is the total amount of EEE put on the market by producer x within a particular 
product category over the specified compliance period; 
 ‘B’ is the total amount of EEE put on the market by all producers within a particular 
product category over the specified compliance period; 
 ‘C’ is the total amount in tonnes of WEEE arising within the relevant product 
category; 
 ‘D’ is the total amount of WEEE that producer x must pay for within the relevant 
product category. 
 
IPR elements and incentives for DfRR 
In a typical market share system there are few DfRR incentives.  Producers currently 
active on the market pay for mixed brand WEEE arising using a standard cost per tonne 
(or per unit) for all products within the same product category.  The only potential incentive 
is to design more lightweight products as the market share ratio is usually calculated 
based on weight of products sold. 
Modified market share systems can introduce additional DfRR incentives.  A key example 
of this is the French bonus/malus system whereby mandated surcharges/reductions are 
applied to the producers’ costs by their PCS based on the specified DfRR features of the 
products being POM.  Further details of the French system are provided in Annex A. 
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5.3 Return Share Approach 
Under a return share approach, producer responsibility is based on the share of each 
producer’s products arising in the waste stream.  Producers pay for a proportion of WEEE 
arising based on the number or weight of own brand products within that WEEE arising.  
This can be identified either via: 
 brand sampling undertaken in accordance with agreed protocols; 
 full brand counting (where brands are identified in all WEEE arising on a continuous 
basis). 
Brand sorting (where brands are identified in all WEEE arising and separated to enable 
producers to take direct physical responsibility for treatment) can be added onto brand 
counting systems on an optional or mandatory basis.  A return share system with full brand 
counting, mandatory brand sorting and a robust financial guarantee requirement to 
minimise the number of orphan WEEE becomes a ‘Full IPR’ approach as all producers 
would be fully paying for their own WEEE. 
How is financial responsibility allocated? 
Applying return share using brand sampling, the amount of the relevant WEEE for which 
each producer is responsible is calculated as follows: 
(A ÷ B) x C = D 
Where: 
 ‘A’ is the total amount of WEEE bearing the brand name(s) of producer x within a 
particular product category.  This is identified via sampling a representative amount 
of WEEE; 
 ‘B’ is the total amount of WEEE arising within a particular product category during 
the sampling process; 
 ‘C’ is the total amount in tonnes of WEEE arising within the relevant product category 
during the specified compliance period; 
 ‘D’ is the total amount of WEEE that producer x must pay for within the relevant 
product category during the specified compliance period. 
 
IPR elements and incentives for DfRR 
All return share systems which are based on weight give a direct incentive to producers to 
reduce individual product weight and increase product longevity (i.e. product lifespan) 
since payment is dependent on these variables (and obviously the number of products 
placed on the market).  Both these factors would reduce the costs paid by the producer by 
reducing the weight of own brand products appearing in the waste stream.  A return share 
system may also have the perhaps unintended consequence of incentivising lower return 
rates in systems where this factor can be influenced by producers. 
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A major criticism of return share systems implemented to date is that they typically make 
no distinction between the costs of treating different branded products.  Producers usually 
pay a flat fee per tonne of a specific product category and hence there are no further DfRR 
incentives.  No distinction is made between the different properties of products within a 
particular product category when treatment costs are allocated.  This is not necessarily 
insurmountable.  It could be possible to incorporate different charges to producers based 
on product properties which result in lower treatment and recycling costs but it would add 
another layer of complexity to the sampling and calculations.  The IPR WG has not 
identified any actual examples of return share systems which apply differentiated costs 
within a product category based on product properties.   
A return share system with full brand counting and the option for producers to separate 
their own brand WEEE would give full access to potential DfRR paybacks to those 
producers who selected brand sorting and separate treatment35.  These producers would 
benefit from the real costs of treating products with different product properties but may 
suffer from reduced economies of scale.  An example of this approach is provided by 
Maine in the USA.   
Maine’s Electronic Waste (E Waste) Law 
Scope 
Maine was the first US State to introduce producer responsibility for end of life EEE.  
The requirements were fully implemented in 2006 and were subject to further changes in 
2011.The scope of the legislation has been broadened  and now includes computer 
monitors, TVs, desktop printers, video game consoles (used with monitors/TVs) and 
computers and some other devices including screens over 4”. Maine introduced a 
separate programme for mobile phones in 2008. 
The manufacturer /brand owner of the equipment is responsible for the costs of handling 
and recycling the waste equipment. Manufacturers have to register with the State 
Government and declare both current and historic brands, weight and number of 
products sold. There is a requirement for all equipment to be clearly marked with a 
visible, permanent label clearly identifying the manufacturer.  
The requirements were introduced in parallel to a ban on landfilling of CRTs and a ban 
on retailers from selling equipment from non-compliant manufacturers. The State 
publishes a list of brands that must not be retailed in Maine on their website. 
(www.maine.gov/dep/waste/ewaste/documents/donotsell.pdf) 
 
Financing Collection and Recycling 
Householders and small businesses are responsible for bringing their e-waste to a 
municipal collection site and can be charged a small fee. Equipment is transferred by the 
municipality to one of 10 consolidators which are approved by the State Government.  
The costs for handling and recycling waste equipment are calculated either by return or 
                                            
35 Note, however, there is an issue regarding the timing of payback (immediate vs delayed) which is 
discussed in Section 2.4 
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market share according to the product. Originally the system operated only on a return 
share basis. 
 Return Share: Manufacturers of monitors and desktop printers are invoiced for 
according to their actual products in the waste stream plus any orphan products. This 
is calculated through brand counting and weighing of each unit (not sorting) by the 
consolidators. 
 Market Share: TVs and video game console manufacturers’ costs are determined 
according to their market share and the total weight per waste shipment of 
televisions and game consoles.  
 
In the case of return share products, manufacturers have the option of consolidators 
separating and storing their waste products, and then taking responsibility for the 
transporting and recycling of their waste from the consolidator. Under this option, 
manufacturers are invoiced by the consolidators for the initial transportation and 
handling, and the manufacturer arranges for and pays the additional transportation to 
their selected recycler and the recycling.   
Those manufacturers who choose to separate and treat their own brand WEEE are 
effectively following a ‘Full IPR’ approach (see below).  Currently, 13 manufacturers 
have chosen this route36.  There are no requirements for individual producers to have 
financial guarantees37. 
 Market share data for TVs, video games consoles as well as the orphan product share 
(for return share manufacturers) is calculated and published by the State. 38  
  
                                            
36 See: http://www.maine.gov/dep/waste/ewaste/documents/option1mfrs112811.pdf 
37 INSEAD IPR Network, P. 35.  According to the Maine Dept of Environmental Protection, Pers Comm, May 
2012: When a trademark owner goes through a bankruptcy which results in termination of liability, this 
creates orphan waste which is then assumed by all other registered trademark owners in the E waste 
recycling program.  The exception to termination of liabilities under bankruptcy is when the assets including 
intellectual properties come out of bankruptcy “whole” to a new company then liabilities are not terminated 
but transferred to the new company. 
38 http://www.maine.gov/dep/waste/ewaste/manufacturers.html 
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5.4 Payment for Own WEEE - ‘Full IPR’  
As the names suggests, this category covers a range of options whereby producers only 
pay for their own WEEE and the costs paid reflect the EOL costs for their own particular 
products.  These may be front-end (where producers pay at the point of placing EEE on 
the market) or back-end (where producers pay at the point of WEEE arising): 
Figure 5.1:  Diagram to illustrate ‘front-end’ versus ‘back-end’ financing under IPR 
            
Adapted from: Individual Producer Responsibility: Principle vs Practical Implementation, C van Rossem, 
200939 
There are several options for implementing a ‘Full IPR’ approach, for example: 
1) A return share system using full brand identification and sorting.  WEEE is 
deposited at collective collection points and all products are identified by brand.  
Products are then separated by brand and producers are responsible for organising 
the treatment of their brand(s) either individually or in collaborative groups. 
2) Producers are made individually responsible for organising take-back systems for 
their own brand(s) and funding the treatment of their own brand products collected.  
These requirements can be fulfilled either individually or in collaborative groups.  
There are no local authority collection points for all brands.  
3) Producers WEEE costs are calculated based on 2 elements: (a) each item of EEE 
that is placed on the market and the allocated cost/revenue associated with 
collecting/treating/recycling that particular item of EEE; and (b) a charge associated 
with the historic WEEE arising funded on a collective basis according to the 
collection category.  Thus producers pay for current products POM on an individual 
upfront basis and for historical WEEE on a collective basis. The PCS will hold these 
funds as a ‘stakeholder’ and access them when meeting the cost of collection, 
treatment, recovery and recycling of WEEE arising.  Any shortfall between monies 
                                            
39 See p.8 http://www.canadianstewardship.com/2009presdownloads/7vanRossemCanadianStewardship.pdf 
IPR Working Group Report 
 
28 
 
collected versus the WEEE arising costs would need to be covered by an additional 
levy.  The collective collection system (e.g. Local Authority DCFs) could remain40. 
Back-end financing, as illustrated in examples 1 and 2 above, are well established within 
the research literature as a form of ‘Pure IPR’; the Japanese systems for PCs and 
Household Appliances are the most frequently cited examples.  Front-end financing forms 
of ‘Full IPR’ are a more recent concept and no examples of these systems have been 
implemented in practice to our knowledge. There are some variations specific to the 
lighting sector.  
Japanese Law for Recycling of Specified Kinds of Home Appliances (HARL) 
In Japan, the policy goal is social equality and ecological efficiency. The purpose is to 
shift the responsibility for the recycling and disposal of home appliances from local 
governments to producers. HARL in Japan required about 200 collection points for each 
producer group to be set up initially around the nation to provide equality of access to 
consumers. Financial responsibility is not the direct responsibility of producers. Instead, 
consumers pay a fee at the point of disposal and this fee is the same throughout Japan. 
Scope 
The Japanese WEEE system covers a limited number of household products namely air 
conditioning units, refrigerators, TVs, washing machines and clothes dryers. There is a 
separate similar system for personal computers (PCs) although this is a voluntary safety 
net program. In reality, most used PC’s are bought and sold on the secondary market. 
 
The system has been operation since 2001 and its scope was originally established to 
capture those waste products which: 
 were considered to be economically feasible to recycle;  
 were traditionally sold through retailers; 
 were considered well-suited to design for recycling initiatives; and 
 at the time (late 1990’s) had limited or no recycling channels.. 
 
Collection and Recycling 
Consumers pay a fee at the point of disposal for all products. The fee ranges from 
around £14 to £38/product. The fee is set by the product manufacturers and the 
collection is predominately undertaken by retailers. The waste equipment is transferred 
to one of 379 consolidation centres where equipment is separated by individual brands 
or groups of brands.  The equipment is transferred to one of 49 recycling plants with the 
aim that producers take back their own product for recycling. In practice, producers have 
organised themselves into two Groups. 
 Group A consisting of Toshiba Corporation, Panasonic Corporation, and other 
                                            
40 This model is based on that outlined in K. Mayers, R. Lifset. K. Bodenhoefer, and L. N. Wassenhove. 
Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment through 
improved cost allocation. Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012. 
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companies; and 
 Group B consisting of Sharp Corporation, Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd., Sony Corporation, 
Hitachi Appliances, Inc., Fujitsu General Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, and 
other companies. 
Each manufacturer originally aimed to operate at least one treatment plant themselves 
with the objective of (a) collecting information to inform the design functions and (b) 
identifying the costs of recycling.  The manufacturers now share facilities including third 
party recyclers41. There are no collection targets, but manufacturers have to meet 
specific recycling targets for each type of product.  A major factor which influenced the 
decision to introduce a consumer disposal fee was the handling of orphan and historic 
products. These unidentifiable products are separated out and handled by ‘designated 
corporations’. 
 
Future Developments. 
Japan's Environment Ministry is currently developing a plan to recycle more rare earth 
metals from small sized electric and electronic products. Japan is keen to reduce it’s 
reliance on imports of rare earth metals required for its manufacturing sector.  The 
proposals include establishing a licensing system for companies to collect materials for 
recycling as opposed to introducing mandatory end-of-life product requirements. The 
aim is to finance the programme through the value of recovered metals from specific 
compact digital ‘gadgets’ namely: mobile phones, game players, portable CD/MD 
players, portable digital audio players, digital cameras, automobile navigation systems, 
video cameras and DVD players.  
 
                                            
41 http://panasonic.net/eco/petec/qanda/#Q01 
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5.5 Hybrid WEEE Systems  
The 3 categories outlined above do not have to be mutually exclusive; hybrid models are 
possible which combine approaches.  For example, the default system may be based on 
market share but producers may be able to opt for return share on either an individual 
producer or product category basis42.  Alternatively, the default system may be based on 
return share but apply an adjustment/weighting mechanism to reflect the processing cost 
differentials between products or other factors43.  In another combination, a return share 
system may give producers the choice to opt for collective collection and treatment based 
on a flat fee for all products within the category or to separate out their own brand products 
and organise treatment themselves.  An actual example of a hybrid approach is the E 
Cycle system in Washington: 
Electronic Product Recycling Program - Chapter 173-900 WAC (E Cycle 
Washington) 
Scope 
The Washington E Cycle programme scope is (like in many US states) restricted to TVs 
and some IT equipment namely monitors, screens and computers. Washington and its 
neighbouring State of Oregon operate very similar programmes. 
In Washington, manufacturers must register with the State, pay an administrative fee 
and participate in an approved recycling plan in order to be able to sell products in 
Washington. Retailers must not sell equipment from unregistered manufacturers. 
Manufacturers automatically become participants of the Standard Plan unless they 
develop an Independent Plan. Manufacturers can establish an independent plan either 
alone or with others if their combined return share is over 5%. The legislation places 
restrictions on the ability of white box manufacturers to employ an Independent Plan. 
 The ‘standard plan’ is named the Washington Materials Management and Financing 
Authority (WMMFA) and has a board of directors including five electronic 
manufacturer representatives who oversee the programme- appointed by the State.  
 In 2009, there were no independent plans – all manufacturers joined the standard 
plan. Two applications were submitted for operation in 2010, but these were rejected. 
 
Financing Collection and Recycling 
Similarly to Oregon, there is a requirement to have staffed collection services in all 
towns with a population over 10,000.  Manufacturers are required to contribute, through 
their plan, to the costs incurred by municipalities for these waste collection activities.   
In addition, the WMMFA is responsible for covering all administrative and operational 
costs associated with the transportation and recycling of their participating 
manufacturers’ equivalent share of covered electronic products sold in Washington (at 
                                            
42 Developing a Practical Solution to the Implementation of Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive in the UK, ERP UK, December 2007 
43 Fair and Efficient Implementation of Product Take-Back Legislation with Collective Producer 
Responsibility, L. Gui, A. Atasu, O. Ergun, B. Toktay. Georgia Tech. Working Paper, 2012. 
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present 100% as no independent plans are operational). 
  The WMMFA decides how subsequently to charge its members and has selected a 
mechanism based on a combination of market share and return share (50:50 market to 
return in 2009). However this is scheduled to revert to 100% market share mechanism 
over time, this process should be complete by 2016. Within the WMMFA, members can 
choose to collect and recycle their own waste themselves (known as a flex participant). 
These participants benefit from reduced standard plan operating costs. 
Market share data is based on the weight of electronic products sold in Washington 
State. Return share is based on a manufacturer's percentage, by weight, of identified 
brands of covered electronic products returned for recycling.  The State is required to 
determine the return share for each manufacturer. 
 
Practicalities of Return Share Calculations. 
In Washington, return share is determined through sampling events at recyclers 
throughout the year. These samples provide data on the type, weight and brand owner 
of the products returned for recycling.  In 2011, 34 sampling events were conducted. At 
those events, over 11,900 TVs, monitors and computers were randomly sampled and 
the data on each unit was recorded for use in determining return share by manufacturer.  
In 2011, orphan products were calculated at 8.62%. 
 
5.6 Moving towards IPR 
As discussed previously, at its essence IPR means that producers are made individually 
responsible for their own products at end of life.  This responsibility can be purely financial 
or financial and physical.  Take-back systems may be individual or collectively organised.  
Figure 5.2:  Steps to IPR According to IPR Works  
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Traditionally within the literature, the move towards a ‘Pure IPR’ WEEE system has been 
seen as a linear progression starting with market share allocation, moving through return 
share systems and resulting in the ultimate goal whereby producers organise their own 
recycling of own brand products. 
Figure 5.3:  Examples of EPR Programmes and their IPR Elements 
                                                        
Source: IPR: Principle vs Practical Implementation, C van Rossem, 200944  
More recently this has been questioned, as some experts have rejected the linear 
framework.  They argue that a return share system which allocates producers WEEE costs 
based on the proportion of their own brand WEEE arising but charges a flat fee per tonne 
of a specific product category (i) does little to achieve the DfRR goals of IPR and (ii) 
should not be viewed as a stepping stone or part of a linear relationship to a single ‘pure 
IPR’ goal based on own recycling of own brand products.   
This has resulted in the development of alternative approaches which move away from a 
‘purist’ form of IPR and focus on the aim of financially rewarding producers for products 
which carry environmental benefits at end of life and/or lower treatment costs without 
necessarily requiring any intervention at the point of collection.  These approaches follow 
the principle that the WEEE costs paid by producers should reflect the attributes of the 
products they are POM (i) based on specified product properties e.g. technology or 
material composition rather than brand and (ii) via front end payment i.e. the financial 
benefit or penalty should be incurred when placing the product on the market to give 
immediate rather than delayed payback.  A simplified and limited example of this principle 
is the French bonus/malus applied to a market share system.  A fuller example is the 
model developed by Kieren Mayers et al45. 
                                            
44 See p.7 http://www.canadianstewardship.com/2009presdownloads/7vanRossemCanadianStewardship.pdf 
45 Some further details of this model are given in Section 4.  Source: K. Mayers, R. Lifset. K. Bodenhoefer, 
and L. N. Wassenhove. Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment through improved cost allocation. Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
The IPR WG found it helpful to classify existing financing models for WEEE as follows:  
 Market Share Approaches 
 Return Share Approaches 
 Payment for Own WEEE - ‘Full IPR’ 
 Hybrid Approaches. 
These approaches are explained in order to refer to the different ‘types’ of WEEE system.  
Relevant case studies are given from France, the USA and Japan as examples of each 
approach. However, it should be highlighted that: 
 Whilst the categories are useful, there is no single, universally recognised 
framework for categorising WEEE systems based on IPR; 
 Within each approach several variants are possible and these can significantly 
affect the level of incentive or reward for DfRR provided by a specific approach; 
 The 3 categories do not have to be mutually exclusive, hybrid models are 
possible which combine approaches e.g. an opt in / opt out basis.  For example, 
the default system may be based on market share but producers may be able to 
opt for return share on either an individual producer or product category basis; 
 The 3 categories are based on existing examples of WEEE systems which 
incorporate IPR elements.  They do not necessarily cover all possible solutions 
and should not restrict the development of other approaches; 
 There are not, to date, any blueprints for the ‘ideal’ IPR system which meets 
Article 8.2, provides significant incentives/rewards for DfRR, is easy and 
practical to implement, and can be transferred to other markets transcending 
cultural differences in consumer behaviour. 
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6 Challenges Facing IPR 
Approaches in Europe 
Implementing any IPR approach for WEEE faces a series of challenges. 
Some challenges are common to all IPR systems, whereas 
implementing IPR in EU Member States needs to consider and meet the 
requirements of the WEEE Directive.  
6.1 Key Challenges 
The Product Policy Institute sums it up well in their observation that “EPR is simple in 
concept, but complex in execution”46, the same statement can be applied to IPR in the 
context of the European WEEE Directive. 
This section outlines the key challenges facing any IPR approach for WEEE in the EU.  
These have been identified as: 
 Product Scope 
 Product and Collection Categories 
 Collection Targets 
 Historic versus New WEEE 
 Definition of Producer 
 Producer marking & Brand Identification 
 Financial Guarantees 
 Accruals 
A summary is provided at the end of this section. 
 
                                            
46 http://www.productpolicy.org/content/epr-issues 
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6.2 Product Scope 
The scope of the WEEE Directive is extremely broad compared to any other WEEE 
legislation globally.  Experience in the USA shows that different models (market share or 
return share) can be applied to different product categories within the same scheme.  In 
Japan, different systems are used for PCs compared to home appliances and a new 
system is being planned for small ICT products.  The following box explains the scope of 
the WEEE Directive and the resulting challenges it poses for IPR. 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Scope 
The current WEEE Directive applies to 10 product 
categories:  
1. Large household appliances;  
2. Small household appliances;  
3. IT & Telecomms equipment;  
4. Consumer equipment;  
5. Lighting equipment;  
6. Electrical & Electronic Tools; 
7. Toys, Leisure & Sports equipment; 
8. Medical Devices;  
9. Monitoring & Control Instruments; 
10. Automatic Dispensers. 
Under the WEEE recast, after 6 years the scope 
will cover 6 product categories on an ‘open’ scope 
basis:  
 Temperature Exchange Equipment;  
 Screens & Monitors;  
 Lamps; 
 Other Large;  
 Small ICT; 
 Other Small. 
The scope of the WEEE Directive 
is broader than any other WEEE 
legislation globally.  The products 
and their market conditions vary 
considerably.   
As it is possible to meet Article 8.2 
requirements via a variety of 
systems, is it appropriate to apply 
a single financial allocation model 
to all WEEE or could variants be 
used per product category?  What 
scope is there for flexibility to allow 
different compliance routes? 
 Should a new system be phased 
in targeting the most appropriate 
product categories first? 
 
This leads to the question, is a single system appropriate for all products covered by the 
WEEE Directive?  Given: 
(a) the different characteristics of electronic products in terms of composition, weight, 
product lifetime and possible trade-offs between improving environmental impacts 
at end of life and overall product environmental impact. 
(b) the different market factors e.g. number of producers within a product category, the 
nature of those producers – long term brand owners with short supply chains versus 
importers with rapidly changing brands and long supply chains, stable product 
categories versus those experiencing rapid convergence or expansion.  
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For example: 
- A return share system will be most suitable for product categories with a limited 
number of major dominant brands.  It will be more difficult to implement for products 
dominated by multiple, changing brands and small physical product size e.g. toys.   
- A system where producers are required to, or have the option to, establish their own 
take-back service is easier for smaller, lightweight products which can be returned 
via a postal or courier system.  
- Introducing a return share system for a product category once dominated by a 
single brand but now shared more equally by multiple brands could place a heavy 
and unexpected burden on the once dominant producer.  
- In a system based on differential charges by product properties (e.g. technology 
and material composition) rather than brand, there may be some product categories 
with clear points of differentiation and others where products are relatively 
homogenous. 
Clearly Article 8.2 should be fulfilled for all forms of new WEEE from private households if 
the UK’s WEEE system is to be in full compliance with the Directive.  However, as 
illustrated in the previous chapter, there are several options which meet the Article 8.2 
requirement such as a return share system with full brand counting and optional or 
mandatory separation; a return share system with differential treatment charges; or a front 
end financing option based on forecasted costs of treatment.     
Is it appropriate to apply a single financial allocation model to all WEEE or could variants 
be used per product category?  Would multiple systems create too much complexity in 
terms of administration and enforcement?  What scope is there for flexibility to allow 
different compliance routes?  Should a new system be phased in, targeting the most 
appropriate product categories first?  These are all questions to consider. 
 
The Experts’ View 
Atalay Atasu interview:  
 If recycling/processing costs are not differentiable between brand names within a 
category, there is no need for IPR; 
 In Maine different categories use different systems based on manufacturers’ 
choice.  Allowing producers to choose lets them play to their benefits. 
Chris van Rossem interview:  
Some product groups are more suitable for return share than others:   
 Products requiring manual disassembly are good candidates e.g. CRT and cooling 
- they are separately managed so easier to identify;  
 ICT is highly suitable for IPR as many manufacturers support it (i) partly driven by 
the potential value (ii) it is also a very competitive sector. 
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The Experts’ View 
Huisman & Magalini interview:  
 Producers may want IPR for some categories and not others based on potential 
benefits.  This would be very complicated.  Multiple systems lead to overlap 
between them and examples of good and bad practice - you need to reward good 
practice and avoid free riding; 
 Multiple systems would not work in a small Member State, economies of scale are 
getting ok around 20M inhabitants served [so] should be ok in the UK. 
 
6.3 Product and Collection Categories 
Product categories are important because in a market share or simple return share system 
they are the primary cost differentiator.  Typically producers are charged a flat fee per 
tonne within a product category.  This can lead to significant discrepancies depending on 
how the product categories are set.  
The following box describes the product and collection categories used in the current UK 
system and the resulting implications for IPR. 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Product & Collection Categories 
UK Producers are currently required to report the 
weight of EEE placed on the UK market using the 10 
EEE categories set out in the WEEE Directive plus 
display equipment, cooling appliances and gas 
discharge lamps.  This gives a total of 13 reporting 
categories.   
In contrast, WEEE in the UK is usually collected at 
DCFs in 5 collection categories: Cold (e.g. 
refrigerators, air conditioning units), Display (e.g. 
TVs, monitors), LDA (Large Domestic Appliances e.g. 
washing machines), Mixed WEEE, and Lighting . 
Note that under the WEEE recast, the current 10 
product categories will be revised after 6 years to 6 
product categories: Temperature Exchange 
Equipment; Screens & Monitors; Lamps; Other Large; 
Small ICT; Other Small. 
Product categories are an 
important tool for data reporting 
and differentiating compliance 
fees.   
The more homogeneous the 
product category in terms of 
materials and treatment costs, 
the closer the match is likely to 
be between actual end of life 
costs for a particular product 
and fees charged by 
compliance schemes for that 
product category. 
 
The implications of category definition can be explained using the example of mobile 
phones. Waste mobile phones typically have a very high value and are within WEEE 
Category 3: IT and Telecommunications Equipment which includes printers, laptops, 
copiers and desk based phones.  If mobile phone producers are charged a flat fee per 
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tonne covering Category 3, their WEEE costs are significantly higher than if these 
producers are charged based on a separate product category for mobile phones47.   
Another example is cold appliances many of which are  more expensive to treat than other 
LDA due to the presence of oil and refrigerants.  In the UK, cold appliances collected and 
reported separately from the Large Household Appliances category specified in the WEEE 
Directive..  This means that the non-cold LDAs do not pay an artificially inflated cost due to 
the presence of cold appliances.  The more homogeneous the product category in terms of 
materials and treatment costs, the closer the match is between actual end of life costs for 
a particular product and fees charged by compliance schemes for that product category.   
Creating narrower product categories within a market share system is one way of trying to 
close the gap between the costs paid by producers and the actual costs of collecting and 
treating a particular product.  However, under a market share system creating narrower 
product categories can cause problems if applied to products going through rapid product 
convergence as there are then insufficient current producers placing products on the 
market within that category to fund the WEEE arising.48   
This problem is avoided within a return share system and narrower product categories can 
be applied to return share even down to a category sub-set. This assumes that the subset 
can be easily identified and counted or separated e.g. displays can be divided into CRTs 
versus Flat panel.  For product categories where this applies, sub-sets can be mandated 
within a return share system and this would arguably go some way to meeting Article 8.2 
of the WEEE Directive without obliging producers to treat their own brand WEEE 
separately.  
The Experts’ View 
Atalay Atasu interview:  
 Volume based systems (such as market share or return share) without cost 
differentiation between product categories will not work.   
Atasu, Van Wassenhove & Sarvary in Efficient Take-Back Legislation 2009:  
 Referring to the current WEEE Directive, “Because the classification of product 
categories and selection of targets are not related to any environmental impact 
measure but weight, most producers state that they do not have an incentive to 
increase the environmental friendliness of their products, and therefore do not 
invest in environmental designs.” 
 Kieren Mayers interview and pers. comm:  
 "A flaw of the original WEEE directive was that the product categories were too 
broad; they did not reflect how WEEE is collected or recycled in practice. With a 
                                            
47 Redesigning the Camel: the European WEEE Directive, K. Mayers et al, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 
2011.  P. 5. 
48 Furthermore applying narrower product categories within a market share system without financial 
guarantees increases the risk of a major player withdrawing from the market and the remaining producers 
being unable to bear the costs. 
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The Experts’ View 
change to only 5 collection-related categories, the current WEEE revision will do 
little to address this shortcoming. Compliance schemes presently charge 
producers average collection and treatment costs for a mixture of unsimilar 
products and brands. As a direct consequence, producer responsibility for WEEE 
within the EU cannot create financial incentives for producers to design their 
products so that they are easier to treat and recycle at end-of-life. With better 
categorisation and allocation costs, compliance schemes could address this 
problem and charge producers more representative fees." 
 
6.4 Collection Targets 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Collection Targets 
The existing collection target is set at 4kg on average per 
inhabitant per year of separately collected WEEE from 
private households.  Under the recast WEEE Directive, 
targets for separately collected WEEE will apply to both 
household and non-household WEEE and will increase as 
follows: 
 Before 2016, each Member State shall ensure that it 
achieves the target of 4kg per capita or the same amount 
of WEEE in weight as an average of the weight that was 
collected over the three preceding years, whichever is 
greater; 
 After four years, the target will be 45% POM calculated 
on the basis of the total weight of WEEE separately 
collected in a given year in the MS, expressed as a 
percentage of the average weight of EEE placed on the 
market in the three preceding years in the MS; 
 After seven years, this target will change to either 65% of 
EEE POM in the 3 preceding years or alternatively 85% 
of WEEE generated in the MS; 
 MS may set more ambitious separate collection rates; 
 Within 3 years, the Commission will examine the 
possibility for setting individual collection rates for 
specified product categories, particularly temperature 
exchange equipment, photovoltaic panels, small 
equipment, including small IT and telecommunication 
equipment and for lamps containing mercury. 
Any changes to the 
current system will need 
to ensure that high levels 
of collection are achieved 
in line with the targets. 
A new approach could be 
considered which sets 
producers’ WEEE 
obligations based initially 
on a 45% POM basis. 
 
The primary implication for any future UK WEEE system is that it will have to meet the 
collection targets.  These could be applied separately to household and non-household 
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WEEE as long as the combined target is met.  Similarly the target can be applied to all 
product categories equally or targets could be varied per category as long as the 
combined target is met.   
This raises the question would some types of IPR system have a negative impact on 
collection rates?  Expert opinion is divided and analysis would have to occur on a case by 
case basis.  Any changes to the current UK collection system for household WEEE, which 
is primarily based on local authority managed DCFs accepting multiple brands for all 
relevant product categories, raises concerns amongst some stakeholders that collection 
rates will decrease.  However, the overall conclusions are that: 
 Some IPR approaches would require no changes to the current collection system.  
Many stakeholders confuse IPR with requiring individual take-back systems which is 
not always the case; 
 An IPR system which removes multi-brand collection points such as the current 
DCFs and provides only one route for returning each brand would be likely to 
reduce collection rates for most products unless end-user incentives were provided; 
 Arguably collection rates will be maximised either by having multiple, easily 
accessible collection channels i.e. a combination of return options for any one 
product or by having fewer routes but with user-incentives to return products.  
The Experts’ View 
IPR INSEAD Network49: 
 Case study data from the Japanese Home Appliance Recycling Law (HARL) for 
2001 – 2006 states that “the collection system is close to meeting the WEEE target 
of the EU of 4kg/capita/year … It should be noted that Japanese home appliances 
are generally lighter than those of their European counterparts … [and] that the 
total units handled through the producer schemes is estimated to be just over 50% 
of the total waste units arising.”   
 Case study information on the Bosch led take-back system for power tools in 
Germany, a return share system based on brand counting states that “Since WEEE 
collected at municipal collection sites in Category 5, is a mixed batch of product 
types with varying recycling cost structures, the cost to manage this WEEE is 
higher than purer streams of primarily tools collected from retailers, businesses and 
service centres.  This provides a business case for producers to become engaged 
in individual collection efforts in order to collect less mixed WEEE from 
municipalities.  This may lead to increased total tonnages of WEEE collected in a 
country”. 
                                            
49 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010, p. 26 and p. 45.  
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
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The Experts’ View 
Kieren Mayers50:  
 “UNU study claims that collection rates [under an IPR system] would be reduced 
as: Increased collection % has increased costs, whereas each individual producer 
would therefore be incentivised to reduce collection rate.  This is not demonstrated 
by examples we may consider IPR to date, such as Japanese and Bosch systems, 
where equivalent collection rates are achieved … IPR is often a feature that 
producers actively finance and market in addition to their collective scheme 
obligations”  
Atasu, Van Wassenhove & Sarvary51:  
 Based on manufacturer quotes, they assume in their model that if manufacturers 
collect directly from individuals, this would lead to scale diseconomies in collection 
costs (i.e. higher unit collection cost as collection volume increases) whereas 
collection from public collection centres would imply a constant per unit collection 
cost. 
 
A secondary implication of the new collection targets in the WEEE recast is the possibility 
to delegate these down to producer level.  Calculating producers’ obligated tonnages 
based on specified collection targets (percentage POM over previous 3 years) could be 
used as an alternative to the current market share system.  This new approach would set 
producers’ WEEE tonnage obligations based on a percentage POM designed to meet the 
overall collection target set in the WEEE recast.  Different targets could be set for different 
product categories and increase over time, as long as the overall collection target set in 
the recast is met (initially 45% POM).  The percentage POM collection targets would need 
to be applied separately to each EEE category, otherwise producers of costly to recycle 
product categories might meet their tonnage through financing only the lowest cost WEEE 
categories.  
This approach would need to consider a range of issues e.g. how to finance any remaining 
WEEE collected at DCFs once each producer had met their finite obligated tonnage, how 
to calculate obligated tonnages for new entrants to the market, whether to require 
individual financial guarantees in order to cover producers who withdraw from the market 
and how to apply the target to B2C versus B2B tonnages52.  From an IPR perspective, it is 
not an IPR approach in itself.  However, an obligated tonnage calculation based on 
percentage POM could be considered a step towards IPR compared to market share, and 
could potentially provide a baseline on top of which additional IPR mechanisms could be 
added. 
 
                                            
50 Kieren Mayers, Geodis UK, Strategic Concerns - Challenges to implementation and criteria for IPR 
systems presentation, 24.01.2008 
51 Atasu, Van Wassenhove & Sarvary: Efficient Take-Back Legislation 2009, p. 254 
52 There is no distinction between household and non-household WEEE within the collection target set in the 
WEEE recast.  However, if a percentage POM calculation was used to set obligated tonnages at producer 
level some distinction would probably be required to ensure that B2C WEEE was adequately financed. 
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6.5 Historic versus New WEEE 
As explained in Chapter 1.2, Article 8 of the WEEE Directive sets different financing 
requirements for ‘new’ and ‘historic’ WEEE from private households.  
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Distinction between ‘New’ and ‘Historic’ WEEE 
Products put on the market before 13/08/2005 are 
termed ‘historic’ WEEE.  For the purposes of this 
report, products put on the market after 13/08/2005 
are termed ‘new’ WEEE.  Article 8 of the WEEE 
Directive specifies an IPR financing model for ‘new’ 
WEEE and a CPR financing model for ‘historic’ 
WEEE. 
In order to enable physical identification of ‘new’ 
WEEE, Article 11(2) of the original WEEE Directive 
and Article 15(2) of the WEEE recast require Member 
States to ensure that producers apply a mark to all 
relevant EEE indicating that it was placed on the 
market after 13 August 2005.  Preferably the 
European Standard EN 50419 shall be applied for 
this purpose.53 
 
The challenge is to incorporate 
two financing mechanisms, one 
based on CPR for historic 
WEEE and one on IPR for new 
WEEE.  
For some product categories 
with shorter lifespans, the 
amount of historic WEEE 
arising may be negligible and a 
single financing mechanism 
based on IPR may now suffice.  
For products such as LDA this 
is not yet likely to be the case. 
 
The INSEAD IPR Network54 proposes 2 possible solutions to this issue:  
1. Apply CPR financing to historic WEEE and IPR financing to new WEEE using the 
product marking to physically differentiate between the two.  It is pointed out that 
this could be ‘challenging’; 
2. Use sampling to identify the point in time at which a particular product category is 
predominantly comprised of new WEEE i.e. the proportion of historical WEEE in 
waste arising is negligible.  At this point introduce IPR financing for the whole of that 
product category. 
Clearly the point at which (2) will apply will vary depending on the average lifetime of 
products within a particular category.  Small household appliances (SHA) tend to have a 
much shorter lifespan than large domestic appliances (LDA) for example.  According to the 
INSEAD IRP Network55, sampling studies demonstrated that ICT products in the waste 
stream were on average between 7 – 9 years old which implies that between 2012 – 2014 
an IPR financing model could be applied to the whole product category.  The IPR WG is 
                                            
53 European standard EN 50419 was adopted by CENELEC in March 2006. 
54 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010.  
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
55 Ibid. 
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unaware of any more recent sampling exercises to identify the ratio between historic and 
new WEEE across different product categories56.  
6.6 Definition of Producer 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Definition of Producer 
At present, the definition of ‘Producer’ covers those 
who: 
 manufacture and sell EEE on ‘own brand’ basis; 
 resell EEE manufactured by others under its ‘own 
brand’; 
 imports or exports EEE into a MS on a 
professional basis. 
Under the recast, Member States must allow 
‘authorised/ legal representatives’ for producers that 
are already established in another Member State. 
In the UK, there are over 5000 registered producers. 
Identification of the producer in 
order to allocate end of life 
costs for own brand products is 
a key element of some IPR 
systems.   
Due to the definition of 
‘producer’, WEEE arising 
bearing a single brand name 
may have been POM by a 
number of different producers.  
How to allocate responsibility 
between multiple producers for 
a single brand is therefore a key 
challenge for IPR systems 
based on brand e.g. return 
share.  
 
Under both the original and recast WEEE Directive, the producer who must bear the costs 
of treating B2C WEEE at end of life may be the original manufacturer, brand owner or 
importer.  This potentially creates a problem with allocating ‘grey imports’ or parallel 
imports under a return share model because multiple ‘producers’ will have put the same 
brand products onto the market.  For example, if 100 units of brand x are placed on the UK 
market, this may consist of 50 tonnes POM by producer A, 20 tonnes by producer B and 
30 tonnes by producer C.  The difficulty is how to allocate financial responsibility for brand 
x products on a return share basis when they arise in the waste stream.   
A possible solution to the allocation problem could be to require producers to report their 
tonnages POM by brand within a product category, apply an estimated lifespan and then 
use the ratios to allocate the financial costs of treating brand x within WEEE arising in a 
particular year.  An alternative is to allocate responsibility to a ‘primary’ producer as 
illustrated by the system used in Maine, USA although this may not be possible within the 
constraints of the European WEEE Directive. 
                                            
56 This paper does provide some estimates for particular product categories, see Practicalities of individual 
producer responsibility under the WEEE directive: experiences in Germany, Rotter,Vera Susanne; 
Chancerel,Perrine; Schill,Wolf-Peter, Waste Management & Research , Volume 29 (9): 931 SAGE – Sep 1, 
2011 
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Maine E Waste Law: Definition of Producer 
 E Waste law assigns primary responsibility to the entity that has the brand name 
registered as a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office; 
 If the trademarked brand is not registered in the US nor has no US office then 
responsibility is allocated to the first importer of the product; 
 In the US the trademark owner has significant control over the use of their brand 
name on products and trademark infringement cases are fairly easily enforced by the 
trademark owner. 
 
The INSEAD IPR Network suggest that either (a) Producers take responsibility for grey 
imports related to their brand or (b) importers continue to take a market share 
responsibility for grey imports, with producers able to take a return share responsibility57. 
6.7 Producer Marking & Brand identification 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Producer Marking & Brand identification 
The WEEE Directive (2002/96/EC) currently includes 
a specific requirement under Article 11(2) that: 
“Member States shall ensure that any producer of an 
electrical or electronic appliance put on the market 
after 13 August 2005 is clearly identifiable by a mark 
on the appliance”.   
Under the WEEE recast the producer identification 
requirement has been removed.   
Whilst the RoHS recast contains some manufacturer 
and importer identification requirements, these do not 
have to be indelibly marked on the products in all 
cases. 
Back-end IPR systems typically 
rely on identifying the brand on 
WEEE arising.   
This means that either (a) the 
brand or producer’s name must 
be clearly and indelibly marked 
on the product so that it can be 
clearly identified at end of life or 
(b) some form of bar code or 
RFID identification system needs 
to be in place.  The current 
recast WEEE Directive does not 
adequately mandate this nor 
does the RoHS Directive. 
 
The producer marking requirement set out in Article 11(2) of the original WEEE Directive 
(see above) was transposed into Article 16 of the current UK WEEE Regulations: 
 
 
                                            
57 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010, P. 69.  
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
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UK WEEE Regulations, Article 16 
(1) A producer shall mark EEE that he puts on the market in such a manner that: 
(a)  he can be easily identified by that mark as the producer of the equipment (“the 
producer identification mark”); and 
(b)  the equipment can be easily identified as having been put on the market after 13th 
August 2005 (“the date mark”). 
(2) The producer identification mark and the date mark shall be affixed in a visible, legible 
and indelible form to each item of equipment. 
 
The implementation of Article 16 causes two challenges for return share system based on 
brand identification: 
 The brand x product does not have to physically bear the name of producer A, 
producer B or producer C.  To meet the requirements of Article 16 of the UK WEEE 
Regulations, importers into the UK must ensure that the EEE they were placing on 
the market carries one of the marks that they registered through their producer 
compliance scheme; 
 if the equipment was subsequently rebadged during refurbishment, the WEEE 
requirements would still fall on the original ‘producer’ who had placed the product on 
the market for the first time58.  However, if the rebadge removed the original 
producer identification there would then be no way at present of allocating this 
product at end of life under a return share system.   
A more fundamental problem is that the producer identification requirement within the 
original WEEE Directive is not included within the text of the recast WEEE Directive.  
Reference to the producer identification mark have been removed and only refer to the 
mandatory application of the crossed out wheelie bin symbol.  Use of European standard 
EN 50419 which still maintains reference to producer identification is preferred but not 
mandated.  It is thought that the producer identification requirements were removed from 
the WEEE recast because they were considered to be adequately covered within the 
RoHS recast.  This potentially creates difficulties because although the RoHS recast 
includes some requirements for producer identification (see below), these do not have to 
be indelibly marked on the product in all cases. 
 
 
 
                                            
58 WEEE Regulations 2006: Government Guidance Notes, November 2009, BIS.  Pages 41-42.  
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54145.pdf 
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Producer identification requirements within the RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU (recast) 
Article 7(g) manufacturers ensure that their EEE bears a type, batch or serial number or 
other element allowing its identification, or, where the size or nature of the EEE does not 
allow it, that the required information is provided on the packaging or in a document 
accompanying the EEE; 
Article 7(h) manufacturers indicate their name, registered trade name or registered trade 
mark … on the EEE or, where that is not possible, on its packaging or in a document 
accompanying the EEE ...; 
Article 9(d) importers indicate their name, registered trade name or registered trade mark 
… on the EEE or, where that is not possible, on its packaging or in a document 
accompanying the EEE …; 
 
Article 10(a) when making an EEE available on the market, distributors act with due care 
in relation to the requirements applicable in particular by verifying that … the manufacturer 
and the importer have complied with the requirements set out in points (g) and (h) of 
Article 7 and in point (d) of Article 9. 
 
The issue of physical marking in order to identify the producer could be resolved, if and 
when EEE products widely adopt technologies such as RFID identification systems or 
similar. 
 
6.8 Financial Guarantees 
 
A guarantee can be defined in law as “an undertaking to answer for the payment or 
performance of another person’s debt or obligation in the event of a default by the person 
primarily responsible for it”59.  Within the context of WEEE, a financial guarantee (FG) is 
intended to ensure that if a producer leaves the market, their WEEE costs are not 
automatically borne by the other producers or by the state60.  Any WEEE system which 
specifies that producers are only legally responsible for their own WEEE will need some 
form of FG requirement61. This guarantee would cover the costs of collecting and treating 
WEEE in the situation where a producer withdraws from the market, leaving orphan WEEE 
for which the other producers are not legally responsible. 
                                            
59 http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/guarantee 
60 The recast WEEE Directive explains in the preamble that “Each producer should, when placing a product 
on the market, provide a financial guarantee to prevent costs for the management of WEEE from orphan 
products from falling on society or the remaining producers”. 
61 Unless the cost of ‘orphan products’ is to be met by Government..  For example, the Government could 
impose some form of levy on EEE products placed on the market. This levy and the fund it gives rise to 
could also help mitigate the financial costs arising from a producer default and/or insolvency event. 
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WEEE Directive 2002/96/EC Article 8.2:  
Financing WEEE from Private Households – Financial Guarantee 
1. Member States shall ensure that, by 13 August 2005, producers provide at least for 
the financing of the collection, treatment, recovery and environmentally sound disposal 
of WEEE from private households deposited at collection facilities ... 
2. For products put on the market later than 13 August 2005, each producer shall be 
responsible for financing the operations referred to in paragraph 1 relating to the 
waste from his own products ...  
Member States shall ensure that each producer provides a guarantee when placing a 
product on the market showing that the management of all WEEE will be financed …. 
This guarantee shall ensure that the operations referred to in paragraph 1 relating to 
this product will be financed. The guarantee may take the form of participation by the 
producer in appropriate schemes for the financing of the management of WEEE, a 
recycling insurance or a blocked bank account. 
 
Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive introduces a requirement for each producer to provide a 
FG.  The intention is that a FG is in place to pay for Producer A’s WEEE in the situation 
where he left the market, either through choice or due to insolvency.  Several forms of FG 
are listed within the legal text as examples (see above) and it should be noted that the 
wording implies that the guarantee could be either individual or collective.  Under the 
current UK market share system for WEEE, the costs of treating producer A’s products are 
shared between those producers that are putting products on the market within that 
product category at the time producer A’s products arise in the waste stream.  This is 
because under a market share system, the cost of treating WEEE arising (of all brands) is 
borne by the producers currently existing on the market.  As a result, producers do not 
need an individual financial guarantee under the UK’s current market share system.  
Membership of an approved PCS will suffice.   
There is some debate within the literature about the issues surrounding financial 
guarantees and IPR, notably: 
1. The need to ensure that equivalent financial guarantees are provided by producers 
selecting collective take-back and those opting for individual take-back, in order to 
create a level playing field; 
2. The role financial guarantees could play in providing incentives for DfRR.  This is 
covered further in Section 7.3. 
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Figure 6.1: Financial guarantees: creating a level-playing field 
 
Ref: EPR for WEEE: Experiences in Europe, Naoko Tojo, IIIEE, Lund University, July 2011. Note 
original source stated by N. Tojo as Van Rossem, Tojo & Lindhqvist, 2006 
Reports by the IIIEE62, Okopol63 and the INSEAD IPR Network argue that requirements for 
financial guarantees should be applied equally to producers regardless of whether they 
choose collective or individual take-back systems.  Okopol’s review of requirements within 
Member State WEEE legislation found that most accepted membership of a collective 
scheme as a satisfactory financial guarantee whereas those wishing to undertake their 
own take-back (if this was an option) must have either a blocked bank account or recycling 
insurance.  According to the INSEAD IPR Network, this additional financial burden for 
producers choosing to set up an individual system or limited brand compliance scheme 
has been cited by producers as a key barrier to the adoption of approaches fulfilling the 
aim of IPR.  This leads to their recommendation that “In order to ensure a level playing-
field, the requirements for a financial guarantee should be the same for producers 
choosing to join a collective scheme and producers choosing to develop individual 
systems of compliance”64. 
Financial Guarantees within the current UK Market Share System 
The current UK WEEE system is based on (a) market share and (b) mandatory PCS 
membership.  Under a market share system, the cost of treating WEEE arising (of all 
brands) is borne by the producers currently existing on the market and registered with the 
                                            
62 Lost in Transposition: a study of the implementation of IPR in the WEEE Directive, IIIEE, 2006. Page vii. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/planet-2/report/2006/10/lost-in-transposition.pdf 
63 The Producer Responsibility Principle of the WEEE Directive, August 2007, Okopol, IIIEE and RPA, P. XX.  
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/final_rep_okopol.pdf 
64 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010, p. viii.  
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
IPR Working Group Report 
 
49 
 
Environment Agencies at any time.  As a result, producers do not need to provide 
individual financial guarantees under the UK’s current market share system.  Membership 
of an approved PCS will suffice.  
The lack of any specific requirement for a financial guarantee from a producer within a 
PCS is predicated on the assumption that if a producer withdraws from the market, is 
unable to pay and/or becomes insolvent, the remaining producers within the PCS will 
remain solvent and will have sufficient capital adequacy between them to meet the 
additional financial costs arising from the additional proportion of WEEE now allocated to 
them by the PCS.   
Potential financial risks of the current UK Market Share System 
One of the key financial risks arising from the present UK system is the potential solvency 
of the PCS and/or their producer members at any given time. In the case of producers who 
have set-up their own PCS, the producer and their PCS are essentially one and the same. 
Some stakeholders regard the current lack of actual financial guarantees from each 
producer to be inadequate and high risk, even under a market share system.  As can be 
seen from the TXU Europe Group case study65, the impact of a one-off event can be 
significant.  It is important that regulators fully understand, appreciate and effectively 
monitor the risk exposure being taken-on under a market share arrangement.  It is 
necessary to identify: What is the probability factor of the risk actually arising or the 
severity of the financial impact thereafter or both and what levels of risk are they, as 
regulators prepared to accept?  For example,    
1. What would happen if a dominant player in a product category suddenly withdrew from 
the market or was unable to pay or became insolvent; would the remaining producers 
be able to absorb the additional WEEE costs between them and is there the possibility 
of a contagion risk arising? 
2. If a product category began to develop technical convergence with another category, 
could this leave a minority of ‘old style’ producers left to fund a large bill for WEEE 
arising within the now defunct product category?   
However, the alternative view is that increasing the requirements for financial guarantees 
would place a high additional cost on producers and is unnecessary for those joining 
collective schemes as scheme members already provide a form of mutual guarantee.  It is 
worth noting that the more narrowly a product category is defined, the higher both risks 
become, so arguably the broader product categories in the WEEE recast may reduce the 
risk for de facto FGs provided by collective schemes e.g. under a market share system.   
 
 
                                            
65 The failure of TXU Europe Group and the shortfall of funds in the Renewables Obligation (RO) buy out 
fund. There are possibly parallel lessons to be learned from this for PCS schemes. See 
http://www.wragge.com/alert_4334.asp for details.   
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Financial Guarantees within a WEEE System based on Article 8.2 
The text within Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive states that the guarantee may take the 
form of participation by the producer in appropriate schemes for the financing of the 
management of WEEE, a recycling insurance or a blocked bank account. 
In order to address this, several potential options are open to an individual producer under 
Article 8.2 e.g. 
 Each producer sets sufficient funds aside in a blocked bank account, or 
alternatively, a producer can ask their bank to provide a surety bond in favour of a 
designated third party or a standby letter of credit66. This effectively achieves the 
same result. 
 Each producer could form a reciprocal commercial agreement with other producers 
within the same product category guaranteeing that they will bear the costs relating 
to that producer’s WEEE in the event that they become insolvent, in effect a form of 
self insurance. However, the issue of a producer withdrawing from the market still 
remains relevant under such an arrangement and as such, this option could form 
part of a hybrid solution. 
 The producer takes out recycling insurance if this product set is available. 
The Swedish WEEE system provides the most comprehensive experience of FGs within 
any EU Member State to date.  Further details can be found under the Swedish case study 
in Annex A.  In addition, an overview of FG options operating in Sweden and their 
comparative costs is provided by the INSEAD IPR Network (2010).   
Potential transferable opportunities and/or applications for the UK 
The Chair of the IPR WG undertook a teleconference with a major insurance broker. From 
these discussions, it is unclear if recycling insurance could become a cost-effective FG 
option in the UK.  Would any underwriters have an appetite for this type of risk and would 
the premiums payable be commercially attractive to either party for the level of cover and 
risk taken on?   
Other FG options available to a PCS and/or Regulators could include: 
 A request for a payment upfront and/or in advance from producers where their 
credit worthiness is in doubt. 
                                            
66 A surety bond and/or a standby letter of credit may need to be supported by cash collateral provided by 
the producer or alternatively, if the producer has agreed bank limits in place, these facilities will have to be 
accommodated from within them. 
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 The provision of a surety bond67 and/or standby letter of credit by the producers 
bank in favour of the PCS and/or Regulator whether supported by a) a blocked 
bank account and/or b) an adjustment in any bank headroom limits marked. 
 The payment of a levy by all producers linked to their EEE placed on the market to 
an external third party. In effect, this gives rise to a ‘self administered insurance 
fund’ in all but name. These funds will need to be ring fenced from the normal 
operations of any third party set up to run and manage the fund.  
Further investigations to ascertain the type and cost of potential guarantees for the UK 
market would be needed before a judgement can be made on the impact of more stringent 
financial guarantee requirements on UK producers. 
6.9 Accruals  
A producer which has a legal obligation under WEEE legislation to finance the costs of 
collecting and treating WEEE must account for these costs within their balance sheet.  To 
do this, the producer must make a provision or accrual under the rules set out within 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 37 on Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets68.  The way the WEEE legislation is formulated (i.e. market share, 
return share, payment for own WEEE) will determine the extent and timing of the liability 
on the producer and hence the level of accrual which needs to be made. 
 
IAS 37 
“The objective of IAS 37 is to ensure that appropriate recognition criteria and 
measurement bases are applied to provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent 
assets and that sufficient information is disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements to enable users to understand their nature, timing and amount. The key 
principle established by the Standard is that a provision should be recognised only 
when there is a liability i.e. a present obligation resulting from past events. The 
Standard thus aims to ensure that only genuine obligations are dealt with in the 
financial statements – planned future expenditure, even where authorised by the 
board of directors or equivalent governing body, is excluded from recognition.69 
 
An accrual must be made in a company’s accounts for each relevant measurement year. 
Accruals are accounted for and/or are adjusted on a cumulative basis subject to a review 
between the auditor and management each year.   
Accruals have a direct impact on a producers Profit and Loss (P&L) account.  Any sum set 
aside by a company for accrual purposes will have an impact on the reported profits for 
that company although not on its free cash. The extent of this impact will depend upon the 
nature of the company e.g. listed/not listed, large/small.   
                                            
67 See by way of an analogous example, arrangements in place with the Environment Agency in respect of 
landfill aftercare liabilities http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/Guidance_-
_financial_provision_for_landfill.pdf 
68 http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard36 
69 http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard36 
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Accruals under a market share system 
The issue of when producers need to make an accrual to cover their liabilities for WEEE 
under a collective producer responsibility system70 (as is specified for historical waste 
under the EC WEEE Directive) is clarified by ‘IFRIC Interpretation 6: Liabilities arising from 
Participating in a Specific Market—Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment in 2005’ 
(IFRIC 6)71.   
“IFRIC 6 clarifies when certain producers of electrical goods will need to recognise a 
liability for the cost of waste management relating to the decommissioning of waste 
electrical and electronic equipment (historical waste) supplied to private households. 
The IFRIC concluded that the event giving rise to the liability for costs of such 
historical waste, and so its recognition, is participation in the market during a 
measurement period, i.e. a period in which market shares are determined for the 
purposes of allocating waste management costs. The IFRIC decided that it is this 
date, rather than the date of production of the equipment, that is the triggering event 
for liability recognition.”  IASB Press Release, 1 September 200572 
 
According to IFRIC 6, if a producer’s WEEE obligations are set under a market share 
system (as is currently the case under the UK WEEE Regulations), then producers do not 
need to make any accruals when putting the product on the market because they do not 
incur the liability at this time.  If they withdraw from the market, they will hold no liability for 
treating the products they have already put on the market as these costs will be shared out 
amongst the remaining producers.  Therefore under a CPR system, producers only need 
to make accruals for the next compliance period73 as this is when they will incur liability for 
WEEE costs74. 
Accruals under an IPR system 
IFRIC 6 does not cover the issue of accruals for producers operating under WEEE 
legislation and adopting an IPR financing mechanism.  It therefore does not apply to the 
WEEE Directive’s Article 8.2 requirements for new WEEE.  This is because IFRIC felt that 
these accruals requirements were already adequately provided for by IAS 37.  If WEEE 
legislation enables producers’ to be responsible for financing the collection and treatment 
of their own brand products and this liability is incurred at the point of placing the product 
on the market, then under the rules of IAS 37 the producer must make an accrual for the 
relevant costs at this time. 
An auditor, in discussion with management, would seek assurances on a) material data 
about the items of EEE placed on the market, b) their expected lifecycle and/or durability 
and c) relevant collection/treatment costs so that the extent of any accruals liability can be 
                                            
70 Also referred to as CPR in this section. 
71 http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/interpretations/interp7 
72 http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/pressrel/0509ifric6.pdf 
73 It is up to the Producer and their auditor to determine what is a reasonable sum to set aside for accrual 
purposes for any given measurement period. 
74 For a full description of this issue, see Deloitte IAS Plus Special Edition September 2005 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/iasplus/0509ifric6.pdf 
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properly determined and a judgement view formed by the company’s auditor in 
consultation with management.  
Accruals within mixed CPR/IPR Systems 
If a national WEEE system provides for and enables both CPR and IPR elements it can be 
difficult to determine the boundaries where IFRIC 6 is applicable or not and where IAS 37 
is applicable or not.  For example, if national WEEE legislation incorporates the 
transposition of Article 8.2 for new WEEE but there is an opt out which enables PCSs to 
continue to allocate costs on a market share basis then a situation can arise whereby 
producers who are PCS members do not make accruals at point of putting a product on 
the market whereas those producers undertaking their own take-back under IPR do make 
accruals at the point of putting a product on the market75. 
IPR - Financial Impact arising from Accruals and Financial Guarantees 
Accruals and financial guarantees are two distinct and quite separate matters.  A financial 
guarantee as required for new household WEEE under the WEEE Directive is intended to 
ensure that if a producer is unable to meet their financial obligations e.g. due to 
insolvency, there is protected financing available to cover the costs.  Hence it is a 
mechanism for ensuring that any orphan WEEE arising can be financed.   
In contrast, an accrual or provision is not required by the WEEE Directive, it is an 
accounting requirement to ensure that a company has properly provided for the costs of 
future liabilities within its financial statements.  Accruals and financial guarantees can be 
interlinked but are not interchangeable.  Hence a key issue is the economic impact on 
producers under an IPR system which will require an accruals policy to be put in place by 
the company and a financial guarantee from the point of putting a product on the market.   
This raises the question, how is the requirement for an accrual affected by the existence of 
a risk transfer mechanism put in place in lieu of a financial guarantee?  For example, if a 
producer has taken out recycling insurance to underpin their financial guarantee 
requirements, does this mitigate the need for a full accrual to be made under IAS 37 given 
that an insurance policy is in place to cover their future liabilities?   
Initial investigations by the IPR WG indicate that no mitigation of the accruals requirement 
is possible.  For example: 
 FG provided via recycling insurance: a recycling insurance policy will not be 
recognised as an asset until the cash proceeds from the insurance policy have 
been paid out and received by the company; 
                                            
75 For a full discussion see pages 6-7, UNICE contribution to the Roundtable on Consistent Application of 
IFRS, 20 September 2006, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/roundtable/060920issues-paper.pdf.  Also pages 
242-244, Individual Producer Responsibility in the WEEE Directive: From theory to practice? Chris van 
Rossem, Doctoral dissertation IIIEE, 2008, 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1266797&fileOId=1266800 
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 FG provided via a blocked bank account: an accruals liability will still need to be set 
aside in the first instance although the extent of any accruals liability can be offset 
by the cash held in the blocked bank account. However, there is an additional 
impact in that cash held in the blocked bank account is capital that a company 
cannot use elsewhere in the business. 
Potential Option available for Mitigating Accruals 
If a producer acting alone or in cooperation with others, wishes to mitigate and/or eliminate 
the need to account for an accruals liability in its accounts, it is possible to achieve this 
outcome subject to the following caveats. 
1) Establish a separate and independent company that will operate at an arms-length 
basis. 
2) Contracts put in place between the producer/s and the company for the ongoing 
management of accrued liabilities and costs. In analogous terms, this is a form of self- 
insurance. 
3) All arrangements have to be on a non-recourse basis. 
Any producer/s seeking to explore the merits of this option further should take proper 
professional advice in this matter, including any relevant financial considerations. 
6.9 Summary 
Implementing IPR in European Member States needs to consider and meet the 
requirements of the WEEE Directive.  Key aspects and implications for IPR systems are 
summarised below. 
 Product Scope: 
- The scope of the European WEEE Directive is broader than any other WEEE 
legislation globally.  The products and their market conditions vary considerably.  
This raises the following questions: As it is possible to meet Article 8.2 
requirements via a variety of systems, is it appropriate to apply a single financial 
allocation model to all WEEE or could variants be used per product category?  
What scope is there for flexibility to allow different compliance routes?  Should a 
new system be phased in targeting the most appropriate product categories first? 
 Product Categories: 
- Product categories are important because in a market share or simple return share 
system they are the primary cost differentiator.  Typically producers are charged a 
flat fee per tonne within a product category.  This can lead to significant 
discrepancies depending on how the product categories are set.  The more 
homogeneous the product category in terms of materials and treatment costs, the 
closer the match is likely to be between actual end of life costs for a particular 
product and fees charged by compliance schemes for that product category; 
 Collection Targets: 
- The recast WEEE Directive will establish challenging new collection targets.  This 
has two implications from an IPR perspective: (i) any changes to the current UK 
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system will need to ensure that high levels of collection are achieved in line with 
the targets; (ii) a new approach could be considered which sets producers’ WEEE 
tonnage obligations based on a percentage POM basis designed to meet the 
overall collection target set in the WEEE recast (initially 45% POM);  
 New vs Historic WEEE: 
- Article 8 of the WEEE Directive specifies an IPR financing model for ‘new’ WEEE 
and a CPR financing model for ‘historic’ WEEE.  For some product categories with 
shorter lifespans, the amount of historic WEEE arising may be negligible and a 
single financing mechanism based on IPR may now suffice.  For products such as 
LDA this is not yet likely to be the case. 
 Definition of Producer: 
- Identification of the producer in order to allocate end of life costs for own brand 
products is a key element of some IPR systems.  Due to the definition of 
‘producer’, WEEE arising bearing a single brand name may have been POM by a 
number of different producers.  How to allocate responsibility between multiple 
producers for a single brand is therefore a key challenge for IPR. 
 Producer marking & Brand identification: 
- Back-end IPR systems typically rely on identifying the brand on WEEE arising.  This 
means that either (a) the brand or producer’s name must be clearly and indelibly 
marked on the product so that it can be clearly identified at end of life or (b) some 
form of bar code or RFID identification system needs to be in place.  The recast 
WEEE Directive does not adequately mandate this nor does the RoHS Directive, 
which could prove a key challenge for return share systems in the UK unless 
addressed via other legislation or standards. 
 Financial Guarantees: 
- Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive introduces a requirement for each producer to 
have a financial guarantee.  A financial guarantee is intended to ensure that if a 
producer leaves the market, their WEEE costs are not borne by the other producers 
or by the state.  Reports by the IIIEE, Okopol and the INSEAD IPR Network argue 
that requirements for financial guarantees should be applied equally to producers 
regardless of whether they choose collective or individual take-back systems.  
- Some stakeholders regard the current lack of actual financial guarantees from each 
producer to be inadequate and high risk, even under a market share system.  
However, the alternative view is that increasing the requirements for financial 
guarantees would place a high additional cost on producers and is unnecessary for 
those joining collective schemes as scheme members already provide a form of 
mutual guarantee.  Whilst experience of FGs is available in Sweden, further 
investigations to ascertain the type and cost of potential guarantees for the UK 
market would be needed before a judgement can be made on the impact of more 
stringent financial guarantee requirements on UK producers. 
 Accruals  
- An accrual is not required by the WEEE Directive, it is an accounting requirement 
to ensure that a company has reflected the costs of future liabilities within its P&L.  
Any sum set aside by a company for accrual purposes will have an impact on the 
reported profits for that company although not on its free cash. The extent of this 
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impact will depend upon the nature of the company e.g. listed/not listed, 
large/small.   
- The way the WEEE legislation is formulated (i.e. market share, return share, 
payment for own WEEE) will determine the extent and timing of the liability on the 
producer and hence the level of accrual which needs to be made.  If WEEE 
legislation mandates that producers’ are responsible for financing the collection 
and treatment of their own brand products and this liability is incurred at the point 
of placing the product on the market, then under the rules of IAS 37 the producer 
must make an accrual at this time. 
 Accruals and Financial Guarantees 
- Accruals and financial guarantees are two different requirements and are not 
generally interchangeable.  When assessing the economic impact on producers of 
any WEEE system, it is necessary to consider the impact of both financial 
guarantees and accruals.  The largest impact would be caused by an IPR system 
which required both accruals and a financial guarantee from the point of putting a 
product on the market.   
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7 DfRR as a result of IPR: fact or 
fiction? 
The theory behind IPR is that in making producers financially 
responsible for their own products at end of life, they are given a direct 
economic incentive to improve the design of their products in terms of 
durability, re-use, repair, upgrade and/or recycling.  This section 
explores the evidence for this and discusses the key influencing 
factors.  
 
This section discusses: 
 The theory and the evidence regarding the link between IPR and DfRR; 
 The UK’s objective with regard to an IPR Solution; 
 The value of DfRR payback; 
 Factors that affect the impact of DfRR payback. 
7.1 Theory and Evidence 
There are many quotes from experts and stakeholders alike that reiterate and support the 
theory that:  
“Individual Producer Responsibility provides a competitive incentive for producers to 
design their products so that they are easier and therefore cheaper to recycle … Without 
IPR, the WEEE Directive is failing its main objective: to establish an incentive for 
producers to design products for easier recycling.” ERP, 2007. 
 
However, other experts dispute this: 
 
“With regard to the Design for Recycling impact [of the EC WEEE Directive], there is no 
industry-wide evidence provided, on the contrary, there is no evidence that it has 
occurred or ever will occur as a common practice.” J. Huisman et al, United Nations 
University, 2007.76 
 
                                            
76 Review of Directive 2002/96 on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment - Final Report – Study No. 
07010401/2006/442493/ETU/G4, J. Huisman et al, United Nations University, P. 298-299, 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/final_rep_unu.pdf 
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The IPR WG recognised the need to evaluate whether there is any evidence of the 
relationship between IPR and DfRR (Design for Re-use, Repair, Upgrade and/or 
Recycling) beyond the theoretical concept. 
 Can an IPR system reward producers who have designed products with improved 
environmental impacts at end of life? 
 Can an IPR system incentivise DfRR and cause market transition to products with 
improved environmental impacts at end of life? 
Examining experience in other EU Member States provides no direct evidence to date, 
primarily because few MS have implemented an IPR system in practice.  For those 
countries that have transposed and potentially implemented Article 8.2 correctly, the IPR 
Working Group has not been able to identify any English language literature which has 
explored the impacts on product design or environmental benefits.  There are also two 
additional factors which limit the possibility of obtaining clear evidence:  
(a) EEE products are designed globally or for regional markets - any impacts from a 
single MS WEEE system on product design are likely to be limited unless it is a 
major market; and  
(b) “IPR does not act as a prescription but as a way to encourage/incentivize design 
initiatives for end of life management, so it is difficult to put a direct quantifiable 
value on such a principle today” 77. 
Examining evidence from IPR systems globally points to the Japanese HARL and PC 
systems.  There is anecdotal evidence indicating that producers of home appliances in 
Japan, and producers of cars in Sweden, developed products to be more easily recyclable 
in anticipation of EPR legislation rather than as a direct result of implementation (Tojo 
2004).  This was confirmed by Chris van Rossem, “companies developed pilot products 
with improved disassembly in anticipation of EPR”.  After implementation of the Japanese 
HARL, it was found that the direct involvement of producers in recycling activities provided 
significant learning opportunities for how to improve the design of products to improve end 
of life treatment (Tojo, 200678).  Research by K.Hosada (2004) found that design 
improvements had been made in 2 key areas: ease of disassembly and uniformity of 
plastic resins.  It is interesting to note that at that time the DfRR incentive may have been 
weakened by the fact that according to Tojo (200679) there was no cost differentiation 
between brands/models amongst manufacturers in the same group.  There were 
differences “depending on when products were manufactured but not so much between 
brands”.  
In terms of the US WEEE systems, no published research on DfRR impacts was identified 
by the IPR WG.  Magalini commented in his interview for the IPR WG that he could “not 
                                            
77 Stephane Arditi, EEB, interview with IPR WG, June 2010. 
78 EPR Program for EEE in Japan: Brand separation?  N. Tojo, IIIEE, 2006. 
http://www.iprworks.org/documents/file/EPRprogramforEEEinJapan.pdf 
79 Ibid. 
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see any design changes” that had resulted from the US WEEE systems.  However, it is 
interesting to note that in Maine (which operates a return share system for monitors and 
desktop printers with the option for producers to have their own brand products separated 
in order to undertake their own treatment), 13 producers have opted to separate their own 
brand products and undertake their ‘own’ recycling80.  This may indicate that the current 
level of DfRR payback obtainable for those brands, within that product category, is 
sufficient to cover the additional costs of segregation, separate transport and treatment 
and that they have sufficient volumes to ensure economies of scale.  It is unknown if this 
could be extrapolated to other forms of WEEE within more mixed collection categories as 
per the current UK context. 
The Experts’ View 
Atsuhiko Sano interview: 
 Mandatory IPR for small business operators and new entrants would possibly 
become a severe barrier to market entry and it is important to consider this in 
designing the scheme. I agree with the theoretical benefit of IPR and that the 
responsibility on the producer should be clear in order to link cost and design. In 
the Japanese HARL system, there has been minimal positive influence between 
the operation of recycling facilities and the design of EEE81. 
 Establishing a recycling rate target does affect the cost of recycling. In this 
respect, it is important to ensure that any recycling rate is achieved at a minimum 
cost, rather than to just seek the highest rate of theoretical recycling. 
 By sharing WEEE recycling and recovery facilities (RRF’s) with other end of life 
goods, it is possible to promote their importance and the way in which they might 
contribute to improving social efficiency in recycling as a whole. 
 
 Stephane Arditi interview:  
 “IPR has not been so far fully implemented and documented in Europe: it is not 
easy to assess the economic results. The point is IPR has not yet been 
comprehensively deployed (from products properties identification, through return 
rate consideration, through recycling and treatment standards to associated 
financial obligations).” 
C van Rossem & Carl Dalhammar82: 
 “The implementation of the WEEE Directive to date has not provided the 
incentives for design for end-of-life as originally perceived by policy-makers. The 
main principle to achieve this, namely individual financial responsibility through 
                                            
80 See: http://www.maine.gov/dep/waste/ewaste/documents/option1mfrs112811.pdf 
81 The Chair of the IPR WG sought to explore this statement further with Mr Atsuhiko Sano and he confirmed 
that there had been some product design changes undertaken by producers although these were minor. In 
part, this is due to the fact that only 4 product categories are mandated and in terms of design, are relatively 
mature already. 
82 Designing Greener Electronic Products: Building synergies between EU Product Policy Instruments or 
simply passing the buck?, IIIEE report for EEB, 2010, Page 6 http://www.eeb.org/?LinkServID=66030392-
BF80-2CAC-B5335569F1526F90&showMeta=0 
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The Experts’ View 
individual producer responsibility (IPR), has not been transposed properly by many 
Member States, neither have compliance schemes implemented the concept in 
actual financial fee structures for producers.” 
Atalay Atasu83 
 “It is not reasonable to look for DfRR evidence in collective systems where 
volume/weight based cost sharing is in practice. With volume/weight based cost 
allocation procedures it is natural to expect minimal design incentives because such 
cost allocations are likely to allow free-riding on other’s design improvements. The 
limited evidence for DfRR improvements is most likely an outcome of the lack of 
IPR in these implementations.” 
C van Rossem, N Tojo, T Lindhqvist84: 
 “Existing research shows that EPR laws do prompt eco-design changes. The 
drivers of eco-design are strengthened when there is feedback on the total end-of-
life costs to individual producers: namely collection, dismantling, re-use and high-
levels of material recycling.  Existing EPR programmes for WEEE and ELV show 
that implementing IPR (individual producer responsibility) is possible.  What is also 
evident is that for products such as cars and EEE, these changes have to date 
been more the result of anticipating such regulatory requirements than the actual 
incentives that are provided when the EPR programme is implemented and in 
operation.” 
 
Implications for the UK WEEE System 
Given that the UK WEEE system should meet the requirements of the WEEE Directive, it 
could be argued that meeting Article 8.2 should be the primary focus.  However, it is 
important to ask:    
a) Is the aim purely to ensure that producers pay the costs relating to their own WEEE 
as specified in Article 8.2? 
b) Is the aim to ensure that producers are rewarded for design changes which result in 
environmental benefits at end of life?  Secondly, does this reward need to be 
sufficient to drive market transition? 
Given the lack of comprehensive evidence, it should not be assumed that (a) will lead 
directly to (b) in all cases.  If there is a design change which results in environmental 
benefit and carries significantly lower collection and treatment costs then both aims can be 
                                            
83 Pers Comm, Atalay Atasu, May 2012.  Statement based on Extended Producer Responsibility for E-
Waste: Individual or Collective Producer Responsibility? Atalay Atasu & Ravi Subramanian, 2012 
84 Note emphasis has been added for the purposes of this report.  Source of quote: Extended Producer 
Responsibility: An examination of its impact on innovation and greening products, C Van Rossem, N Tojo, T 
Lindhqvist, IEEE for Greenpeace International, FoEE and EEB, 2006, p. IX 
http://www.productpolicy.org/ppi/attachments/EPR-and-Eco-Design_2006.pdf 
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met simultaneously.  However, if a design change reduces environmental impacts at end 
of life but does not lead to significantly lower treatment and recycling costs (or costs more 
to change than can be recouped) then only (a) is met.  
Another limitation of focusing purely on Article 8.2 is that it cannot address trade-offs 
between environmental impacts.  For example, if a product is more durable but less 
energy efficient during use.  There may be some improvements to end of life 
environmental impact which from a policy perspective should not be incentivised within the 
WEEE system because this would result in a negative overall life cycle environmental 
impact.  Expert opinion on how this would be experienced in practice is divided; Huisman 
et al think it is significant and argue that Eco-design and Waste Management goals should 
be split between the Eco-Design and RoHS Directives on the one side and the WEEE 
Directive on the other.  In contrast, interviews conducted by Tojo found that Swedish and 
Japanese companies were well versed in life cycle environmental impacts and would 
balance any trade-offs themselves. 
The Experts’ View 
J. Huisman et al, United Nations University85: 
 “For instance (smaller) LCD monitors use less energy in the use phase compared 
to CRT screens, which prevails from an environmental point of view over the risks 
in recycling of the mercury containing backlights. … Basically, the Hg-backlights 
case is a perfect example why the EPR provision with regard to DfR does not work 
in practice.” 
Chris van Rossem86:  
 “Tojo (2004) conducted an empirical study in 2000-2001 which investigated the 
impact of EPR legislation for vehicles and electronics on manufacturers’ product 
design and other environmental measures in Japan and Sweden. … A particularly 
important finding in this research was that the design for end of life measures 
reported by manufacturers have been integrated into other design strategies. When 
competing with other environmental priorities, careful consideration has been made 
so as not to increase the environmental impact from other phases of the life cycle at 
the expense of design for end of life (Tojo, N, 200487).” 
 
It can be concluded that making producers pay the costs relating to their own WEEE will in 
some instances create no DfRR incentive or environmental benefit at all.  It is against this 
context that Mayers argues “the question producers should ask themselves in developing 
their approach to EPR for WEEE in Europe is perhaps not “How do we implement 
individual responsibility for our branded products?” but “How do we secure financial 
                                            
85 Review of Directive 2002/96 on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment - Final Report – Study No. 
07010401/2006/442493/ETU/G4, J. Huisman et al, United Nations University, P. 298-299, 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/pdf/final_rep_unu.pdf 
86 Individual Producer Responsibility in the WEEE Directive: From theory to practice? Chris van Rossem, 
Doctoral dissertation IIIEE, 2008. 
87 Extended Producer Responsibility as a driver for design change: Utopia or reality?  N. Tojo, IIIEE, 2004 
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advantage from our improved designs?”88.  Similarly Huisman and Magalini state that the 
focus should not be on IPR per se but that “the challenge is to financially reward producers 
for good practice”.     
7.2 Value of DfRR to Producers 
Another key question in this debate is what level of payback can DfRR deliver?  After all, if 
the majority of DfRR improvements were to lead to negligible reductions in end of life costs 
for WEEE89 then arguably implementing Article 8.2 would do little to incentivise change 
and would not be able to deliver environmental benefits at end of life.  To answer this 
question, one would need to examine the range of DfRR improvements for each category 
of household EEE and their cost implications in terms of the cost to make the change 
versus the reduced costs or benefits at end of life. 
This task was outside the scope of the IPR WG’s available resources.  Given the rate of 
technology change within the EEE sector and developments in recycling methods any 
such study would, in any case, illustrate only a snapshot in time.  Based on the Group’s 
combined knowledge of the EEE sector, re-use and recycling industry it is fair to conclude 
that the value of DfRR payback will vary by product, change over time and be 
dependent on secondary factors such as availability of raw materials and market 
conditions. 
Impact of Secondary Factors 
It is worth noting the impact of these secondary factors on the level of DfRR payback, 
primarily: 
 Treatment requirements and Recovery targets 
 Precious and special metals 
Treatment Requirements and Recovery Targets 
 
WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Treatment Requirements 
The recast WEEE Directive states that minimum standards 
for the treatment of WEEE should be developed at EU level.  
Under the current Directive, Member States have set their 
own treatment requirements. 
Treatment requirements 
set within the context of 
an IPR system could 
significantly affect the 
value of financial 
payback from DfRR 
improvements. 
                                            
88 Mayers, C.K. 2007. Strategic, Financial, and Design Implications of Extended Producer Responsibility in 
Europe: A Producer Case Study. Journal of Industrial Ecology 11 (3): 113-131. 
89 Reports by Eikelenberg (2003) and Huisman (2003, 2004) found that “the environmental room for 
improving the EOL phase of most mainstream products is very limited”.  This is refuted by other 
stakeholders. 
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WEEE Directive Requirement Implications for IPR 
Recovery Targets 
The existing requirements set recovery and recycling targets 
of between 50% - 80% for most product categories.  The 
new requirements under the recast will cover all product 
categories and all targets will be increased by 5% after three 
years.  Within 4 years, the Commission will examine the 
case for a mandatory 5% reuse target. 
Within an IPR system, 
both re-use and/or 
recycling targets could 
affect the value of 
financial payback from 
DfRR improvements. 
 
Do DfRR changes result in real and significant differences in EOL costs compared to the 
level of investment required to make the changes during design and production?  As 
discussed, this will vary on a product by product basis but on a generic level it will be 
influenced by (a) treatment requirements and (b) recovery targets.  For example:  
 If there was a pre-treatment requirement which mandated the removal of a 
particular hazardous component at end of life this would potentially increase the 
payback (i.e. reduce the overall treatment cost) for products which had been 
designed for disassembly; 
 If the recycling target was particularly challenging for a specific product category, 
more effort would need to go into increasing material separation and recycling.  
Products which had fewer material types each in a more homogenous form (e.g. 
without paint or coatings) would be cheaper to treat in this circumstance.   
Precious and Special Metals 
“Raw materials like Copper, Tin, Aluminum, Gold, Yttrium are not a concern for 
manufacturers of electronic products today as they represent on average less than 5% of 
the production cost. This is going to change as demand will increase and cost of the 
materials will rise … putting them more into the focus of the electronic companies. In the 
next couple of years, these companies will include access to affordable raw materials into 
their major strategies”90. Klaus Hieronymi, Hewlett-Packard 
 
There is growing concern about the long-term availability of specific groups of precious 
and special metals for EEE production, notably Platinum Group Metals (PGM) and Rare 
Earth Elements (REE), in terms of both access and rising costs91.  These substances, 
although used in small amounts, are critical for the functioning of many types of electronic 
equipment.  Using recovered metals has been identified as a key strategy for addressing 
future supply risks alongside efforts to secure the supply of virgin materials and the use of 
                                            
90 Raw Material – The Next Big Battle? K. Hieronymi, Hewlett-Packard, CARE Innovation 2010. 
91 The EU Raw Material Initiative (RMI) identified 14 critical materials which combine high economic 
importance to the EU with a high risk of potential disruption to or interference in supply – many applicable to 
the electronic sector.  For more information on the RMI see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-
materials/critical/index_en.htm 
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alternative substances or technologies.  As a result, several research projects92 have been 
undertaken to examine the potential for increasing the recovery of these substances from 
WEEE and other sources.   
"We estimate that between now and 2020, in the UK, we'll dispose of 12 million tonnes of 
WEEE. A quarter of this will comprise IT equipment, consumer electronics and display 
devices, which in turn, will contain around 63 tonnes of palladium, and 17 tonnes of 
iridium.  At current market prices, this amount of palladium would be worth £1 billion, and 
the iridium, around £380 million"93.  WRAP 
 
This highlights that in future there may be increased economic incentives or mandatory 
treatment requirements to disassemble and remove key parts containing PGM and REE 
(e.g. medium and high grade circuit boards, LCD screens, brominated plastics) from 
equipment prior to shredding.  DfRR changes which enable re-use or facilitate recovery of 
PGM and REE may provide increased payback.  Thus ‘ease of disassembly’ and 
‘identification and access to key components containing REE and PGM’ may become 
more important DfRR criteria in future than under the current treatment regime.  There 
may also be growing demand from producers to be able to physically access their ‘own’ 
WEEE in future, in order to facilitate the potential for closed loop recycling. 
7.3 Impact of DfRR payback 
Following on from the question ‘What level of DfRR payback exists’, is the related issue of 
what secondary factors affect the impact of DfRR paybacks on producers and need to be 
taken into consideration when designing a new approach.  The three key factors here are: 
 Point of Payment/ Return on DfR;  
 Applicability to all versus optional access to own WEEE; 
 Number of producers within a product category who are purely importers and have 
no close links with the original manufacturer.   Such importers may have limited 
ability to select products on the basis of certain DfRR features even where 
significant payback exists. 
                                            
92  Recycling: From E-Waste to Resources, 2009, UNEP. Pages 7-10. 
http://www.unep.org/PDF/PressReleases/E-Waste_publication_screen_FINALVERSION-sml.pdf 
- UNEP, http://www.unep.org/resourcepanel/Portals/24102/PDFs/Metals_Stocks_Press_Release.pdf; 
- WRAP IMT002-001 Final Report, 
http://www.wrap.org.uk/sites/files/wrap/IMT002%20Strategic%20Raw%20Materials%20Capacity%20Repor
t%20-%2027th%20March%202012.pdf 
- Study into the feasibility of protecting and recovering critical raw materials, 2011, Oakdene Hollins for the 
Environment Agency. http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/EPOW-
recovering-critical-raw-materials-T5v2.pdf 
- Metal Recycling Challenges from Waste Products in Japan, 2011, Kyoto University.  
http://www.ctci.org.tw/public/Attachment/112111194871.pdf 
93 http://www.wrap.org.uk/content/product-re-use-could-hold-key-issues-resource-security-says-wrap 
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Point of Payment / Return on DfRR 
As illustrated in Section 5, WEEE systems may be based on front end payment (where 
producers pay at the point of placing EEE on the market) or back-end (where producers 
pay when products are collected as WEEE).  Front end systems provide an immediate 
payback where one is realisable.  In comparison, the impact of any DfRR incentive 
provided via a back-end system may be diluted.  This is a particular problem for household 
EEE with long lifetimes such as LDAs.  According to a major LDA manufacturer, “Today 
the average expected life cycle of [LDA] products in all European countries is 15 years and 
more. The amortization of investments in R&D product design for a better recycling would 
therefore take 15 years too – subject to actually being able to realize the future value of 
the returned product”94. 
The Experts’ View 
J. Huisman interview: 
 There is a long residence time between design, use and waste therefore delayed 
incentives + future technologies unknown.   
Magalini interview: 
 “If design is to be improved we need to find the right policy tool to concentrate on 
that issue.  Using end of life to do this takes too long”  
Chris van Rossem:  
 “Net present value of future savings in end-of-life costs may be too low to justify 
current design investments (delayed incentive)”95 
 Any IPR benefits come at end-of-life. With longer product life, IPR economic 
benefits from reduced end-of-life costs could be negated when a discount rate is 
applied to the current investment costs associated with a design improvement. 
[BUT] It will become evident in the future how to address the extended payback 
period.  There could be an artificial earlier pay back, e.g. differentiated product 
compliance fees based on end-of-life design criteria.  In France fees are 
differentiated based on if they meet minimum criteria. i.e lower fees for products 
that have improved end-of-life properties.  The key is to differentiate based on when 
products are placed on the market, not the when they become waste, as it brings 
the payback forward. E.g. If a laptop had a mercury backlight you would add 20% to 
the compliance fee - differentiate costs based on design.96 
 
Logically, we can assume that any DfRR incentive will have more impact if it is felt at the 
time of putting the product on the market than if it is only realised at end of life.  This points 
towards a front-end payment system.  However, there are additional ways of addressing 
this problem within back-end systems via the use of financial guarantees.  
                                            
94 Source: IPR WG stakeholder questionnaire response from major LDA manufacturer. 
95 Individual Producer Responsibility: Principle vs Practical Implementation, C van Rossem, 2009, Slide 14.  
http://www.canadianstewardship.com/2009presdownloads/7vanRossemCanadianStewardship.pdf 
96 Chris van Rossem interview with IPR WG representative, May 2010. 
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Financial guarantees as a mechanism for rewarding DfRR 
 
If mandatory and equivalent financial guarantee requirements are placed on all producers, 
they can be either the primary or an additional mechanism for rewarding DfRR, depending 
on the WEEE system in place and its underlying financial model.  If the financial model 
enables different product properties resulting in lower end of life (EOL) costs to be 
reflected in the costs to the producers, so the financial guarantee would reflect these 
differentials.  For example: 
a) In a return share system where producers pay for their proportion of own products 
in WEEE arising but are charged a flat fee for a tonne of WEEE within a particular 
product category there is no reason why the financial guarantee should consider 
any DfRR features except potentially durability, upgradeability and their impact on 
product lifetime; 
b) If the WEEE system applies cost differentials by brand or product properties, then 
the financial guarantee should reflect any lower EOL costs resulting from those 
features; 
c) If a WEEE system gives the option for producers to access and take physical 
responsibility for their own WEEE at EOL, those producers choosing to do so may 
be able to reflect any lower EOL costs for their own brand WEEE within the financial 
guarantee for as long as they continue to select this option.   
According to the INSEAD IPR Network (2010) there are examples such as the Swedish 
recycling insurance for end of life vehicles (ELVs) which promotes design for recycling 
because “the easier the car is to recycle the lower the premium for the insurance”97.   
Applicability to All vs Optional Access to WEEE 
The other key factor affecting the impact of DfRR payback is whether it applies to all 
producers or only some.  For example: 
a) Some WEEE systems apply any DfRR payback to all producers e.g. in a return 
share system which charges less for some product types within a category than 
others the DfRR benefits/penalties are felt by all producers; 
b) In a return share system which charges a flat fee per product category but has the 
option for producers to segregate and separately treat their own WEEE, the DfRR 
‘benefits’ are only open to producers at extra cost.  Whilst there is evidence from 
Maine that these benefits are significant enough to warrant segregation of monitors 
and desktop printers for several large producers, the DfRR benefits would not be 
                                            
97 IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE 
Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010, p. 59.  
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=45054 
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as readily accessible to smaller brands with less volume and hence fewer 
economies of scale98.   
Therefore, whilst there are good reasons for enabling producers to access their own 
WEEE either via segregation within collective collection or via their own take-back 
channels, it should not be seen as proxy for providing DfRR payback for all producers. 
7.4 Conclusions 
There are many quotes from experts and stakeholders alike that reiterate and support the 
theory that “Individual Producer Responsibility provides a competitive incentive for 
producers to design their products so that they are easier and therefore cheaper to 
recycle” (ERP, 2007).  However, other experts such as Huisman and Magalini, dispute 
this.   
This leads to 2 questions (1) what level of DfRR payback potentially exists for household 
WEEE and (2) can IPR systems access and return this payback to the producer? 
(1) The IPR WG could not find a comprehensive review of the range of DfRR 
improvements for each category of household EEE and their cost implications (i.e. the cost 
to make the change versus the reduced costs or benefits at end of life).  Given the rate of 
technology change within the EEE sector and developments in recycling methods any 
such study would, in any case, illustrate only a snapshot in time.  Based on the Group’s 
combined knowledge of the EEE sector, re-use and recycling industry it is fair to conclude 
that the relative value of DfRR payback will vary per product, change over time and 
be dependent on secondary factors such as treatment requirements, re-use and 
recycling targets. 
It is also possible that in future, producers may want to access their own WEEE not only 
because it may be more cost-effective to treat than mixed WEEE and to reduce their 
compliance costs but driven also by the need to access the materials contained therein 
(e.g. known, pure grade recycled plastics, rare earth metals). 
(2) Evidence from existing schemes such as the Japanese HARL system and the Maine 
return share system does indicate that DfRR benefits are being realised.  However, the 
lack of ‘Full IPR’ schemes globally and the fact that IPR is intended to work alongside 
other policy tools as an incentive for DfRR makes it difficult to obtain a definitive picture. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, a blueprint for an effective WEEE system which 
maximises DfRR incentives would be a system which: 
 Is flexible and will enable DfRR payback to all producers within a product category as 
and when improved features or technologies which reduce environmental impact at 
end of life are developed e.g. LED versus mercury backlights within displays; 
                                            
98 “the cost savings may not be seen if you do not have the volume”, Maine Dept of Environmental 
Protection, Pers Comm May 2012 
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 Considers the secondary factors affecting the value of DfRR payback in order to 
maximise potential environmental benefits e.g. treatment requirements, recycling and 
re-use targets; 
 Ensures as far as reasonably possible that the value of DfRR payback exceeds the 
costs of implementation for all producers.  In other words a system which is costly to 
implement should not be imposed on all producers if the likely DfRR benefits are small 
or would only apply to the few; 
 Ensures that DfRR payback is available to all producers, large and small; 
 Provides immediate DfRR payback, not delayed.  Any financial payback to producers 
based on the DfRR characteristics of the products they POM needs to be immediate to 
be effective and not rely on long-term feedback loops.  The financial payback should 
not be at the point when that product becomes WEEE as this would delay the impact 
and reduce the incentive for design change. 
 Incorporates the option for producers to access their own WEEE (a) as a route to 
reduced treatment costs as payback for DfRR investments and (b) in recognition that 
physical access may become more important in future e.g. as options for closed loop 
recycling improve and in response to potential sourcing issues affecting special and 
precious metals. 
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8. Options Development & Analysis 
This section presents the methodology used by the IPR WG to identify 
and analyse a range of potential options for incorporating IPR elements 
within the UK WEEE system.  
This section explains how the IPR WG: 
 identified a wide range of potential options based on knowledge gained from the 
evidence review; 
 developed a series of criteria for evaluating these options; 
 reduced the list of potential options to a reasonable number for direct stakeholder 
consultation; 
 held a stakeholder event to obtain feedback on the evaluation criteria and selected 
options; 
 refined and weighted the criteria based on stakeholder feedback and subsequently.  
evaluated the selected options using these criteria.  
Figure 8.1 summarises the process.  
Figure 8.1:  Process Diagram 
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8.1 Identification of Options 
The IPR WG considered it important to identify a wide range of options incorporating 
different IPR elements and not limit the discussion to ‘pure IPR’ options.  Eleven options 
were identified covering  (a) market share (b) return share and (c) payment for own WEEE 
(see Section 5 for an explanation of these 3 approaches).   
The options were developed during a series of IPR Working Group meetings with 
assistance from the consultants.  The options originated or were adapted from: 
 models proposed by experts in published papers; 
 models proposed by stakeholders during the initial consultation exercise; 
 existing WEEE schemes used in other countries e.g. Japan; 
 modifications or variants developed by the IPR WG.   
Figure 8.2 summarises these initial options and Table 8.1 provides a more detailed 
description of each one. 
Figure 8.2: Summary of Initial Options 
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Table 8.1: Description of Initial Options Identified by the IPR Working Group. 
Approach Description 
MARKET SHARE:  
1. Independent Route. 
 
The current UK WEEE 
system is modified to 
facilitate producers 
wishing to undertake 
their own take-back 
activities. 
 Producers register with a compliance scheme OR opt to undertake their own take-back and register 
independently.  
 Producers opting for the ‘independent’ route must demonstrate they have established adequate collection 
network (e.g. postal system).  Take-back may be only own brand or may cover mixed brand WEEE. 
 Third parties should not hinder take back activities by the ‘independent route’ producers. 
 Producers’ obligations would be calculated by market share as at present.  However, a set volume could be 
introduced for the ‘independent route’ producers, based on the collection targets within the WEEE recast. 
 All producers need a financial guarantee (intention is to create a level playing field). 
 Consider mechanisms for over/under collection (e.g. paying standard price for evidence, banking evidence). 
MARKET SHARE:  
2. Narrower Product 
Categories. 
 
The current UK WEEE 
system is modified by 
making changes to the 
reporting categories. 
 Producers’ obligations are still calculated by market share.  PCS membership and collection channels are 
unaltered. 
 Additional product sub-categories are introduced where the cost of treating and recycling is significantly 
different from the other products in the category. An example could be ‘mobile phones’ as a sub-category of 
category 3.  PCS charges should reflect the actual costs of collecting and treating products within the sub-
category.    
 The intention is to try and ensure that reporting categories cover relatively homogenous products with similar 
treatment costs and thus avoid the situation where producers of products with high value or low treatment 
costs effectively subsidise the costs of other products within the same reporting category (see Section 6.3 on 
‘Product and Collection Categories’ for further explanation and examples).   
MARKET SHARE:  
3. IPR ‘Club’. 
 
 Two systems would operate concurrently.  Producers could choose whether to join the existing CPR system 
within a PCS or the alternative ‘IPR’ PCS sub set.  The ‘IPR’ PCS sub set would operate as follows: 
 Producers have to sign up to an agreed DfRR (Design for Reuse/Refurb/Recycling) protocol/standard. 
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Approach Description 
  Within the IPR product sub set, producers cost allocation by the PCS will be determined on the basis of 
product type and actual cost of recycling. This will differentiate between products and reward/penalise 
accordingly.  In addition, producers will pay an additional amount to cover the cost of future treatment thus 
building up an accrual. 
 In the initial years of the system, the ‘IPR’ PCS can purchase evidence at a set fee to address any under-
collection of WEEE through the IPR system. The ‘set fee’ is arranged by the authorities. 
MARKET SHARE: 
4. Mandated 
Surcharges or 
Reductions. 
 
This is based on the 
current French 
‘bonus/malus’ system. 
 Producers’ obligations are calculated based on market share.  
 A mandatory percentage premium or reduction is applied to PCS compliance fees based on products’ put on 
the market (POM) environmental attributes.   
 Products with specific characteristics which affect end of life management costs are set a percentage 
increase or decrease. 
 PCS are obliged to apply this mandated increase or decrease to producer fees. 
 See Annex A for further details of French bonus/malus system. 
MARKET OR RETURN 
SHARE: 
5. Optional Return 
Share. 
  
Market share is the 
default financing method 
 Producers have an option to report products according to category (1, 2, 3 etc) and pay according to market 
share. 
 Alternatively a producer can choose to form their own product category (Category Producer ‘X’) and report 
their market share data in this exclusive category. 
 Those producers choosing to report data in their own separate category pay according to return share.  
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Approach Description 
but producers can opt 
for return share99 
RETURN SHARE: 
6. Brand Sampling or 
Counting 
(Categories) 
 
 Example: Maine 
 Producers register and report general categories of products sold, however they do not report detailed sales 
quantities. 
 All WEEE is collected through existing DCF network. WEEE is sampled to identify the proportion of each 
brand within the product category.  These proportions are then applied to all WEEE arising within the product 
category and used to calculate the costs to each brand owner.   
 Costs are charged as a standard fee per tonne within the product category.  Costs per tonne do not vary 
between brands unless a producer opts to segregate and separately treat their own brands. 
RETURN SHARE: 
7. Brand Sampling or 
Counting 
(Technologies) 
 Producers register and report the general categories and types of products sold, however they do not report 
detailed sales quantities. 
 All WEEE is collected through existing DCF network. WEEE is sampled and proportions of WEEE allocated to 
different brands /producers. 
 Producers are charged based on narrower product categories or attributes (e.g. separate displays into CRT, 
LED Hg, LED Hg free). 
PAYMENT FOR OWN 
WEEE: 
8. Collaborative IPR  
 
 This is a back-end IPR option.  
 Producers are required to establish take back and recycling systems for their own products. 
 They can collaborate with other producers and organise joint collection and recycling to avoid 
sorting/sampling by brand.  
                                            
99 Source: Developing a Practical Solution to the Implementation of Individual Producer Responsibility for the WEEE Directive in the UK published by ERP UK 
in December 2007 
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Approach Description 
Example: Japanese 
HARL system 
 The costs paid should therefore be reflective of their own (or similar) products. 
PAYMENT FOR OWN 
WEEE: 
9. ‘Pure’ IPR  
 This is a back-end IPR option.  
 Producers are required to establish take back and recycling systems for their own products. 
 They can collaborate with other producers and organise joint collection and recycling although there has to be 
brand identification to allow costs to be allocated to individual producers.  
 The costs paid should therefore be reflective of their own products. 
PAYMENT FOR OWN 
WEEE:  
10.  Front End Payment 
funds future WEEE 
 This is a front-end IPR option. Producers pay upfront cost when putting a product on the market.   
 This money is then used to fund collection + treatment costs of future WEEE arisings.   
 Compliance fees for new WEEE at the point of POM have to be calculated based on estimated treatment 
costs in future and estimated product lifetimes.  
 There will be a ‘double payment’ period where producers have to fund new WEEE being POM in addition to 
current WEEE arising. 
 There are no real life examples of this model to our knowledge.   
PAYMENT FOR OWN 
WEEE:  
11. Front End Payment 
based on set 
 Producers pay an upfront fee when putting a product on the market.   
 Product sub-categories are defined based on technologies with similar treatment and recycling costs.  The 
upfront fee is standard for all products within a particular sub-category e.g. all LCD displays with mercury-free 
backlight being POM pay £X, all CRT being POM pay £Y.  
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Approach Description 
product 
differentials100 
 Producer fees are effectively split into 2 parts: (1) based on predicted/estimated future recycling costs i.e. how 
much will that product cost to treat when it becomes WEEE (adjusted for likely return rates) and (2) collective 
financing requirements for historic waste and shortfalls.   
 Money generated by the upfront fee is used to finance WEEE arising within that product sub-category.  
Additional fees are charged to cover the costs of historic WEEE arising based on market share. 
 There are mechanisms for handling any over payment (e.g. return to producers or accrued by scheme). 
 
 
                                            
100 Source: Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment through improved cost allocation, K. Mayers, R. 
Lifset. K. Bodenhoefer, and L. N. Wassenhove.  Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012. 
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8.2 Evaluation Criteria 
Having identified a range of possible approaches, the IPR WG then developed a 
series of evaluation criteria. These are shown in Table 3.3.  These evaluation criteria 
were based on the Terms of Reference for the IPR WG which states that the 
business case for IPR must satisfy four imperatives101: commercial, environmental, 
political and consumer.   
Appraisal Criteria: Does this approach… 
Commercial Imperatives 
1. Avoid producers accruing funds for future WEEE liabilities? 
2. Provide a robust mechanism for financing the treatment of orphan or non-
branded products equitably?  
3. Use a cost allocation which is easy to understand, fair and reasonable? 
4. Offer producers cost certainty (greater predictability of costs enabling more 
accurate future financial planning)? 
Environmental Imperatives 
5. Reward producers that invest in Product Durability (including ease of repair, 
upgrade)? 
6. Reward producers that invest in Design for Recycling (e.g. reduced 
hazardousness, ease of disassembly/material separation, fewer material 
types etc)?   
7. Enhance reuse/refurbishment?   
8. Support minimum transport movements associated with WEEE collection 
and management? 
Political Imperatives 
9. Reflect the Government aim of reducing regulatory and administrative 
burdens on business?  
10. Meet the requirements of Article 8.2?  
11. Reflect the Government aim of reducing regulatory and administrative 
burdens on SMEs? 
12. Straightforward for authorities to implement and enforce (e.g. Local 
Authorities, Environment Agency, Central Government)? 
Consumer Imperatives 
13. Support a collection infrastructure which is widely accessible and 
straightforward for consumers to use? 
                                            
101 A full copy of the IPR WG Terms of Reference and the four imperatives is provided in Annex E. 
IPR Working Group Report 
 
77 
 
An IPR WG meeting was held, during which members evaluated the 11 options 
against the criteria.  Following this evaluation, the WG decided that 5 options should 
be presented at the stakeholder event covering the range of different financing 
mechanisms (market share, return share, payment for own WEEE).   
The highest scoring options within each of the 3 approaches were selected as 
follows: 
Figure 8.3:  Selection of 5 Options 
 
8.3 Stakeholder Event 
A stakeholder event was held on 22nd March 2012.  Further details are provided in 
Annex B. Approximately 45 stakeholders attended primarily PCSs and large 
producers/producer trade associations.  No NGOs were able to attend.   
The 5 options were presented along with their key opportunities and challenges. 
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Break Out Groups 
Following the presentations, attendees were divided into 5 break-out groups and 
asked to comment on (a) proposed criteria for assessing options and (b) five 
example options. 
Stakeholder Feedback on Evaluation Criteria 
Participants were asked to comment on the 13 proposed evaluation criteria.  The aim 
was to identify which criteria were most important for the stakeholders present, which 
criteria were considered redundant and any additions or amendments. 
Taking the results from all groups and using the majority views to rank the criteria, 
the outcome was as follows: 
TOP Priority  “Support a collection infrastructure which is widely accessible 
and straightforward for consumers to use.” 
HIGH Priority  “Use a cost allocation which is easy to understand, fair102 and 
reasonable.” 
MEDIUM Priority 
 “Reward producers that invest in Design for Recycling” 
 “Reflect the Government aim of reducing regulatory and 
administrative burdens on business” 
 “Meets requirements of Article 8.2” 
 
An additional issue highlighted as the top priority by several producers and PCSs 
was ‘access to WEEE’.  It was felt that this would help to enable producers to predict 
costs and prevent others from dictating costs.  These participants felt strongly that 
‘physical access to WEEE by producers/their PCSs’ should be one of the top key 
criteria.  One participant stated that this would be a “pre-requisite for any IPR 
system”. 
Stakeholder Feedback on Example Options 
Each group was also asked to comment on the 5 example options.   
Two groups reached consensus on a preferred option, one group selected ‘Market 
Share: Independent Route’ whilst another selected ‘Market Share: Mandated 
surcharges and reductions’.   
The other groups did not state a preference for a specific option although most were 
not in favour of ‘Return share’ or ‘Payment for Own WEEE: Pure IPR approach’.  In 
                                            
102 One group suggested adding the term ‘equitable’.  Another group considered that ‘fair and 
reasonable’ were much more important than ‘easy to understand’.  
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general, the stakeholders present felt that these were too burdensome and costly to 
implement for insufficient reward.  ‘Payment for Own WEEE: Front end option’ was 
not easy for participants to grasp and stakeholders felt that further explanation would 
be required in order to give a full considered opinion.   
Participants made the following general observations regarding the options: 
 There appears to be a trade-off between (a) ‘fairness’ or rewarding DfRR and (b) 
simplicity, practicality and low implementation costs.  No participants identified a 
win-win option or silver bullet either from amongst the examples provided or any 
alternative proposals.   
 The suitability of options will differ per product category.  An option may be better 
for one product category but worse for another.  
 Flexibility and a hybrid approach may be needed.  IPR could be applied to 
specific product categories.  The IPR mode within that category could also be 
flexible as illustrated by Maine where producers can opt to accept a return share 
of mixed products or can pay for their own brand to be segregated. 
 Changing over to an ‘IPR’ system could lead to painful ‘double costs’ for 
producers in the transition phase – where producers have to pay simultaneously 
for current WEEE arising and EEE POM. 
 Participants were split in their overall opinion on IPR.  Some were very positive 
about the opportunities and competitive advantage it could provide.  Others 
questioned the benefits and thought that incorporating individual financial 
responsibility via the UK WEEE Regulation was simply too burdensome. 
8.4 Evaluation of Options 
Following feedback from the stakeholder event, the evaluation criteria were revised: 
 Two criteria were removed bringing the total number down to 11: 
o Criterion 1 on accruals was removed to reflect the divergence in 
stakeholder opinion on the validity of this criterion; 
o Criterion 11 evaluating the impact on SMEs was removed as 
stakeholders felt that this should be evaluated as part of Criterion 9 
relating to impact on all businesses.  This decision was supported by 
early analysis which showed little difference between the options in 
terms of SME impact compared to the impact on all businesses; 
 The criteria were weighted to reflect stakeholder priorities resulting from the 
break out groups.  The top priority criterion (collection) was given a 4 fold 
multiplier, the high priority criterion (cost allocation easy to understand, fair 
and reasonable) a 3 fold multiplier and the medium priority criteria a 2 fold 
multiplier. 
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Each of the five options was then evaluated by the consultants and given a score 
from 0 (not met) to 10 (fully met) for each criterion.  It was found that some elements 
were difficult to score due to a number of possible variants within each option and 
that inevitably scoring is open to a degree of subjectivity.   
The results of the evaluation carried out by the consultants are provided in Annex C. 
They show that according to this evaluation process, the ‘Payment for own WEEE’ 
and the ‘Return Share Brand Counting or Sampling’ outperform the other proposed 
options. 
8.5 Development of a New Option – DfRR Weighting 
Obligation 
Nevertheless, on closer examination of the evaluation process, some members of 
the Working Group felt the process had failed to capture adequately whether the 
options would provide a realistic and practical solution for the UK. Further evaluation 
was considered necessary. 
In particular, some members of the Group were keen to see some characteristics of 
the present UK system retained whilst recognising the importance of (a) moving 
towards producers paying costs relating to their own WEEE whilst paying for WEEE 
arising and avoiding any double-payment period and (b) incorporating effective DfRR 
incentives via immediate (rather than delayed) payback.   
During these deliberations, the Group reflected on other possible ‘hybrid’ approaches 
and in parallel to these discussions a new DfRR weighting option was developed by 
the consultants103.  
This new DfRR weighting option retains some of the features of the UK system whilst 
applying an increase/decrease to obligated tonnages based on the current actual 
treatment costs and the characteristics of products being POM.   
This option received backing from members of the IPR Group. Members of the IPR 
Group felt this option should be further evaluated. It had some potential benefits but 
would also require some additional administration.  
Further information about this option is now provided in Section 9.5. A detailed 
examination is provided in Annex D. 
                                            
103 The DfRR weighting option builds on concepts such as the French bonus/malus system and the 
proposal to alter obligated tonnages outlined in Fair and Efficient Implementation of Product Take-
Back Legislation with Collective Producer Responsibility, L. Gui, A. Atasu, O. Ergun, B. Toktay. 
Georgia Tech. Working Paper, 2012. 
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9. Developing an IPR Approach 
for the UK 
This chapter summarises the context within which an IPR solution 
could be developed in the UK.  It then provides an overview of the 3 
shortlisted options selected by the IPR WG and provides a 
comparative assessment of these 3 options. 
Having fully considered the evidence and information arising in Sections 1 to 7 along 
with the process of evaluation undertaken in Section 8, the IPR WG shortlisted three 
potential options that could be applied in the UK context. 
9.1 Key elements of the recast WEEE Directive with respect 
to IPR 
As discussed in the early sections of this report, the recast WEEE Directive 
introduces no significant changes to the requirements for financing household or 
non-household WEEE as set out in the original WEEE Directive.  Articles 8 and 9 
within the original WEEE Directive remain largely intact.  However, the recast WEEE 
Directive does introduce other changes which need to be considered when analysing 
potential IPR options for the UK.  Most notably: 
 Scope: Under the WEEE recast, after 6 years the scope will cover 6 product 
categories on an ‘open’ scope basis: Temperature Exchange Equipment; 
Screens & Monitors (Displays); Lamps; Other Large; Small ICT; Other Small. 
 Collection Targets: New collection targets for separately collected WEEE will 
apply to all WEEE (household and non-household) and will increase as outlined 
below.   
o After four years, the target will be 45% POM calculated on the basis of the 
total weight of WEEE separately collected in a given year in the MS, 
expressed as a percentage of the average weight of EEE placed on the 
market in the three preceding years in the MS; 
o After seven years, this target will change to either 65% of EEE POM in the 
3 preceding years or alternatively 85% of WEEE generated in the 
MS;Within 3 years, the Commission will examine the possibility for setting 
individual collection rates for specified product categories; 
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o The majority of non-household WEEE is currently managed and treated 
outside of the current WEEE system. It has yet to be decided how this 
tonnage will be recorded and reported as part of future collection targets. 
It is not yet known how the targets will be implemented within the revised UK 
WEEE Regulations and if the collection targets will be assigned directly to PCSs 
or producers or whether they will be applied to different categories separately. 
 Brand/Producer Identification: The producer identification requirement 
previously covered by Article 11(2) has been removed.  Whilst the RoHS recast 
contains some manufacturer and importer identification requirements, these do 
not have to be indelibly marked on the products in all cases; 
 Differentiated Fees: The preamble states that collective schemes could provide 
for differentiated fees based on how easily products and the valuable secondary 
raw materials they contain could be recycled. 
9.2 Key elements of the current UK System 
Taking into consideration the current political and economic climate and the recast 
WEEE Directive, the IPR WG considers that the following fundamental elements of 
the current UK system are likely to remain in the medium to longer term:   
 The current definition of Producer within the UK WEEE Regulations is expected 
to remain largely unchanged except for the WEEE recast requirement to allow 
‘authorised/ legal representatives’ for producers that are already established in 
another Member State. This therefore means that (a) there may be multiple 
producers for one brand and (b) there are likely to be between 5000 – 6000 
producers registered in the UK; 
 The UK will maintain the requirement that all producers must be a member of a 
PCS, that the present operational plans will continue as before between the 
authorities and the schemes and that the responsibility for compliance in respect 
of any changes introduced will be for the PCS to implement with its producer 
members. Nevertheless individual producers will continue to be able to establish 
their own scheme to the same approval criteria if they wish; 
 The UK will maintain a multiple PCS model providing a competitive market and 
choice for Producers. There are currently 34 PCSs for household WEEE; 
 DCFs will remain largely as at present and may be supplemented by producers’ 
own take-back activities.  Local Authorities or their waste contractors will contract 
with PCSs for WEEE collection, treatment and evidence.  There are currently 
1748 DCFs, of which approximately 1200 (68%) are local authority sites and the 
remainder are private e.g. retailers, other commercial operators, charities etc.; 
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 The DTS will remain in operation substantially as at present to provide an 
alternative for retailers in store take-back, although its operation may be 
enhanced to cover the additional recast requirements (with respect to retailing 
activities); 
 All separately collected household WEEE must be treated at AATFs to the 
standards set out in the UK WEEE Regulations.  Resulting evidence is issued by 
AATFs to a PCS.  There are currently approximately 170 AATFs.  
9.3 Key long term goals for the UK WEEE system 
In line with the key outcomes that the WEEE Directive and Article 8.2 in particular 
intends to achieve, the IPR WG considers that an IPR approach within the UK 
WEEE system should encompass the following long term goals: 
 Producers pay costs relating to their own new household WEEE in 
accordance with Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive.  
 Provides incentives or payback for DfRR (design for easier repair, 
upgrading, reuse or recycling).  
 Producers should have the option to manage their own WEEE compliance 
directly (with appropriate regulatory safeguards to ensure controls are 
applied as per PCSs). 
However, the IPR WG also recognises that it may not be possible to make the 
transition to ‘full’ IPR in one step.  The introduction of IPR needs to be retrofitted onto 
the existing infrastructure rather than designed onto a blank canvas.  Any approach 
must work within the framework of the recast WEEE Directive and must be both 
practical and realistic for the UK in line with the IPR WG’s terms of reference.  Given 
this context, the IPR WG concluded that a strategy of evolution rather than revolution 
is most appropriate at this point in time. 
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Figure 9.1:  Strategy of Evolution rather than Revolution 
 
 
 
9.4 Shortlisted Options 
The IPR WG short-listed 3 options which it is recommended the Government 
consider further in order to move towards the long term goals whilst being practical 
and realistic to implement in the UK in the foreseeable future.  These are: 
 A DfRR weighting mechanism which applies an increase/decrease to obligated 
tonnages based on the current actual treatment costs and the characteristics of 
products being POM104.   
 Front end payment for WEEE arising – based on a version of the model 
proposed by K. Mayers, R. Lifset, K. Bodenhoefer and L. N. Wassenhove.   
 Return share based on brand sampling with the option for producers to 
separate out their own brand WEEE at own cost. 
                                            
104 This is a new option which is fully explained in Annex D 
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An overview of these options is presented below, together with an analysis of their 
advantages and disadvantages.  It is important to highlight that this analysis has 
been undertaken against the background of the UK context outlined above (see Key 
elements of the current UK system). 
9.5 DfRR Weighting Mechanism 
Overview 
This approach involves the appropriate authority applying a DfRR weighting 
mechanism (specified percentage increase/decrease) to producers’ obligated 
tonnages of WEEE arising.  The weighting mechanism can be applied irrespective of 
how a producer’s obligated WEEE tonnage is calculated (e.g. through a 45% POM 
‘Recast’ target or through a current ‘market share’ collection target). 
 
The percentage increase/decrease is based on specified features of products that 
the producer is currently placing on the market, which have a significant impact 
(positive or negative) on the actual costs of re-use, repair, refurbishment, treatment 
and recycling. Reducing or increasing a producer’s obligated tonnage (and therefore 
cost) of WEEE arising within a product category is used as proxy for differences in 
collection and treatment costs of products currently being POM.  It therefore reflects 
in a relative rather than absolute form, the costs of collecting and treating products 
currently being POM whilst still funding WEEE arising.   
How would it work in the UK? 
All key elements of the current UK system as described above would remain.  This 
option would involve the following steps. 
1. BIS would establish the basis for calculating a producer’s obligated tonnage of 
WEEE arising e.g. market share, collection targets105 or other.  Whichever basis 
is selected would be set out within the UK WEEE Regulations and applied to all 
producers and schemes on a mandatory basis.  The outcome is that each 
producer is allocated a specific weight of WEEE arising that they must fund within 
each product category during a compliance period; 
2. The authorities (e.g. BIS) would identify key differentials that make one product or 
class of products cheaper to re-use, repair, refurbish or treat and recycle than 
another106.  Once the differential has been identified, it is allocated a percentage 
increase/decrease based on its impact on the cost of re-use, repair, 
                                            
105 For further details of this method please see ‘Collection Targets’ in Section 6.4 
106 It is possible that a similar process may occur at EU level in future either as part of the Eco-Design 
Directive or the recast WEEE Directive.  The WEEE recast includes a new clause Article 12(6) which 
states: “The Commission is invited to report, by ..., on the possibility of developing criteria to 
incorporate the real end-of-life costs into the financing of WEEE by producers, and to submit a 
legislative proposal to the European Parliament and the Council if appropriate”. 
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refurbishment or treatment and recycling at EOL.  There are various approaches 
which could be used to determine the differentials e.g. establish a Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC), joint producer/re-use /recycler forum, WRAP.  The 
differentials would be reviewed on a regular basis (e.g. annually) to take into 
account developments in product technology, treatment requirements and 
recycling processes.  Examples of possible differentials and options for their 
identification are discussed in Annex D; 
3. Producers would report their products POM (via schemes) within the product 
categories as at present (or as per the new product categories listed in the 
Recast in future).  In addition, producers would report data within sub-categories 
based on the differentials set in Step 2.  For example, when reporting displays, 
producers might be required to report the weight of displays POM with mercury 
backlights and the weight of displays POM with a mercury-free lighting source 
separately.   
4. The relevant authority (e.g. the Environment Agencies) would calculate the 
obligated volume of WEEE arising.  This could be done either for each producer 
or per PCS depending on how the system was implemented.  The obligated 
volumes would be worked out using the calculation specified in step 1 and then 
applying the specified percentage increase/reduction established in step 2.  
There are several variations on how the percentage increase/decrease could be 
applied to the obligated tonnages.  This could involve either a simple multiplier or 
a reallocation mechanism.  Both are illustrated in Annex D. 
5. Once steps 1 – 4 are completed, each producer would be notified  of their 
obligated tonnage either directly by the authorities or via its PCS depending on 
who was charged with undertaking the calculation and application of the 
weighting mechanism.  In either case, the PCSs would be free to set their price 
per tonne without restrictions but the tonnages of WEEE arising allocated to each 
producer should be directly transferred in order to make the weighting 
mechanism effective.      
6. Each producer would be free to either pay for compliance via the PCS costs per 
tonne and/or to meet all or some of their obligated tonnage via their own take-
back channels and have these discounted from their overall responsibility.    
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9.6 Front end payment funds WEEE arising 
Overview  
This approach is based on a model proposed by K. Mayers, R. Lifset, K. 
Bodenhoefer and L. N. Wassenhove107.  In this option, producers pay according to 
the current costs of collecting, treating, and recycling the sub-category of EEE being 
put on the market.  For example, rather than all display producers paying the same 
£/tonne or £/unit, those placing LCD Hg free displays on the market would pay less 
than those placing LCD with Hg backlights on the market based on the actual current 
recycling costs. 
This approach would result in a more accurate distribution of costs to producers108, 
however, as the amount and composition of WEEE arising will not be the same as 
that sold (e.g. CRTs are predominant in waste displays collected, but LCDs TVs 
comprise most sales) a balancing mechanism is introduced.  WEEE schemes either 
refund producers their average financial surplus per tonne for each collected WEEE 
collection category (e.g. displays) or recharge their average financial shortfall. 
Additional details of how the system would work in the UK are provided below. 
How would it work in the UK? 
This option would involve the following steps. 
1. Sub-categories within each existing WEEE collection category would need to be 
determined centrally by the Government or Environment Agencies. These sub-
categories would be determined according to actual treatment / recycling 
requirements or costs for the sub-category. It is envisaged that the number of 
sub-categories would be limited to around 10-15 and would result in a similar 
level of reporting complexity as experienced by producers at present. 
Example sub-categories could be: 
 Within the displays collection category,  the subcategories could be CRT TVs, 
LCD TVs (with mercury backlights), LCD TVs (mercury free),  
 Within the cooling collection category, the subcategories could be based on 
type of refrigerant. 
 Within the mixed WEEE collection category, the subcategories could be 
laptops (with mercury backlights), laptops (mercury free), servers, mobile 
phones, Other 
                                            
107 See Implementing individual producer responsibility for Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
through improved cost allocation, Paper accepted for Journal of Industrial Ecology, 2012. Note the 
shortlisted option is version 1 of the model and does not involve future estimated cost. 
108 According to K Mayers. 
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 Within the lamps collection category, the subcategories could be compact 
fluorescent light-bulbs and fluorescent tube lights. 
The LDA collection category would probably not have any sub-categories. 
The definition of treatment sub-categories could evolve with time to reflect 
changes in technology. 
2. The estimated WEEE return rate by sub-categories would also need to be 
determined centrally based on the lifetime sales vs waste. This could be adjusted 
regularly based on experienced return rates for any sub-category e.g. it can be 
expected that collection /sales volumes for LCDs will eventually match those over 
the lifetime of CRTs. 
3. Each scheme would then determine fees based on actual recycling costs, and 
then compete for producer members on this basis. AATFs already charge 
different fees for differing types of WEEE and have detailed knowledge of 
material values and treatment costs for each. The definition of sub-categories 
does not necessarily require their separate treatment (i.e. collection categories 
would be retained), but does encourage better allocation of actual treatment 
costs and recycling value to each sub-category.  
4. Producers would report their products POM within the sub-categories and pay 
fees according to the current costs of collecting, treating, and recycling these 
sub-categories.  A further payment by/refund to individual producers would be 
required to balance the total incoming producer fees with the total outgoing 
treatment and recycling costs paid by the schemes.  
 
The balancing part of the fee calculation would be based on overall scheme costs 
for a collected category e.g. displays, cooling etc. This balancing calculation 
could be estimated monthly and corrected / adjusted to actual scheme collected 
treated results during the normal end-of-year settlement period.  
9.7 Return Share based on Brand Sampling 
Overview 
Producers would be allocated responsibility for a proportion of WEEE arising within 
each product category based on (a) a brand sampling exercise to identify the 
percentage of their own brand(s) within WEEE arising and (b) a percentage of 
unregistered WEEE pro rata based on return share.  Producers would have the 
option to separate out their own brand WEEE at point of collection, consolidation or 
treatment at their own cost. Alternatively producers could pay the standard fees per 
tonne as charged by their PCS. 
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How would it work in the UK? 
All key elements of the current UK system as described above would remain.   
1. Producers would have to register and report data according to brand names they 
were putting on the UK market.   
2. A brand sampling exercise would be undertaken by, or on behalf of, the 
authorities to identify the proportion of each brand within each product category 
of WEEE arising. This would need to be of adequate scope and frequency to 
account for geographical and seasonal differences in WEEE arising at multiple 
DCFs or AATFs across all product categories in order to be suitably 
representative and statistically reliable.  It may be funded by central government 
or by producers depending on how it is implemented. The weight of each brand 
within the sample would determine the percentage allocated per brand.   
 
Eg,  if within 100 tonnes of waste there were 20 tonnes of brand yellow, 50 
tonnes of brand blue, 20 tonnes of orphan products and 10 tonnes of product 
associated with free riders109 yellow would be allocated 20%, blue 50%, orphan 
products 20% and free riders 10%.  In practice, a more sophisticated sampling 
protocol would be developed involving representative samples being taken for 
each product category from different localities and at different times of year to 
ensure that any significant geographical and seasonal differences were captured.   
3. The percentages from step 2 would then be applied to the total weight of WEEE 
arising within a compliance period to calculate a producer’s obligated tonnage.  
Each producer would pay for their ‘own’ brand proportion plus a proportion of 
orphan products and free riders110.  If financial guarantees were required then 
over time there would be no orphan products.  If financial guarantees were not 
required then the costs for orphan products would be divided between producers 
remaining on the market in proportion to their own brand percentage111.  As 
would be expected, experience has shown (e.g. ICT Milieu, Maine) that return 
share systems operate best where the proportion of orphan and free rider 
products is minimal112.  This depends on enforcement (to minimise free riders) 
                                            
109 Unregistered brands would be due to either free riders (i.e. brands belonging to a single producer 
who had not registered) or orphans (i.e. brands belonging to producers who had now left the market). 
110 For example, if brand yellow was only being POM by a single producer, this producer’s obligated 
tonnage would be calculated as 20% for own brand + 6% for orphans/free riders = 26% of WEEE 
arising in that product category during the compliance period.  The orphans/free riders proportion is 
calculated by applying the producer’s brand share percentage to the percentage of orphans/free 
riders from the sampling exercise therefore 20% of 30% = 6%.   
111 Under the majority of return share systems which exist at present, or have in the past, e.g. Maine, 
ICT Milieu in the NL, the costs of orphan products were shared by the producers still existing on the 
market and individual financial guarantees were not required. 
112 See pages 30 – 36 in IPR: A Review of Practical Approaches to Implementing Individual Producer 
Responsibility for the WEEE Directive, INSEAD IPR Network, INSEAD Working Paper, 2010. 
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and either a product category with a high proportion of relatively stable brands or 
the presence of financial guarantees (to minimise orphan products). 
4. Where a single brand is being POM by multiple producers (i.e. due to definition 
of Producer within the current UK Regulations and recast WEEE Directive), the 
percentage allocated to that brand must be divided up between the responsible 
producers of that brand.  Arguably the fairest and most accurate way of doing 
this would be based on market share using historical sales figures (if available) 
but otherwise market share based on current sales figures could be used.  This 
would place an additional reporting requirement on producers (especially 
importers) who will need to report by brand. In practice, the ‘primary’ brand 
owners may opt to assume responsibility for all their branded products (even if 
imported via another party), therefore increasing the burden on brand owners. 
5. Once the above steps are completed, each producer would be notified of their 
obligated share either directly by the authorities or via its PCS, depending on who 
was charged with undertaking the calculation and application of the return share 
mechanism.  In either case, the PCSs would be free to set their price per tonne 
without restrictions but the tonnages allocated to each producer should be 
passed down to each producer directly according to the return share calculation 
in order to make the mechanism effective.        
6. Each producer would be free to either pay for compliance via the PCS costs per 
tonne and/or to meet all or some of their obligated tonnage via their own take-
back channels and have these discounted from their overall responsibility.  This 
would need to be subject to the same requirements for reporting and controls as 
apply to PCSs.  A producer would need to provide sufficient advance notification 
to its PCS of its plans to undertake individual take-back so that the PCS can 
make effective compliance plans. 
7. In addition, each producer would have the option of paying for their own brand 
WEEE to be separated at DCFs or AATFs and to finance its re-use, 
refurbishment or recycling.  Given the number of PCSs in the UK, this option is 
easiest to implement for the WEEE collected by the member’s own PCS.  The 
PCS would set a charge which would cover the costs of collection, transport (if 
applicable) and separation and then the producer would organise and pay the 
costs of re-use, refurbishment or recycling for their own brand products from the 
point of separation onwards.   
8. Implementing brand separation of WEEE in the control of other PCSs would 
require commercial negotiation and reciprocal agreements between the PCSs to 
be put in place.  Alternatively a system may allow producers to reach agreement 
with other PCSs to pay for access to their own brand WEEE.  
IPR Working Group Report 
 
91 
 
Table 9.1 Analysis of Shortlisted Options113 
Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
Commercial imperatives 
What are the likely 
time and resource 
implications on 
producers 
implementing the 
approach? 
Note any 
particular impacts 
on SMEs. 
 Additional data burden on 
producers to report their 
products POM in sub-categories 
according to the specified 
product differentials.  The impact 
of this data burden would 
depend on (a) the number of 
differentials set (b) whether the 
differentials related to features 
already captured within 
producers’ existing product data 
systems.  This may still only be 
10-15 categories as today, but 
initially a change in reporting 
would be required. A default 
 Producers may need to pay for 
the brand sampling to be 
undertaken and maintained. It is 
difficult to predict the costs of 
sampling exercises. The costs 
quoted for existing return share 
systems are modest (28k Euro/a 
in one US state and similar in 
some smaller EU markets) 
however their geographical 
scale, sampling frequency and 
product scope is different to that 
envisaged in the UK. 
 Additional data burden as all 
producers must report POM data 
 Additional data burden on 
producers to report their POM 
data in treatment sub-
categories. The impact of this 
data requirement would 
depend on whether the sub-
categories related to features 
already captured within 
producers’ existing product 
data systems.  This may still 
only be 10-15 categories as 
today. 
 Schemes may hold limited 
surpluses for a short period 
during a compliance period, 
                                            
113 The bases of the format analysis was agreed by a majority of the IPR WG with only one member dissenting. 
IPR Working Group Report 
 
92 
 
Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
reporting category could be set if 
this is considered too 
burdensome for all, or a 
particular, differential.  However, 
this would reduce the impact of 
the DfRR payback. 
9. This option will require a 
process/organisation to 
analyse and determine the 
product attributes to be 
differentiated. Producers may 
wish to be involved in this. 
The level of impact will be 
influenced by the breadth of 
coverage of the differentials. 
 The model has no practical 
experience and so it is difficult 
by brand. 
 EEE must have indelible brand 
marking114. 
 Producers opting for separation 
of own brand would need to 
negotiate terms with PCS(s) 
and potentially DCFs and 
AATFs, to fund costs of 
separation and organise re-
use, refurbishment or recycling. 
 Producers that experience a 
sharp reduction in product 
sales will still face high WEEE 
costs.  Conversely new 
entrants to the market will face 
low WEEE costs. 
although this is equivalent to 
current practice.  
 This particular front end 
payment model has no 
practical experience and so it is 
difficult to assess 
implementation costs. 
 
                                            
114 The name of the importer does not have to be on the EEE.  However, the EEE must clearly bear the brand declared by the importer at point of registration 
in order for the brand to be identified during the sampling exercise. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
to assess implementation 
costs.   
 
What are the likely 
Producer impacts 
in terms of 
Financial 
Guarantees (FG)? 
 It is possible to implement this 
option either with, or without, 
individual producer FGs.  If 
without, a collective FG would 
need to be in place from all 
remaining Producers in the 
market. 
 A return share system based 
on brand sampling could 
operate with FG in order to 
reduce the proportion of orphan 
WEEE.   
 A system without FG would 
require orphan products to be 
funded by producers in some 
other way (e.g. pro rata). 
 Return share is less effective 
for product categories with a 
high level of orphan WEEE. 
The financial viability of a return 
share system without FGs may 
be threatened if several major 
players within a product 
category leave the market. 
 The balancing payment would 
provide a collective guarantee.  
Essentially the same as under 
the current UK WEEE system.  
 An additional FG system could 
be implemented if desirable. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
What are the likely 
Producer impacts 
in terms of 
Company 
accruals?  Note 
the analysis 
responses are 
based on the IPR 
WG’s opinion and 
do not represent 
legal or 
professional 
accountancy 
advice. 
 
 Accruals would primarily 
depend on what approach is 
used to calculate the obligated 
tonnage (e.g. market share, 
collection target, other).  This 
determines when the accrual 
would need to be made and for 
how long.  The weighing 
mechanism would 
subsequently affect the level of 
any accrual. 
 
 Companies would be required 
to make accruals from the point 
of putting a product on the 
market as this is when the 
liability is incurred. 
 The accrual would need to be 
made for the lifetime of the 
product taking into 
consideration the following 
variables: future treatment 
costs, estimated product 
lifetime, likely return rate, 
proportion of separated own 
brand WEEE in future, 
proportion of free riders, 
volume of orphans in future 
(depending on FG 
requirements). 
 Short terms accruals may be 
needed for the immediate 
compliance period (e.g. 12 
months).  As under the current 
UK WEEE system. 
What are the likely 
time and resource 
implications on 
 This option will require a 
process/organisation to analyse 
 Negotiate and organise 
process to enable own brand 
 Essentially Compliance 
Scheme procedures would 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
Producer 
Compliance 
Schemes 
implementing the 
approach? 
and determine the product 
attributes to be differentiated. 
PCSs may wish to be involved 
in this. The level of impact will 
be influenced by the breadth of 
coverage of the differentials. 
 Possibly some additional 
administration to allocate 
weighted obligation to producer 
members depending on 
whether this is done by the 
PCS or by the Environment 
Agencies. 
 
separation at either DCF or 
AATF. 
 Negotiate terms and costs with 
producers opting for own brand 
separation. 
 Potential role to check brand 
marking is being followed by 
members? 
remain the same as today, with 
some adjustments to their 
internal accounting only. 
 Compliance Schemes would 
be encouraged to differentiate 
fees to producers based on 
actual recycling costs, meaning 
they may seek greater 
technical expertise than today. 
 
What are the likely 
implications for 
Local Authorities?
 No implications.  If own brand separation occurs 
after point of collection – no 
impact on LAs. 
 If own brand separation occurs 
at point of collection e.g. DCF – 
 No implications. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
the LA or its contractors would 
need to negotiate and organise 
process with PCS.  Separation 
unlikely to be feasible at small 
scale DCFs due to space 
constraints.   
What are the likely 
time and resource 
implications on 
AATF’s 
implementing the 
approach? 
 No implications.  Selected AATFs will need to 
participate in the brand sample 
exercises. 
 Optional own brand separation 
is likely to be most feasible at 
an AATF. All AATFs would 
need to negotiate costs with 
PCSs and establish a process 
to enable own brand separation 
for those producers selecting 
this route.  Note the costs of 
separation would be funded by 
the producer. 
 AATFs may be asked by 
Compliance Schemes to 
breakdown their costs and 
materials data in greater detail 
to assist with calculating sub-
category fees.  
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
Would it be 
compatible with 
producers doing 
their own take 
back within PCS 
framework? 
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Environmental imperatives 
To what extent 
would it provide 
incentives or 
payback to 
Producers for 
DfRR? 
 
 Once the differentials have 
been agreed, the producer gets 
an immediate gain/penalty 
based on the DfRR features of 
the product being POM.   
 It is possible for the differentials 
to take into account any trade-
offs between environmental 
impacts. 
 It is equally applicable to 
producers of all sizes.  Any 
payback from DfRR changes 
 Producers investing in product 
durability would be likely to 
have reduced WEEE costs 
although this would depend on 
weight, costs of 
repair/refurbishment etc. 
 Producers complying only via 
PCS tonnages would receive 
few DfRR incentives or 
payback (assuming PCSs 
continued to charge a flat fee 
per tonne per product 
category). 
 Fees would be differentiated to 
producers based upon the 
actual recycling and treatment 
costs of their products, in 
accordance with the principle of 
‘IPR’. The producer gets an 
immediate gain/penalty based 
on the DfRR features of the 
product being POM. 
 In this system, there is no direct 
relationship between the 
producer and recycler. 
Producers will not get their own 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
covered by the specified 
differentials is available to both 
SMEs and larger producers. 
 Payback is limited to those 
DfRR factors which are easily 
and clearly measurable at the 
time of putting a product on the 
market i.e. ‘yes’ the EEE meets 
the differential or ’no’ it does 
not.   
 In this system, there is no direct 
relationship between the 
producer and recycler. 
Producers will not get their own 
products back to close the loop 
without some additional 
mechanism.   
10. The response to DFRR changes 
could be slow depending on the 
process for agreeing/revising 
 The primary mechanism for 
producers to access DfRR 
payback would be via the 
separation of their own brand 
WEEE.  They would pay the 
additional costs of separation 
but could benefit directly from 
DfRR payback for the specific 
volume of separated own brand 
WEEE.  The level of payback 
would therefore be dependent 
on the ability of producers to 
access their own brand WEEE 
within a multiple PCS system. 
 The viability of paying for 
separation (and hence access 
to DfRR rewards) may not be 
feasible for SMEs due to lack of 
economies of scale. 
 Producers opting for separation 
would access the actual 
products back to close the loop 
without some additional 
mechanism.   
 The response to producers’ 
DFRR changes will not 
necessarily have immediate 
effect due to required changes 
to the sub-categories.   
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
differentials.  
 
payback when the product 
reached EoL (i.e. delayed 
payback).  Producers may be 
able to access some form of 
immediate incentive via 
reduced accruals (and FGs if 
system requires).  This would 
depend on the auditors’ 
judgement. 
 For producers opting for brand 
segregation, end of life costs 
reflect the actual design 
improvements. 
Ease of 
applicability to all 
product 
categories.   
Would the option 
 Any product category for which 
there is a key differential which 
makes one product cheaper to 
re-use, repair, refurbish or treat 
and recycle than another and is 
 Products requiring separate 
manual handling (eg 
disassembly) are good 
candidates e.g. screens and 
cooling as they are separately 
 Any product category for which 
there is a key differential which 
makes one product cheaper to 
treat and recycle than another 
and is easily measurable. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
have full or 
restricted scope?  
Are there any 
product categories 
to which it would 
be easier or more 
difficult to apply?  
Note further 
research is 
required on this 
issue to provide a 
comprehensive 
analysis. 
easily measurable. managed so easier to 
identify115. 
 Some ICT producers believe it 
is well suited to their products. 
 Cooling and ‘Other large’ 
equipment due to ability to 
mark and  relatively small 
number of stable brands on the 
UK market. 
 Displays due to the manual 
handling requirements and 
size, although apparent 
frequency of brand ‘changes’ 
may be an issue. 
 May be challenging to apply to 
product categories with a large 
number of small products that 
                                            
115 Source: Informed by Chris van Rossem interview for IPR WG. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
are not easily identified or 
distinguished. 
What are the likely 
impacts on 
collection/return 
rates? 
 No impacts.  The current 
collection infrastructure will 
remain. 
 No impacts.  The current 
collection infrastructure will 
remain. 
 No impacts.  The current 
collection infrastructure will 
remain. 
Would it affect the 
level of transport 
movements 
required for 
WEEE collection 
& management? 
 No impacts as the current 
collection, transportation and 
treatment infrastructure will 
remain. 
 Increased transportation 
impacts would be likely to result 
from those producers wishing 
to separate their own brand 
WEEE from DCFs and AATFs. 
 No, the method operates 
independently of collection. 
Political imperatives 
To what extent 
would it meet the 
Article 8.2 
requirement that: 
Each producer 
Partially:  
 This will depend partly on what 
basis is selected by BIS for 
calculating the obligated 
tonnage (e.g. market share, 
Partially: 
 All producers would be 
responsible for a representative 
proportion of their own brand 
WEEE. 
 Arguably this option fully meets 
the requirements of Article 8.2 
as producers are paying the 
cost of treating their own 
product types according to 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
shall be 
responsible for 
financing [at least 
the collection, 
treatment, 
recovery and 
environmentally 
sound disposal of 
WEEE from 
private 
households 
deposited at 
collection 
facilities] relating 
to the waste from 
his own products.
 
 
collection target, other). 
 It will also depend on the scope 
of DfRR differentials applied. If 
they are limited in scope this 
approach will not move as far 
towards Article 8.2 compared to 
if a comprehensive range of 
differentials is applied. 
 The DfRR weighting reflects in 
a relative rather than absolute 
form, the costs of collecting and 
treating products currently 
being POM.  It is a matter of 
interpretation whether this 
meets the Article 8.2 wording 
‘relating to’.  
 For producers complying via 
the PCS tonnages the costs for 
that WEEE would not be 
reflective of the actual costs of 
treating their own WEEE 
(assuming PCSs retained 
universal £/tonne/product 
category). 
 For producers separating out 
their own brand WEEE the 
costs would fully meet Article 
8.2 for the volume of own brand 
WEEE that could be accessed.  
 The costs associated with 
imported products (producers 
who are importers) may in 
practice fall to brand owners. 
However, it is not clear how 
significant this displacement 
could be.   
defined sub-categories.  
 As the sub-categories are 
defined according to 
treatment/recycling costs of 
different product types, the 
costs a producer pays should 
be reflective of his own 
products.  
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
To what extent 
would it meet the 
Government aim 
of reducing 
regulatory and 
administrative 
burdens on 
business? 
 Additional reporting 
requirements would be faced by 
all producers. The impact of this 
data burden would depend on 
(a) the number of differentials 
set (b) whether the differentials 
related to features already 
captured within producers’ 
existing product data systems.  
A default reporting category 
could be set if this is considered 
too burdensome for all, or a 
particular, differential.  However, 
this would reduce the impact of 
the DfRR payback. 
11. This option will require a 
process to analyse and 
determine the product attributes 
to be differentiated in which 
producers may wish to be 
involved. The level of impact will 
 The burdens associated with 
separation would be on a 
purely optional basis. 
 There would be additional 
issues associated with 
agreements regarding the 
substitution of ‘own’ brand with 
‘mixed’ brand WEEE at AATFs. 
 
 Additional data burden on 
producers to report their POM 
data in treatment sub-
categories. The impact of this 
data requirement would 
depend on whether the 
differentials related to features 
already captured within 
producers’ existing product 
data systems.  This may still 
only be 10-15 categories as 
today. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
be influenced by the breadth of 
coverage of the differentials. 
Would it be easy 
for authorities 
(e.g. BIS, 
Environment 
Agencies) to 
implement in 
terms of time and 
resource 
requirements? 
Both initially and 
on an ongoing 
basis. 
 The main impact would be the 
time and resources required to 
identify relevant product 
differentials, set clear criteria 
and identify the appropriate 
weighting.  These will need 
reviewing on a regular basis e.g. 
annually.  The level of resources 
required depends heavily on the 
process selected (see Annex D) 
and also whether they are 
developed on a UK or EU level. 
 The central authority responsible 
for calculating obligated 
tonnages may need to establish 
an automated system to carry 
out the calculations and inform 
each producer and/or their PCS.  
The main impacts on authorities 
would be: 
 Identify which product 
categories would be suited to a 
return share option and any 
financial viability concerns 
based on market changes. 
 Oversee representative 
sampling exercise covering 
selected/all product categories. 
 Apply return share calculations 
to WEEE arising and apportion 
volumes of orphan/free riders 
as required. 
 Calculate and apportion 
responsibility between 
producers of the same brand if 
brand owner does not assume 
 There would be some work for 
agencies to introduce new 
WEEE sub-categories and 
determine acceptable return 
rates for use by schemes to 
calculate fees, and for 
transparency to producers on 
the return rates that should 
apply to their products. 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
This would involve an initial input 
of time and resources. 
responsibility. 
Can it be 
effectively 
enforced by the 
authorities?  What 
are the likely time 
and resource 
implications? 
 Ensuring that producers were 
correctly reporting products 
against the specified differentials
is the key additional requirement 
in terms of enforcement.  This 
would primarily be based on self-
declaration by producers. 
 There is a danger that without 
effective enforcement producers 
could manipulate their 
declarations to reduce their 
costs. This is the same as the 
current UK situation.   
 The effective operation of a 
return share system benefits 
greatly if free riders are 
minimised as it is based on 
apportioning costs by brand.  
The authorities would therefore 
need effective enforcement to 
ensure that the majority of 
producers and brands within 
each product category were 
registered. 
 An unfair burden would fall on a 
single producer if other 
importers of the same brand 
failed to register.  
 Ensuring that producers were 
correctly reporting products 
against the sub-categories is the 
key additional requirement in 
terms of enforcement.  This 
would primarily be based on 
self-declaration by producers. 
 There is a danger that without 
effective enforcement 
producers could manipulate 
their declarations to reduce 
their costs. This is the same as 
the current UK situation.   
What additional 
impact would it 
 No impacts on collection/return  No impacts on collection/return  No impacts on collection/return 
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Issue DfRR Weighting Mechanism Return Share  
(Brand Sampling + Optional 
Separation) 
Front End Payment funds WEEE 
Arising (K. Mayers et al) 
 
have on the UK’s 
obligation to meet 
the collection 
target within the 
WEEE recast? 
rates are envisaged. 
 The POM% collection target 
could be applied at individual 
producer level. 
rates are envisaged. 
 It would be difficult to apply the 
POM% collection target down 
to individual producer level 
within this system.  
rates are envisaged. 
 The POM% collection target 
could be applied at individual 
producer level. 
Consumer imperatives 
What are the likely 
impacts on the 
present collection 
infrastructure and 
accessibility? 
 No impacts as the current 
collection infrastructure will 
remain unchanged. 
 No or few impacts as the 
current collection infrastructure 
will remain and brand 
separation by the consumer at 
the DCF is an option but is 
unlikely to be the selected 
method for separating own 
brand WEEE. 
 No impacts as the current 
collection infrastructure will 
remain unchanged. 
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9.8 Evaluation Findings 
From the IPR WG evaluation of the options above, it is clear that all 3 have advantages 
and disadvantages.  The IPR WG did not find the ‘silver bullet’ - an option which all 
members believe clearly meets Article 8.2 and comprehensively rewards producers for 
DfRR whilst being practical and realistic to implement in the current UK context.   
However, it was felt that all 3 options listed would move the UK WEEE system closer to 
meeting Article 8.2 and, from an IPR perspective, would be an improvement on the current 
market share system. 
In order to identify the final recommendations of the WG, a vote was taken which resulted 
in: 
 An overall majority view that all 3 options should be presented to stakeholders by 
BIS as possible approaches for their consideration and feedback;  
 A slim majority supporting the DfRR weighting mechanism as the primary 
recommendation; 
 No votes for Return Share based on brand sampling or Front End payment for 
WEEE arising (specific model as outlined above) to be the primary 
recommendation116; 
 A single view that PCSs should be free to select and implement multiple options 
within a framework of key principles outlined in the UK WEEE Regulations. 
In addition, it was agreed that in order to (i) facilitate the move towards IPR (ii) address 
specific requests from producers and (iii) meet the WEEE Directive’s requirement that 
producers are allowed to set up and operate individual and/or collective take-back systems 
for WEEE from private households117, a primary recommendation is therefore made to fully 
enable and facilitate producers wishing to undertake their own individual take-back 
activities within the framework of mandatory PCS membership. 
                                            
116 One IPR WG member did vote that a front end payment model would be  their preferred option in a 
particular sector i.e. lighting but noted that it would not necessarily be a preferred option in all sectors.    
117 Article 5(2)d in the recast WEEE Directive. 
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10 Recommendations 
This section presents the IPR Working Group’s recommendations for 
how IPR could be practically and realistically implemented in the UK. 
This meets the principal aim of the Working Group as set out in the 
Terms of Reference. 
This section presents the IPR Working Group’s final recommendations for the Department 
of Business Innovation & Skills (BIS).  These constitute:  
 Primary recommendations for how the UK WEEE system could move towards 
Article 8.2 and incorporate IPR elements; and 
 Secondary recommendations focused on supporting actions which are needed to 
facilitate the primary recommendations. 
10.1 Key Principles  
Bearing in mind the current political and economic climate and the need to implement an 
approach which is both practical and realistic, the IPR WG recommends that the following 
key principles are applied.  The UK WEEE system should:  
 Move towards producers paying costs relating to their own WEEE in accordance 
with Article 8.2 of the original WEEE Directive and in doing so also incorporate effective 
DfRR incentives; 
 Be based on a strategy of evolution not revolution.  The UK has an established 
WEEE system and infrastructure which should be modified, through a series of interim 
evolutionary steps, to progress towards the policy aims of IPR as set out in Article 8.2; 
 Avoid any double-payment period.  Given the current economic pressures on 
producers, it is advisable to avoid any mandatory double-payment period (i.e. where 
producers pay for WEEE arising at the same time as paying for EEE being POM).      
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10.2 Primary Recommendations  
The IPR WG makes 2 primary recommendations as follows: 
Recommendation 1118: 
Three options for moving towards Article 8.2 should be presented by BIS within 
the forthcoming stakeholder consultation on possible changes to the UK WEEE 
Regulations.  This will enable the validity of the analysis undertaken in Section 9 to be 
tested and for the commercial and environmental merits of each to be properly 
determined.   
 
These 3 options119 are: 
 
 DfRR Weighting Mechanism 
 Return Share based on brand sampling 
 Front End payment for WEEE arising. 
By a slim majority, the IPR WG concluded that the DfRR Weighting Mechanism was the 
preferred option for the UK at this time but there were dissenting views.  The IPR WG 
recommend by overall consensus that all 3 options and their commercial and 
environmental merits should be presented for consultation. 
 
Recommendation 2: 
The UK WEEE system should fully enable and encourage producers wishing to 
undertake their own direct take-back activities for household WEEE whilst putting in 
place safeguards to ensure that the proper collection, treatment and recycling still occurs.   
This is in order to (i) facilitate the move towards IPR (ii) address specific demands from 
producers and (iii) meet the WEEE Directive’s requirement that producers are allowed to 
set up and operate individual and/or collective take-back systems for WEEE from private 
households120.  
In the current UK WEEE Regulations, Producers have this facility by being able to set up 
their own PCS.  It is recommended that this be extended by requiring PCS’s to offer 
Producers the option to undertake individual take-back within PCS membership, provided 
that the Producer can demonstrate that they will at least meet all the requirements that 
PCS’s are obliged to meet and that there will be no regulatory or financial risk falling on the 
PCS and/or the other members of the PCS.         
                                            
118 Recommendation 1 sets out the first step in a series of interim steps towards a full IPR system. An 
approach agreed by the IPR WG and as set out in Section 9.3 
119 See Section 9.4 
120 Article 5(2)d in the recast WEEE Directive. 
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Producers wishing to meet all or the majority of their obligations via own take-back within a 
PCS should not face prohibitive administration costs, unnecessary PCS costs linked to 
collective collection or unreasonable barriers to PCS membership.   
10.3 Secondary Recommendations 
These secondary recommendations are intended to inform both the Government and 
relevant authorities on other related matters that have come to the IPR WG’s attention 
during the preparation of this report. 
In the main, these are of a practical nature and due consideration should be given to them 
because they either a) highlight potential areas of risk and/or opaqueness in the present 
system or b) they have an impact on the effective implementation of the Primary 
Recommendations as set out in the section above. 
Guiding principle of evolution not revolution 
The purpose of this report is to set the UK on a course that will enable it, through a series 
of interim evolutionary steps, to progress towards the policy aims of IPR as set out in 
Article 8.2. In parallel to this, the sector as a whole will require time to consider and reflect 
upon the recommendations and/or implications arising from this report121. 
Recommendation 3:  
The Government, through BIS should take this window of opportunity to engage with the 
industry and the wider sector on the recommendations arising from this report. This will 
ensure that a phased implementation plan can be formulated that converges, in terms of 
any medium term regulatory changes required, with the transposition of the recast WEEE 
Directive but also allows time for the development and consideration of further longer term 
improvements and enhancements which might be considered in future. 
The Government, through BIS, should continue to have oversight of the UK’s IPR policy 
and its effective implementation. Guidance should then be provided to the Environment 
Agencies by BIS to enable them to advise the PCSs of the changes required so that these 
changes and/or requirements can be accommodated within the present PCS operational 
plans. The contractual relationship between the PCS and their producer members remains 
unchanged. Thereafter, the Environment Agencies will still remain responsible for 
monitoring and effective enforcement. 
Recommendation 4:  
The Government, through BIS should ensure that regular reviews are undertaken on the 
effective implementation of the UK’s policy on IPR to ensure that the intended aims of the 
WEEE Directive are being met. To this extent, minimum review intervals of 3 years appear 
appropriate in the circumstances.  This review process should take the opportunity to 
identify further evolution towards a full IPR approach taking into consideration 
                                            
121 It is assumed that new regulations in respect of the recast WEEE Directive will come into force in 2014 
following a consultation process. 
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developments in collection, treatment and recycling infrastructure, financial guarantee 
options, product identification (e.g. RFID tagging), policy development (e.g. Eco-Design 
Directive) and the nature of EEE being placed on the market and WEEE arising. 
Recommendation 5122:  
Depending on the IPR option ultimately decided upon by Government from the three set 
out in this report, the Government, through BIS, will need to consider what additional 
measures will be required in order to implement the option.  
By way of an example, BIS might have to establish an arm’s length advisory committee 
comprised of representatives from the producer community (all relevant categories and 
PCSs), collection and treatment industry, academia, enforcement authorities and NGOs, 
as applicable. A committee would need clear terms of reference to help advise the 
Government on an impartial basis on various aspects of implementation such as: 
 In relation to the DfRR Weighting Option: the possible product differentials and the 
relevant percentages to be adopted as well as more general issues regarding the 
future policy direction of IPR.  
 In relation to the Front End Payment Option: the possible WEEE sub-categories 
and likely return rates for these sub-categories of WEEE as well as more general 
issues regarding the future policy direction of IPR. 
 In relation to Return Share option: the sampling methodology to be undertaken and 
related guidance to help inform the actual sampling process as well as potential 
changes to the sampling methodology. 
Categorisation of UEEE and WEEE 
Whilst the concept of WEEE is fully understood, there appears to be a lack of clarity as to 
what constitutes UEEE and when. This lack of clarity could lead to an unnecessary burden 
on producers who are looking to introduce and/or facilitate their own take back 
arrangements, especially if the items of equipment that are taken back are regulated as 
waste when perhaps they should not be. 
Recommendation 6: 
The Government should review, as necessary, the present guidance and/or decision tree 
regarding the identification and categorisation of UEEE as opposed to WEEE in order to 
ensure that implications for all take-back systems are clear and remove any unnecessary 
regulatory burdens from the producers.  
                                            
122 The IPR Working Group recognises the Government’s light touch regulatory agenda. Where specific 
expertise is required and this expertise is not within the relevant Government Departments, then there is a 
policy precedent in place for these types of specialist committees. Recommendation 5 is set within this 
context. 
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IAS 37 
In Section 6.9 of this report, the role and importance of this accounting standard can be 
seen.  The requirements of IAS 37 can give rise to potential challenges for producers who 
are looking to implement an IPR solution. 
Recommendation 7:  
The Government should engage, through BIS with the relevant professional accountancy 
bodies (such as the Accounting Regulatory Committee ‘ARC’)123 to make them aware of 
the potential challenges arising from IAS 37 and to see what amendments can be 
realistically accommodated without, at the same time, giving rise to any presentation risk in 
so far as the financial statements are concerned.  
Transposition Guidance: How to implement European Directives effectively 
The present collection targets under the original WEEE Directive and the 45% interim 
target mandated under the recast WEEE Directive are binding on the UK as a whole. 
On 15 December 2010, the Government announced Guiding Principles for EU legislation. 
This Guidance has been drafted for use by policy makers and lawyers across 
Government. It explains what departments need to do to implement EU legislation to meet 
the requirements in this Guiding Principles1. It can also be referred to by, but is not binding 
on, officials in the devolved administrations. 
There have been considerable administrative and financial benefits for producers in having 
a common implementation model across the UK so that, for example, registration in one 
part of the UK is registration for the whole of the UK. Common guidance, interpretations, 
data forms and IT interfaces also help to create a level playing field, minimise duplication 
and reduce the risk of misunderstandings.   
Recommendation 8:  
In order to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under the WEEE directive and that 
producers, PCSs and AATFs continue to benefit from a common implementation model, 
the Coalition Government is urged to work closely with the Devolved Administrations.  
Where there is a desire to have a bespoke requirement in one nation in the UK, the 
Governments should have regard to relative cost and benefit of the proposal and, if it goes 
ahead, ensure that it can be accommodated within the structure of the overall UK 
approach.  
Provision of Financial Guarantees 
There is a requirement under Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive that each producer 
provides a guarantee when placing new household EEE on the market showing that the 
EOL costs will be financed. The Directive provides examples of possible financial 
guarantees e.g. participation by a producer in appropriate schemes, a recycling insurance 
                                            
123 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/committees/index_en.htm 
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or a blocked bank account.  Whilst the outcome required in the Directive is clear on this 
matter, a number of issues arise in the case of some collective guarantees. 
Whilst there is a section in the PCS Operational Plan where schemes have to report on 
their Financial Resources as a condition of approval, what constitutes Financial Resources 
and what actual tests should be undertaken to determine the adequacy of these Financial 
Resources  is not properly set out. In so far as the producer members are concerned, the 
schemes can already undertake external solvency checks in the normal course of 
business and perhaps this can be included in the operational plans as best practise. 
Both these aspects should be subject to review at regular intervals to ensure that any 
potential financial risk124 for both the sector and scheme members is adequately covered. 
Recommendation 9: 
The Government should take this opportunity to review this risk and then through BIS, 
determine any enhancements to the Financial Resources checks125 to be put in place and 
their frequency for both the PCS schemes and for their producer members. Under 
guidance from BIS, the requirements for any financial resources checks can be provided 
for within the present operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and 
the registered PCS schemes. 
In the event that there is any doubt raised about the solvency of either a PCS or a 
producer member, appropriate action should be taken by the authorities to address this. 
This action could include by way of example, additional capital being injected into a PCS, 
transfer of its producer members to another scheme or in the case of the producer 
member, security being taken to support their guarantee commitment. Under guidance 
from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present operational plans as 
agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS schemes. 
The Government, through BIS, should ensure that any specific financial guarantee funds 
held by the PCS on behalf of its members are properly ring fenced, separately accounted 
for in their management accounts and/or financial statements and safeguarded from the 
day to day operations undertaken by the PCS via a separately designated bank account. 
Under guidance from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present 
operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS 
schemes.  
In Section 6.8 we illustrated the challenges for producers that can arise from recycling 
insurance and from blocked bank accounts. 
Recommendation 10: 
The Government, through BIS should take this opportunity to engage with the European 
Commission to determine what flexibility and/or discretion exists with the Directive for the 
                                            
124 As illustrated by the TXU case study referenced in section 6.8 of this report. 
125 These tests could mirror those that are standard practices such as a) audited financial statements and a 
clean audit on the scheme operator b) turnover c) profitability d) EBITDA and e) balance sheet strength. 
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provision of alternative financial instruments from producers (in addition to those already 
set out) that still provide for and meet the intended outcomes required. 
Subject to this proviso, the Government, through BIS should determine the exceptional 
circumstances in which it will allow producers to bring forward their own alternative 
solutions that are convenient and appropriate to them and which are wholly acceptable to 
BIS.  Under guidance from BIS, this arrangement can be provided for within the present 
operational plans as agreed between the Environment Agencies and the registered PCS 
schemes.  
WEEE Data 
Having an accurate data set for all WEEE (Household/Non-Household) will become even 
more important for the UK under the recast WEEE Directive.  
Recommendation 11: 
The Government should take the opportunity, through BIS, to review the present data set, 
the way in which the data is captured and that the inadvertent classification of items of 
equipment is minimised so as to ensure that it can effectively manage and monitor the 
UK’s performance as a whole. 
Enforcement 
For regulation to be effective there needs to be effective and proactive enforcement across 
the sector by both the Environment Agencies (producer registration, environment permits), 
by BIS (DCF Sites) and the VCA (Retailers). With that said we are mindful of the current 
fiscal and related budgetary constraints. 
Recommendation 12: 
The Government, through BIS should take this opportunity to review the present 
enforcement regime to determine what is effective and what is not and the reasons as to 
why. Thereafter, it should ensure that it, the Environment Agencies (in consultation with 
Defra) and the VCA adopt a proactive risk based enforcement policy that targets specific 
parties and/or specific elements within the sector as a whole in order to promote 
compliance and tackle serious infringement of the regulations. 
Design for Recycling and Reuse – Use of voluntary agreements 
It is possible to achieve some outcomes through the use of voluntary agreements (e.g. 
common mobile phone charger) and this will be in line with the Government’s policy on 
‘light touch regulation’. 
Recommendation 13: 
The Government should investigate, possibly through WRAP, whether there is the 
potential to extend the use of voluntary agreements into such areas as a) product light 
weighting, b) common polymers in plastics amongst others. 
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Dissemination of this report 
Given the stakeholders that the working group has engaged with, both in the UK and 
abroad there is a significant level of interest in this report, the information that it contains 
and the conclusions and/or recommendations that it brings forward. 
Recommendation 14: 
The Government, through BIS should give consideration to making this report, in its 
entirety, a publicly available document at the earliest opportunity via a hyperlink on the BIS 
website.    
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Annex A: Austria 
In Austria, the WEEE Directive has been transposed by WEEE 
Ordinance (Elektroaltgeräteverordnung EAG-VO) of April 29, 
2005 and has been in force since August 13, 2005. 
Scope 
The Austria WEEE system covers all electrical appliances according to the ten 
product categories in the original WEEE Directive.  These categories are 
consolidated by Austrian law into five categories: Large Appliances, Cooling 
Appliances, Display Screen Equipment, Small Electrical Appliances and Gas 
Discharge Lamps. 
Producer Registration and Reporting 
Austrian-based Producers, as well as retailers or foreign companies selling to 
Austria via telesales, must register online at http://edm.umweltbundesamt.at and 
must report annually the quantity of EEE sold in Austria. 
According to the Austrian Ordinance on WEEE, producers and importers can 
either fulfil their future household WEEE obligations individually or by joining a 
Collection and Recovery Systems (CRS).  To date, no Producer has chosen to 
fulfil the WEEE obligations individually. 
By joining a CRS, the WEEE obligations and duties are transferred to the 
operator of the CRS.  There are five CRSs (representing 2,047 producers at the 
end of 2009): 
 ERA Elektro Recycling Austria GmbH (www.era-gmbh.at) 
 European Recycling Platform (ERP) Österreich GmbH (www.erp-
recycling.at)  
 Erfassen und Verwerten von Altstoffen GmbH (www.eva.co.at) 
 Umweltforum Haushalt Altlampen Systembetreiber GmbH (www.ufh.at) 
 Umweltforum Haushalt Elektroaltgeräte System Betreiber GmbH 
(www.ufssystem.at) 
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To ensure fair competition, a coordination body called “the clearing house” was 
established, controlled by the Ministry of Environment.  The clearing house is 
operated by Elektroaltgeräte Koordinierungsstelle Austria GmbH (EAK). EAK 
coordinates CRS activities and allocates pickup orders according to the CRS 
market share. 
Producers must submit quarterly and annual reports to the clearing house (either 
directly or via a collective scheme). 
Producer Financing 
Producers are responsible for financing the collection, recovery and recycling of 
household WEEE. 
In accordance to the Austrian Ordinance on WEEE, CRSs have to calculate their 
prices (recycling fees) based on the following criteria: 
 The prices have to be calculated per collection and treatment category. A 
category consists of WEEE that is collected and recycled more or less the 
same way. There are 5 categories as listed above. 
 The prices have to be the same for every client. e.g. it is not allowed to 
give quantity discount 
 Cross-subsidies between the collection and treatment categories are not 
allowed 
 The annual costs have to be covered by the annual revenues for each 
collection and treatment category 
In Austria currently there are three common ways CRSs charge their customers 
(producers): 
 A price per piece 
A price per piece is used to make it easier for the clients to collect the relevant 
data (market input of electronic equipment). It is often used for charging gas 
discharge lamps. Normally, collection and recycling of WEEE are charged per 
kg: the heavier the item the higher the price. If the prices are per piece it 
should be noted that within a sub-category the heavier item has a price 
“privilege”; 
 Price per weight 
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Most costs are given in €/kg. Even if some services are offered in €/pcs (e.g. 
pick up of containers, rents for containers, it is recommended to fix collection 
costs in €/kg)it is guaranteed that the collection is efficient (no empty 
containers are picked up). 
 Lump sum 
For small volumes, it is inefficient to obtain information on the weight or the 
number of pieces. In this case, collective schemes are charging the producers 
of EEE a lump sum. 
The following cost factors are taken into consideration for calculating costs by 
collective schemes: 
 Infrastructure (containers, municipal waste collection centres) 
 Collection (transportation) 
 Treatment (sorting, dismantling, treatment) 
 Costs of collective schemes (staff, advisors, logistics) 
 Contribution “Waste minimization” (CRS have to financially support 
minimization measures) 
 Contribution to the “Clearing House” (regulating the competition between 
CRS in Austria) 
 Revenues for material 
Collection of Household WEEE 
In Austria, WEEE is mainly collected via municipal collection centres.  The CRSs 
are responsible for transporting waste from the municipal waste collection 
centres (1,770 in Austria collecting around 80% of WEEE). The number of 
collection centres per 10,000 inhabitants is between 1.4 (in the state of Upper 
Austria) and 3.4 (in the state of Styria). The CRSs pay for the infrastructure of the 
collection centres, but not for the staff. 
As several CRSs use the same collection sites, transport is coordinated by the 
clearing house to manage traffic levels.Mobile collection of WEEE takes place in 
small rural municipalities without municipal collection centre.The collection 
system for household WEEE in Austria is represented in the schematic below: 
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Austria household WEEE collection system 
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Annex A:  France 
In France, the WEEE Directive has been transposed by Decree 
No. 2005-829.  In 2010, France introduced  a mandatory system 
of differentiated charges for six electronic products based on 
their DfRR features.  
Scope 
The French WEEE system covers all electrical appliances according to the 10 
product categories in the original WEEE Directive. 
Producer Registration and Reporting 
Producers must identify annually the quantities of EEE placed on market, the 
quantities of WEEE collected and recycled and the quantities of 
components/substances extracted in WEEE treatment. A national register of 
producers is held by the French Environment Agency, ADEME. 
Producers of household EEE must either (a) comply individually but seek 
approval or (b) join an accredited collective scheme. There is a choice of 
schemes named Eco-Organisms (EOs): Three general schemes (Eco-Systems, 
Ecologic and ERP) and a further scheme specific for lighting (Recyclum).  Note 
no household EEE producer is currently complying through an individual 
route. 
Producer Financing 
Producers pay a fee for each product they supply onto the French market to their 
nominated EO. The fees vary according to both product and EO.  
A standard % increase/decrease is applied to the product fee for six specific 
products based on specific design for dismantling, recovery and reuse (DfRR) 
criteria. Developing these criteria was a challenging and time-consuming process 
and the criteria were ultimately based on three fundamental principles:  
 Life cycle and durability criteria; 
 Hazardous material content; and 
 Recycled content. 
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This % increase/decrease is mandatory and is standard across all EO’s. The 
objective is to motivate DfRR changes for these specific products. 
Equipment Criteria for Increase/Decrease Level of 
Differentiatio
n 
Category 1 
Equipment 
producing cold 
with a 
refrigerant 
circuit 
Usage of frigorific fluids having a GWP 
over 15 
+ 20% 
Category 2 
Hoovers 
Usage of plastic parts over 25g 
containing brominated flame retardants 
+ 20% 
Category 3 
Mobile Phone 
Absence of a universal phone charger 
(criteria applicable as soon as the 
international technical standard is 
published) 
+100% 
Category 3 
Laptop 
Usage of lamps containing mercury 
and usage of plastic parts over 25g 
containing brominated flame 
retardants. 
+ 20% 
Category 4 
Television 
Usage of lamps containing mercury 
and usage of plastic parts over 25g 
containing brominated flame retardants 
+ 20% 
Category 5 
Lamp 
Exclusive LED source -20% 
Each scheme has the flexibility to charge producers different fees according to 
the product characteristics. Each EO has devised a tariff of charges. A selection 
of some example charges (in Euros including tax) according to EO are shown 
below: 
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 ERP Ecologic Eco-
Systems 
Notes 
 Not 
DfR 
DfR Not 
DfR 
DfR Not 
DfR 
DfR  
Large HH 
(Not Cold) 
> 6kg 
6 
 
6 
 
0.08 - 3.34 
 
Eco-Systems’ 
equivalent category 
is sub-divided into a 
series of specific 
product types.  
Cold  
> 40kg  
15.
6 
13 15.6 13 13.0
4 
10.8
7 
ERP’s equivalent 
category is defined 
as products over 
42kg. 
TV 
/Monitors 
> 25kg  
9.6 8 9.6 8 6.69 6.69 Eco-Systems’ 
equivalent category 
is defined as  screen 
size > 42” (not 
weight)  
Mobile 
Phones 
0.0
2 
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01  
Small 
Appliance
s <0.2kg 
0.01 0.01 0.42  
In France, the producer can show this charge visibly on the sale of the product to 
the consumer, known as a visible fee or visible contribution. Distributors/ retailers 
and producers are not able to alter the value of this visible fee (eg add a margin).  
The financial flow is depicted below.  
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Guarantees 
Producers are only required to provide a financial guarantee if they are not a 
member of an EO. The financial guarantee would need to be sufficient to cover 
their producer obligations for the current year. This option appears not to have 
been taken up by any producers as all producers are members of an EO. 
Collection of Household WEEE 
France introduced a steadily increasing collection target for household WEEE, 
namely 8kg/inhabitant per year in 2012, 9kg in 2013 and 10kg in 2014.  These 
collection targets are devolved down to the EOs according to their relative market 
share. The EOs have separately agreed to set minimum collection levels by 
category of WEEE.  
France has a network of over 8000 collection points primarily operated by 
municipalities and retailers. Collection of WEEE is according to five categories: 
Large Cooling Appliances, Large Appliances, Screens and Small Appliances. 
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OCAD3E is a company which was established by the four EOs. The role of 
OCAD3E is to organise collection from municipalities. Municipalities receive 
financial compensation from OCAD3E in the form of a set amount for each 
collection point, a variable amount according to the tonnage of WEEE collected 
by the municipalities and financial support for public communication. 
Each EO contracts with specific municipalities (through OCAD3E) according to 
their expected level of WEEE required to meet their collection target. Each EO is 
required to collect freely all the WEEE collected by the distributers.  It is also 
required to collect the WEEE collected by local authority as long as the following 
formula is respected: 
WEEE tonnage already collected & treated in year n 
__________________________________________
WEEE tonnage selectively collected in year n from 
municipalities 
< 
EEE tonnage declared by the EO Members 
__________________________________ 
EEE tonnage declared by all producers 
 
A few municipalities act as ‘adjustment’ and an EO can switch collection from 
these municipalities for a given time if required to meet collection targets. 
Experience to date has shown that variation from anticipated collection levels has 
been small:  limited to around 600 tonnes of the total of 400,000 tonnes collected 
WEEE. 
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Annex A:  Germany 
In Germany, the WEEE Directive has been transposed by 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (ElektroG) 
Scope 
The German WEEE system covers all electrical appliances according to the 10 
product categories in the original WEEE Directive. 
Producer Registration and Reporting 
Producers are required to register at the German Stfitung 
Elektronikaltgeräteregister (EAR)1 or Clearing House, provide proof of financial 
guarantee and report on monthly basis the amount and type of products placed 
on the market to the EAR according to 10 WEEE categories. Producers are not 
required to provide any financial contribution to the EAR. 
 
The EAR is a private organisation although it was originally established under 
statute. It has been transferred specific public powers and is overseen by the 
German Federal Environment Agency.  
The EAR calculates market share for each producer by product category and this 
market share proportion is applied to the WEEE arisings. Producers must 
arrange for corresponding amounts of household WEEE to be properly recycled 
under instruction from the EAR.  
Producer Financing 
Producers’ obligations for historic WEEE are based on market share, for new 
WEEE producers have two choices.  
Producers’ new WEEE obligations can be based on market share or they may 
opt for their obligation to be based on their share of WEEE by category in the 
waste stream. If they choose the second option, they must apply scientifically 
                                            
1 www.stiftung-ear.de 
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recognised statistical methods to calculate their obligation2. It seems that few, if 
any, producers calculate their new WEEE obligations via the second option. 
Guarantees 
Producers are mandated to provide annual evidence of an insolvency-proof 
guarantee for financing the collection and disposal of new household WEEE. This 
can be done via setting up provisions (such as insurance policy or a blocked 
bank account) covering the expected recycling costs.  
The level of provision is calculated based on the type and weight of equipment 
predicted to be placed on the market by the producer in the next 12 months, 
expected lifetime and expected recycling costs based on data provided by the 
Clearing House.  Some example data is provided below.3 
Equipment Predicted Return 
Rate (%) 
Predicted 
Average Lifetime
(months) 
Average 
Cost of 
Treatment 
per 
collection 
group 
(Euro/tonne) 
Cold 
Appliances, Air 
Conditioning 
units and Oil 
radiators, 
75 120 220 
Printers 27 84 230 
Mobile Phone 27 84 230 
TVs 50 60 230 
                                            
2 http://www.umweltkanzlei.de/Upload/Image/UBA-BE-FKZ_206_31_300_Teil_III.pdf 
3 http://www2.stiftung-
ear.de/hersteller/regelsetzung_regelbuch/produktuebergreifende_arbeitsgruppe_pbue/regelsetzu
ng_garantiehoehe 
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Equipment Predicted Return 
Rate (%) 
Predicted 
Average Lifetime
(months) 
Average 
Cost of 
Treatment 
per 
collection 
group 
(Euro/tonne) 
Gas Discharge 
Lamps) 
10 72 1300 
Small 
Household 
Appliances 
40 60 170 
 
Collection of Household WEEE 
There is a network of around 1600 collection points for household WEEE.  
WEEE is collected by municipalities in five collection categories which (with the 
exception of cold appliances) reflect the recovery and recycling targets. The five 
collection categories are: Large Appliances; Cold Appliances; IT Equipment & 
Consumer Equipment including displays; Lamps; and Small Appliances.  This 
differs from the situation in France and the UK where ‘screens’ are collected as a 
separate category. German municipalities can opt out of collection of certain 
categories.  
The Clearing House assigns individual producers (or third parties acting on their 
behalf) a specific ‘pick up’ of household WEEE from a specific public collection 
point based on an algorithm4. The location of the collection point is not defined in 
advance and remains unknown until the Clearing House instructs the collection.  
Any container of WEEE has to be removed and replaced by an empty container 
within 72 hours. Delays are fined up to 10,000 Euros per container by the 
German Federal Environment Agency. A producer can instruct a compliance 
scheme to manage these ‘pick ups’ on their behalf and ensure that the WEEE is 
delivered for appropriate treatment and recycling.  
The process is depicted in the diagram below. 
                                            
4 http://www2.stiftung-ear.de/hersteller/abholkoordination_b2c/berechnungsweise/# 
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Annex A: Sweden 
In Sweden, the WEEE Directive has been transposed by 
Ordinance 2005:209.  
Scope 
The Sweden WEEE system covers all electrical appliances according to the ten 
product categories in the original WEEE Directive.  
Producer Registration and Reporting 
Producers (importers, manufacturers and retailers) are required to register with 
the Swedish EPA (Naturvårdsverket). The following information must be 
reported: 
1. Quantities of EEE sold in Sweden and via distance selling to other EU 
countries. 
2. Quantities of WEEE collected and treated for each calendar year. 
3. Financial guarantee arrangements. 
Producer Financing 
The responsibilities regarding household WEEE differ depending upon whether 
the equipment was sold before 13 August 2004 (Historical waste) or after 13 
August 2005 (New waste). 
1. Historical waste: The producer has a collective responsibility for historical 
waste produced by products from the same product category. The portion 
of the costs that produces are responsible for is based on product 
category market share.   
2. New Waste: Producers are responsible for waste produced from their 
products. For new waste the producer has two options: collective 
responsibility in the same way as for historical waste or individual 
responsibility.  
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The Swedish EPA reported that there are currently no producers taking individual 
responsibility for new waste5. 
Household collection centres are financed by Local Regional Authorities (LRAs).  
All other costs (sorting, treatment and recycling) are met by El-Kretsen and EÅF, 
the two producer compliance schemes. 
Collection of Household WEEE 
Local Regional Authorities (LRAs), or municipalities, are responsible for collecting 
and treating household WEEE.  Household consumers may return WEEE to one 
of 650 waste recycling centres paid for by the municipalities free of charge. The 
municipalities are also responsible for the local monitoring of the collection 
system, and for informing consumers where they may dispose of their WEEE-
products. WEEE is collected in separate bins owned by El-kretsen. The collective 
collection systems do not differentiate between new waste and historical waste. 
El-Kretsen 
El-Kretsen is a not for profit service provider set up in July 2001 to represent 
producers (manufacturers, importers and retailers) in their agreement with the 
Local Regional Authorities (LRAs) and to operate a voluntary nationwide take-
back system. 
El-Kretsen is responsible for sorting, treatment and recycling.  Waste is sorted 
into three fractions at the point of collection: electronics, large white goods, and 
lighting. The transport of the waste from the collection centres to relevant 
recycling organisation is organised and financed by El-Kretsen, using 
subcontractors.  Treatment and recycling firms are chosen on the basis of 
technical ability, location and price.  
El-Kretsen provides 100% coverage of the Swedish Territory and has concluded 
standardised agreements with all 290 local municipalities to take responsibility for 
historic waste in return for the maintenance of collection sites. 
Elektronikåtervinningsföreningen (EÅF) 
EÅF, launched in 2008, uses its members’ shops as collection points for 
household WEEE. EÅF has an agreement with El-Kretsen as member shops are 
not located in all municipalities. 
                                            
5 Confirmed by email by Ingela Grudin, Adviser producer responsibility EE and batteries, Swedish 
EPA, Compliance, Grants and Enforcement Unit, TEL: + 46 10 698 12 46 
EEfraga@naturvardsverket.se 
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The collection system for household WEEE in Sweden is represented in the 
schematic below: 
Swedish household WEEE collection system 
 
 
Financial Guarantees in Sweden 
 
All Swedish producers must report how they will meet the requirements of the 
financial guarantee. It is not sufficient simply to be a member of a compliance 
scheme; a specific financial guarantee arrangement must be in place (albeit this 
could be arranged through the compliance scheme.)  There are four alternatives 
detailed below6. 
El-Kresten Member Scheme  
Producers choosing to join El-Kretsen are given the opportunity of being included 
in El-Kretsen’s financial guarantee system. This system ensures there are 
sufficient funds to finance El Kretsen’s operation in the forthcoming year, there is 
a reserve fund for the following year and that there is an insurance arrangement 
which would ‘kick in’ in the event of bankruptcy. 
                                            
6 http://www.swedishepa.se/Documents/publikationer/978-91-620-8421-9.pdf 
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Collective Trade Association Scheme 
Members of El Kretsen can also establish their own insurance solution if they 
wish. For example, members of a trade organisation of white goods 
manufacturers known as the Elektriska Hushållsapparat Leverantörer (EHL - 
Household Electrical Equipment Service Providers) have established their own 
financial guarantee fund. The manufacturers contribute to a collective fund and 
the financial guarantee consists of an insurance taken out using the fund as 
security. The financial guarantee cost for 2012 is set at 5 SEK (EUR 0.58) per 
large appliances (refrigerator, freezer, cookers) and 1.4 SEK (EUR 0.16) per 
small appliances (vacuum cleaners, kitchen appliances). This collective fund 
would pay out if any of the companies went out of business. 
EÅF Member Scheme 
Members of EÅF use a different financial guarantee system to El-Kretsen 
members. The financial guarantee used by EÅF members is an insurance 
system whereby the producer pays an annual insurance premium based on the 
number of products sold and the recycling costs of the products. The insurance 
premium goes to a fund that finances the recycling costs for the electric waste of 
the producer. In case the producer goes into bankruptcy or leaves the market 
due to other reasons, the insurance company would continue to pay the recycling 
costs of the producer and thus ensure that the producer will not become a free-
rider. 
Blocked Bank Account 
Some small companies choose to meet their financial guarantee requirement 
through setting up a block banked account which is pledged to the Swedish EPA 
should they go out of business.  
Insurance Providers 
Länsförsäkringar Alliance AB is the only insurance company offering recycling 
insurance to producers in Sweden. Their policy only covers products placed on 
the market after the insurance agreement has been made. 
Länsförsäkringar recycling insurance is a long-term guarantee, usually for a 
period of 20 years, and provides cover for higher recycling costs in the future, 
thus reducing the uncertainty in the producer’s balance sheet.  When the 
producer releases the product into the market, a single premium is paid.  The 
sum is invested and the investment income helps to keep the premium as low as 
possible.  The Länsförsäkringar insurance premium is calculated based on the 
following key factors: 
1. Nature of the product; 
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2. Estimated future recycling costs; 
3. Risk that materials will be classed as hazardous in the future; 
4. Risk of extended demands in the recycling process; 
5. Expected increased efficiency in the recycling process; and 
6. The estimated future value of metals. 
Länsförsäkringar estimated that <1% of the 1,800 producers on the Swedish EPA 
EE register have recycling insurance agreements with them.  For confidentiality 
reasons, Länsförsäkringar would not disclose information on their recycling 
insurance premiums7. 
 
                                            
7 Patricia Seidel Garpedal, Head of Commercial Motor & Environment, Länsförsäkringar Sak 
Försäkrings AB (publ), Tel 08-588 415 69 
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Annex B: IPR Stakeholder 
Meeting, 22 March 2012 
Outcome of Discussions within Break-Out Groups 
Introduction 
The audience was divided into 5 break-out groups.  Each group was comprised 
of approximately 7 – 10 participants from a range of stakeholder factions, 
primarily Producer Compliance Schemes (PCSs) and large producers but also 
trade associations, waste management companies and a limited number of 
retailers.  The groups discussed (a) proposed criteria for assessing options and 
(b) five example options. 
Criteria 
Participants were asked to comment on 13 proposed criteria which would be 
used by the IPR WG to assess possible approaches.  The aim was to identify 
which criteria were most important for the stakeholders present, which criteria 
were considered redundant and any additions or amendments. 
Taking the results from all groups and using the majority views to rank the 
criteria, the outcome is as follows: 
TOP Priority  “Support a collection infrastructure which is widely 
accessible and straightforward for consumers to use.” 
HIGH Priority  “Use a cost allocation which is easy to understand, fair8 
and   reasonable.” 
MEDIUM Priority 
 “Reward producers that invest in Design for Recycling” 
 “Reflect the Government aim of reducing regulatory and 
administrative burdens on business” 
 “Meets requirements of Article 8.2” 
 
The breakdown of results was as follows: 
 
                                            
8 One group suggested adding the term ‘equitable’.  Another group considered that ‘fair and reasonable’ were much 
more important than ‘easy to understand’.  
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Criteria 
Groups for 
whom this 
was a 
Priority 
issue 
Stakeholder Views 
1  Avoid producers accruing 
funds 

In general this received a split reaction.  
Only one group identified this as a 
priority criterion.  Some participants were 
supportive (accruals for long life products 
would potentially represent significant 
burden) some negative (remove this 
criterion as any true IPR solution likely to 
require some form of accrual).  One 
participant suggested that it should be 
replaced by ‘Allows producers to control 
and reduce their future WEEE liabilities’ 
which was welcomed as a good solution 
by all within discussion group 2. 
2  Financing orphan or non‐
branded products equitably   
 
3  Cost allocation easy to 
understand, fair and 
reasonable 
 
HIGH priority, with emphasis on fair and 
reasonable.  One group suggested adding 
‘equitable’. 
4  Cost certainty 
 ‐ 
No votes.  One group considered this 
desirable but a much lower priority than 
criterion 3. 
5  Reward product durability    
6  Reward DfR 
 
MEDIUM priority.  Conversely some 
participants questioned if WEEE system 
could or should aim to fulfil this criterion 
~ see later discussion in Options. 
7  Enhance 
reuse/refurbishment   
 
8  Minimum transport    
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movements 
9  Reduce regulatory and 
administrative burdens on 
business 
 
MEDIUM priority. 
10  Meet Article 8.2   MEDIUM priority. 
11  Reduce burden on SMEs 
 ‐ 
No votes.  Two groups felt that this 
criterion could be removed as already 
covered by (9). 
12  Straightforward for 
authorities to implement 
and enforce 
 
 
13  Support a collection 
infrastructure which is 
widely accessible and 
straightforward for 
consumers to use. 
 
TOP priority.   
One group suggested replacing term 
‘consumer’ with ‘end users’. 
 
An additional issue highlighted as the top priority by several producers and PCSs 
was ‘access to WEEE’.  It was felt that this would help to enable producers to 
predict costs and prevent others from dictating costs.  These participants felt 
strongly that ‘physical access to WEEE by producers/their PCSs’ should be one 
of the top key criteria.  One participant stated that this would be a “pre-requisite 
for any IPR system”. 
One group suggested that an additional criterion should be ‘future proofing’ – to 
ensure that the system would be financially robust in the long term and not 
collapse.  For example, if a system was based on estimating future recycling 
costs were there sufficient safeguards for significant under-estimates?  Similarly 
how would the system cope with product convergence? 
Five Example Options 
Each group was asked to comment on the 5 example options presented.   
Two groups reached consensus on a preferred example, one group selected 
Market Share: Independent Route whilst another selected Market Share: 
Mandated surcharges and reductions.   
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The other groups did not state a preference for a specific example although most 
were not in favour of Return share or Payment for Own WEEE: Pure IPR 
approach.  In general it was felt that these were too burdensome and costly to 
implement for insufficient reward.  Payment for Own WEEE: Front end option 
was not easy for participants to grasp and it was felt by many that further 
explanation would be required in order to give a full considered opinion. 
Key points raised were as follows (N.B. stakeholder comments reported verbatim 
without critical assessment): 
Example Positive Comments Negative Comments Conclusions / Suggestions 
Market 
Share: 
Independent 
Route 
Straightforward and 
practical for 
business 
Easier to implement 
than options 3, 4 or 
5 
Does not provide 
incentive for DfRR or 
product durability 
Is not IPR 
Would require stringent 
financial guarantees 
for producers operating 
individually 
One group concluded that this 
was their preferred Option 
either as described or by 
maintaining the current system 
but ensuring producers/their 
PCSs had unfettered access to 
WEEE.  
One group suggested that 
existing Protocols could be 
broken down to lower levels to 
reward DfRR within the current 
system. 
Orphans – some participants 
suggested that reserve fees 
could be held by EA to cover 
risk although others felt this 
would be outside the scope of 
EA.   
Market 
Share: 
Mandated 
surcharges 
and 
reductions 
Potential to meet all 
criteria and 
practicality 
Easier to implement 
than options 3, 4 or 
5 
Issues over how to set 
surcharges 
Concern that factors 
set under the French 
system are very 
simplistic/ arbitrary 
Costly administrative 
burden on producers.  
Highly complex to 
report data 
requirements on a 
product level. 
 
Little enforcement/few 
producer audits under 
the French system.  
Producers ‘self-
One group concluded that this 
was their preferred Option on 
the basis that it provided a 
DfRR incentive whilst 
maintaining practicality and low 
administrative burden. 
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declare’. 
 
Return Share: 
Brand 
sampling or 
counting 
Rewards product 
durability 
Does not incentivise 
DfRR.  Reallocation of 
costs for no 
environmental benefit. 
Would discourage 
separate collection 
Affluence in different 
regions will influence 
sampling results 
Sampling can place 
exaggerated 
responsibility on large 
brands which are easy 
to identify 
Complex to implement 
Little brand 
differentiation for some 
product categories e.g. 
lamps 
Problems identifying 
producer responsible 
for each brand (due to 
definition of producer, 
multiple importers etc) 
System needs to be able to 
cope with practical 
situations/difficulties, for 
example: 
 the same brand being put on 
the market by a number of 
different producers (eg. 
importers), and you can’t tell 
by looking at the product; 
 brands changing between 
different producer over the 
years, for example 
transferring to another 
company (Braun to P&G) or 
importers switching 
suppliers from one year to 
the next. Need to know who 
was the producer when it 
was actually imported? 
 producers with thousands of 
product lines which may be 
changing several times per 
year. 
 
Payment for 
Own WEEE: 
Pure IPR 
approach 
Japanese system 
works well 
Not practical 
Does not meet criteria 
9, 11, 12 or 13 
If consumers had to 
return WEEE to 
producers directly (not 
via DCFs) it would 
reduce accessibility 
and probably lead to 
reduced collection 
rates 
 
Scepticism that UK 
consumers would 
utilise such a system to 
the same degree of 
compliance as 
See comments above on brand 
identification/ definition of 
producer. 
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consumers in Japan 
 
Problems identifying 
producer responsible 
for each brand 
 
Any sorting by brand 
would be very costly 
Payment for 
Own WEEE: 
Front end 
financing 
Rewards DfRR Difficult to understand 
at present 
Similar to example 2 
(mandated surcharge/ 
reduction) but more 
elaborate and 
complex. 
Actual costs likely to 
differ considerably 
from estimates so 
option 2 may be more 
practical and lower 
administrative burden. 
More explanation required - not 
fully understood by all 
participants 
 
 
General Comments from participants: 
 
 There appears to be a trade-off between (a) ‘fairness’ or rewarding DfRR and 
(b) simplicity, practicality and low implementation costs.  No participants 
identified a win-win option or silver bullet either from amongst the examples 
provided or any alternative proposals.   
 The suitability of options will differ per product category.  An option may be 
better for one product category but worse for another.  
 Flexibility and a hybrid approach may be needed.  IPR could be applied to 
specific product categories.  The IPR mode within that category could also be 
flexible as illustrated by Maine where producers can opt to accept a return 
share of mixed products or can pay for their own brand to be segregated. 
 Changing over to an ‘IPR’ system could lead to painful ‘double costs’ for 
producers in the transition phase – where producers have to pay 
simultaneously for WEEE arising and WEEE POM. 
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 Participants were split in their overall opinion on IPR.  Some were very positive 
about the opportunities and competitive advantage it could provide.  Others 
questioned the benefits and thought that incorporating individual financial 
responsibility via the UK WEEE Regulation was simply too burdensome and 
the potential benefits not substantive enough to incentivise design change.  
Instead they argued that other policy tools such as the ErP Directive should be 
used to mandate relevant DfRR requirements. 
 The main point of consensus was on the issue of ensuring that producers/their 
PCSs had access to WEEE.  This was considered by many to be a pre-
requisite for any ‘IPR’ approach. 
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Annex C:  Independent 
Evaluation of Options 
Following the stakeholder event and review of criteria, each of the five options 
was evaluated by the consultants and given a score from 0 (not met) to 10 (fully 
met) for each criterion.  The results are presented in the table below.   
It was found that some elements were difficult to score due to a number of 
possible variants within each option and that inevitably scoring is open to a 
degree of subjectivity.   
The scores are presented as colours where: 
 Green (GREEN) indicates a positive high score i.e. it performs well and 
fully meets or addresses the issue; 
 Yellow (YELLOw) a medium score i.e. it partially meets or addresses the 
issue; 
 Red (RED) a negative low score i.e. it performs poorly and does little to 
meet or address the issue.   
 Paler gradations are used in between e.g. pale green = relatively high 
score, orange = relatively low score. 
The scoring process identified a number of key points: 
 ‘Payment for own WEEE: Front end payment by set product differentials’ 
performs well for all the weighted criteria which were considered most 
important by stakeholders attending the event and had only minor 
weaknesses in respect of other criteria; 
 Return share also performed well overall with minor weakness on the 
weighted criteria regarding incentives for DfR and reuse/refurbishment but 
showed significant weakness on criterion 3 (cost certainty); 
 ‘Payment for own WEEE: Collaborative IPR Approach’ illustrates significant 
shortcomings relating to the provision of collection infrastructure (the top 
stakeholder priority); 
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 The market share approaches perform poorly due to the failure to meet the 
criteria relating to Article 8.2 or incentivise DfR (Design for Recycling) which 
are both medium priorities for stakeholders; 
 The assessment process failed to capture two important issues in sufficient 
detail: (a) the extent to which an option is practicable for the UK and (b) the 
likely costs of implementation.     
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1 Provide a robust mechanism for 
financing the treatment of orphan or 
non-branded products equitably 
     
2 Use a cost allocation which is easy 
to understand, fair and reasonable 
     
3 Offer producers cost certainty      
4 Reward producers that invest in 
Product Durability 
     
5 Reward producers that invest in 
Design for Recycling (DfR) 
     
6 Enhance reuse/refurbishment      
7 Support minimum transport 
movements associated with WEEE 
collection and management 
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8 Reflect Govn aim of reducing 
regulatory & administrative burdens 
on business 
     
9 Meet the requirements of Article 8.2      
10 Straightforward for authorities to 
implement and enforce 
     
11 Support a collection infrastructure 
which is widely accessible and 
straightforward for consumers to use 
     
OVERALL RANKING after weighting 
and scoring(1 = highest, 5 = lowest 
scoring) 
5 4 2 3 1 
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Annex D: DfRR Weighting 
Option 
This Annex provides further detail about the DfRR9 Weighting 
Obligation which was devised by the Consultants  
Summary  
The basic premise of this approach is to ensure that: 
a) WEEE compliance costs paid by producers are used to fund current WEEE 
arising   
  in order to avoid any double payment period; 
b) WEEE compliance costs paid by producers reflect the costs of collecting and 
treating products currently being put on the market (POM)   
  in order to move towards meeting Article 8.2  
  in order to provide an immediate financial incentive to sell products which 
are  easier and cheaper to collect, treat, re-use or recycle at end of life (EOL); 
c) Compliance can be achieved either via a Producer Compliance Scheme 
(PCS) or independently (whereby the producer organises their own take-back 
of mixed or own brand WEEE) and enables (b) to be applied to equally to 
both compliance routes.  
This approach involves the appropriate authority applying a weighting 
mechanism (specified percentage increase/decrease) to producers’ obligated 
tonnages of WEEE arising.  The percentage increase/decrease is based on 
specified features of products that the producer is currently placing on the 
market, which have a significant impact (positive or negative) on the cost of re-
use, repair, refurbishment or recycling10.  The weighting mechanism can be 
applied irrespective of how a producer’s obligated WEEE tonnage is calculated.   
                                            
9 DfRR = Design for Re-use, Repair, Upgrade and/or Recycling 
10 The DfRR weighting option builds on concepts such as the French bonus/malus system but 
aims to strictly identify and define criteria and percentages in accordance with impacts on EOL 
costs as discussed later in this Annex. 
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Reducing or increasing a producer’s obligated tonnage of WEEE arising within a 
product category is used as proxy for differences in collection and treatment 
costs of products currently being POM11.  The weighting mechanism therefore 
provides a way of reflecting, in a relative rather than absolute form, the costs of 
collecting and treating products currently being POM whilst funding WEEE 
arising.  This aligns with the principle of evolution rather than revolution in so far 
as taking the first step of the journey is concerned. 
Applying a DfRR Weighting– Step by Step 
This section aims to outline step by step how a DfRR weighting obligation would 
work. 
Step 1: Identify Basis for determining Obligated Tonnages 
The first step is to identify the basis for determining producers’ obligated 
tonnages of WEEE arising within each product category.  For example: 
a) market share (as per current UK system); 
b) obligated tonnage based on specified collection targets12. 
Whichever basis is selected would then be set out within the UK WEEE 
Regulations and applied to all producers on a mandatory basis.  The outcome is 
that each producer (potentially via its scheme) is allocated a specific weight of 
WEEE arising that they must fund within each product category.   
The remit of this report does not enable a detailed analysis of the merits of 
setting obligated tonnages based on specified collection targets, compared to the 
existing market share calculation.  This comparison would need to consider a 
wide range of factors within the UK WEEE system e.g. trading issues and how to 
address them, current and predicted collection volumes and so on.  In 
accordance with meeting the IPR Working Group (IPR WG) Terms of Reference, 
the focus of the proposed approach is the application of a weighting mechanism 
to these obligated tonnages and is independent from how the obligated tonnages 
are originally calculated.  It is the weighting mechanism which will enable the 
costs of collecting and treating products currently being POM to be taken into 
consideration whilst funding WEEE arising.  
                                            
11 The concept of altering obligated tonnages is outlined in Fair and Efficient Implementation of 
Product Take-Back Legislation with Collective Producer Responsibility, L. Gui, A. Atasu, O. 
Ergun, B. Toktay. Georgia Tech. Working Paper, 2012.  The DfRR weighing option adopts 
elements of this approach. 
12 For further details on using collection targets to set obligated tonnages see Section 2. 
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Step 2: Identify Product Differentials 
The next step is to identify the key differentials within a particular product group 
that make one product cheaper to re-use, repair, refurbish or recycle than 
another.  Both existing and new /emerging products and their technologies need 
to be considered.  Differentials could relate to material composition, durability, 
disassembly or ability to upgrade for example.  The key requirements are that 
each criterion identified: 
a) Has a significant impact (positive or negative) on the cost of re-use, repair, 
refurbishment or recycling within a particular product group; 
b) Has no trade-offs or unintended consequences in terms of other 
environmental impacts which cannot be addressed via other policy 
measures (e.g. a type of backlight within a display product may be very 
costly to recycle but very energy efficient.  Identifying this as a differentiator 
on the basis of its recycling impact would be fine as long as other policy 
measures were able to address the energy efficiency aspect); 
c) Can be easily and definitively measured i.e. yes a product meets the 
criterion or no it does not.    
Once the criterion has been identified, it is allocated a percentage 
increase/decrease based on (a).  For example, if products which meet the 
criterion are on average cheaper to recycle than products which don’t meet it, 
then a set percentage reduction should be allocated to that criterion. 
An investigation needs to be undertaken involving producers, re-use 
organisations and AATF13 operators amongst others in order to identify valid 
criteria and the associated percentage increase/decrease.  
Possible Product Differentials 
It would be possible, for example, to develop differentials for category 11 
(displays). Until relatively recently, displays have contained a mercury-containing 
(Hg) backlight. However, displays with an LED (mercury-free) light source are 
now gaining market share.  Given that mercury is hazardous and mercury 
containing backlights require special treatment, displays with a mercury-free 
backlight should in theory be cheaper to recycle assuming other variables remain 
unchanged.  A criterion could therefore be ‘Backlight containing mercury above x 
ppm’ 
 
                                            
13 AATF = Approved Authorised Treatment Facility 
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Some preliminary ideas for other criteria include:  
 All Categories: Larger plastic parts are coated or painted with materials 
known to inhibit the recycling process. 
 All Categories: Larger plastic parts are not marked with polymer type. 
 All Categories: Plastic enclosures contain glued or moulded-in metal inserts. 
 Category 3: Equipment has more than ‘x’ different screw fixings 
(compromising efficiency of upgradeability processes). 
The criterion should be updated on a regular basis (e.g. annually) to take into 
account developments in product technology, treatment requirements and 
recycling processes.  Significant changes to relevant commodity prices could 
also be considered if relevant and feasible.  To enable sufficient review and 
revision, the criteria and the associated percentage increase/decrease values 
would not be specified in the UK WEEE Regulations.  However, the process or 
procedure for agreeing and implementing the percentage increase/decrease 
should be specified in the legal text. 
Step 3: Apply Weighting Mechanism 
The third step is to apply the weighting mechanism to the obligated tonnage 
calculated in Step 1.  This is how key differences in the costs of collecting and 
treating products currently being POM are applied to WEEE arising.   
Producers would report their products POM within the product categories as at 
present (or as per the new product categories listed in the Recast).  In addition, 
producers would report data within sub-categories based on the criteria set in 
Step 2.  For example, when reporting displays, producers would need to report 
the weight of displays POM with mercury backlights and the weight of displays 
POM with a mercury-free lighting source. 
The relevant authority (e.g. the Environment Agencies) would apply the specified 
percentage increase/reduction to the relevant sub-category and calculate the 
obligated volume of WEEE arising.  This could be done either per PCS or directly 
for each producer depending on how the system was implemented.  Ultimately 
each producer would be notified of their obligated tonnage either directly by the 
authorities or via its PCS.      
There are several variations on how the percentage increase/decrease could be 
applied to the obligated tonnages.  This could involve either a simple multiplier or 
a reallocation mechanism.  Both are illustrated below as worked examples. 
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Weighting Mechanism - Worked Examples  
This section details some worked examples to demonstrate the impact of the 
weighting mechanism depending on how the weighting is applied.   
 Example A assumes that a producers obligations is calculated based on 
market share.  
 Examples B and C assume that a producers obligation is calculated according to a 
specific collection target. 
In each worked example:  
 
 The criterion used as the differentiator is the presence (or absence) of Hg 
backlights in displays.  In most examples Hg backlights are given a 
penalty in the form of a 20% increase.  In the last example LEDs are given 
an incentive in the form of a 20% decrease; 
 
 The tonnages put on the market by Producer A and Producer B are kept 
consistent throughout.   
o Producer A places on the market 10 tonnes of displays with Hg 
backlights and 90 tonnes of displays with LED backlights.   
o Producer B places on the market 50 tonnes of displays with Hg 
backlights and no displays with LED backlights.   
There are 3 parts to each worked example: 
1. Explains the steps involved. 
2. Details the calculations 
3. Summarises the impact on each producer’s obligation. 
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Worked Example A – apply weighting in a current market share system 
Step 1 Producer’s obligated tonnage is calculated based on current market 
share 
Step 2 A 20% increase is applied to displays with mercury (Hg) backlights 
Step 3 
The 20% increase to displays with Hg backlights can be applied in 
two ways:   
Example A1 “Simple multiplier”: apply 20% increase to the weight of 
displays with Hg backlights POM.   
Example A2 “Reallocation”: apply 20% increase to the market share 
for Hg backlights and then reduce the LED backlight market share 
accordingly. 
 
Example A1 “Simple multiplier”: apply 20% increase to the weight of displays with 
Hg backlights POM.   
Total amount of WEEE arising = 100 tonnes.   
Producer A Producer B 
POM POM 
apply 
20% Hg 
increase 
Market 
Share 
after 20% 
Hg 
increase 
Obligated 
volume of 
WEEE 
arising 
POM POM 
apply 
20% Hg 
increase 
Market 
Share after 
20% Hg 
increase 
Obligated 
volume of 
WEEE 
arising 
10 
tonnes 
Hg 
10 x 1.2 
= 12 
tonnes 
(12/162) x 
100 = 
7.4% 
7.4% of 
100 = 7.4 
tonnes 
50 
tonnes 
Hg 
50 x 1.2 
= 60 
tonnes 
(60/162) x 
100 = 37% 
37% of 100 
tonnes = 37 
tonnes 
90 
tonnes 
LED 
displays 
90 
tonnes 
(90/162) x 
100 = 
55.6%. 
55.6% of 
100 = 55.6 
tonnes 
0 tonnes 
LED 
displays 
0 tonnes 0% x 1.2 = 
0%. 
 
 
0% of 100 = 
0 tonnes 
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Example A2 “Reallocation”: apply 20% increase to the market share for Hg 
backlights and then reduce the LED backlight market share accordingly. 
Total amount of WEEE arising = 100 tonnes.   
Producer A Producer B 
POM Market 
Share 
under 
current 
system 
Market 
Share 
20% Hg 
increase 
+ removal 
from LED 
Obligated 
volume of 
WEEE 
arising 
POM Market 
Share 
under 
current 
system
Market 
Share 20% 
Hg 
increase + 
removal 
from LED 
Obligated 
volume of 
WEEE 
arising 
10 
tonnes 
Hg 
6.67% 6.67% X 
1.2 = 8% 
i.e. 
additional 
1.33% is 
incurred 
8% of 100 
= 8 tonnes 
50 
tonnes 
Hg 
33.33% 33.33% x 
1.2 = 40% 
i.e. 
additional 
6.67% is 
incurred 
40% of 100 
tonnes = 40 
tonnes 
90 
tonnes 
LED 
displays 
60% 60% – 
1.33%  – 
6.67% = 
52%. 
Remove 
1.33% and 
6.67% 
from LED 
market 
share. 
52% of 
100 = 52 
tonnes 
0 tonnes 
LED 
displays 
0% 0% x 1.2 = 
0%. 
 
 
0% of 100 = 
0 tonnes 
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The following table summarises the impact on obligated tonnages for Producer A 
and Producer B compared to the current market share approach.  
Producer obligation 
based on:   
Producer A obligated 
tonnage 
Producer B obligated 
tonnage  
Current Market Share 
approach. 
66.7 33.3 
Market Share with simple 
multiplier applied 
63 37 
Market Share with  
reallocation method 
applied 
60 40 
 
Under the reallocation method outlined in Example A2, the penalty on the Hg 
backlight increases significantly as the rest of the market moves towards Hg-free.  
This incentivises rapid market change but places an increasing cost on the last 
few Hg backlight display producers.  A cap could be implemented to prevent 
excessive costs falling on the remaining minority of producers.   
The simple multiplier used in Example A1 is much easier to apply, particularly in 
a market such as the UK with thousands of producers.  In addition, the penalty on 
the Hg backlight remains more constant which is in line with Article 8.2.  
Depending on the economics, the penalty on the Hg backlight under example A1 
may or may not be sufficient to stimulate market transition.   
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Worked Example B – apply increased weighting in a system where targets 
are based on 45% POM  
Step 1 Producer’s obligation is based on a 45% POM collection target14 
Step 2 A 20% increase is applied to displays with mercury (Hg) backlights 
Step 3 
The 20% increase to the obligated volumes for displays with Hg 
backlights can be applied in two ways:   
Example B1 “Simple Multiplier”: apply the 20% increase to displays 
with Hg backlights.  Other products within the category remain 
unaffected e.g. LED displays.  The total weight of obligated WEEE 
within a product category increases above the 45% POM target.  The 
cost ‘penalty’ on the Hg backlight displays remains constant and 
does not change over time; 
Example B2 “Reallocation”: apply the 20% increase to displays with 
Hg backlights and reduce the weight for non-Hg backlight displays 
accordingly.  The total amount of obligated WEEE within a product 
category remains constant at the 45% POM target.  The cost 
‘penalty’ on the Hg backlight displays remains constant and does not 
change over time. 
 
Example B1: apply 20% increase to displays with Hg backlights.  This increases 
the total obligated volume required. 
Producer 
A POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage  
20% Hg backlight 
increase applied 
Producer B 
POM 
Producer B 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer B 
Obligated 
tonnage  
20% Hg backlight 
increase applied 
10 tonnes 
Hg15 
4.5 tonnes 4.5 x 1.2 = 5.4 
tonnes 
50 tonnes 
Hg 
22.5 tonnes 22.5 x 1.2 = 27 
tonnes 
                                            
14 45% has been selected for illustrative purposes only.  Although an obligated tonnage based on 
a 45% POM collection target would be based on the previous 3 years figures as per the draft 
WEEE recast text on collection targets, we have provided one POM figure for the worked 
examples for simplicity. Further discussion of setting obligated tonnages based on a % POM 
target is provided in Section 2.3. 
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i.e. an additional 
0.9 tonnes is 
incurred 
i.e. an additional 
4.5 tonnes is 
incurred 
90 tonnes 
LED 
40.5 tonnes 40.5 tonnes 0 tonnes 
LED 
0 tonnes 0 tonnes 
 
Example B2: apply 20% increase to displays with Hg backlights and remove the 
additional volume from LED backlights.  This keeps the total obligated volume the 
same.   
Producer 
A POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage  
20% Hg backlight 
increase applied 
+ removed from 
LED 
Producer B 
POM 
Producer B 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer B 
Obligated 
tonnage  
20% Hg backlight 
increase applied 
+ removed from 
LED 
10 tonnes 
Hg 
4.5 tonnes 4.5 x 1.2 = 5.4 
tonnes 
i.e. an additional 
0.9 tonnes is 
incurred 
50 tonnes 
Hg 
22.5 tonnes 22.5 x 1.2 = 27 
tonnes 
i.e. an additional 
4.5 tonnes is 
incurred 
90 tonnes 
LED 
40.5 tonnes 40.5 – 0.9 – 4.5 = 
35.1 tonnes 
Remove 0.9 tonnes 
and 4.5 tonnes 
from LED incurred 
obligation. 
0 tonnes 
LED 
0 tonnes 0 tonnes 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
15 Note, in this example the percentage increase could be applied to the product weight POM 
(column 1) or to the obligated tonnage (column 3) – the end result would be the same i.e. the 
same volume of obligated tonnage would result. 
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The following table summarises the impact on obligated tonnages for Producer A 
and Producer B compared to a standard 45% POM target.  
Producer obligation 
based on: 
Producer A obligated 
tonnage 
Producer B obligated 
tonnage 
45% POM obligation 45 22.5 
45% POM obligation with 
simple multiplier applied 
45.9 27 
45% POM obligation 
reallocation method 
applied 
40.5 27 
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Worked Example C - apply decreased weighting in a system where targets are 
based on 45% POM 
Step 1 Producer’s obligated tonnage based on 45% POM collection target 
Step 2 A 20% decrease is applied to LED backlight displays 
Step 3 
Apply a 20% decrease with reallocation.  The % decrease to the 
obligated tonnages for displays with Hg backlights can only be 
applied as a reallocation.  If a percentage decrease is applied as a 
‘simple multiplier’ with no reallocation then the total obligated 
tonnage would be reduced below the national 45% POM target.   
Example C1 “Reallocation”: apply a 20% decrease to displays with 
LED backlights and reallocate the saved volume to displays with Hg 
backlights.  The total volume of obligated WEEE within a product 
category will remain the same i.e. remains at the 45% POM target.  
The cost benefit to the LED  displays remains constant and does not 
change over time.  The cost ‘penalty’ on the Hg backlight will 
increase as the tonnage of LEDs POM increases. 
 
Producer 
A POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer A 
Obligated 
tonnage 20% 
LED reduction 
applied + 
reallocated to 
Hg 
Producer B 
POM 
Producer B 
Obligated 
tonnage 
WEEE 
arising 
based on 
45% POM 
Producer B 
Obligated tonnage  
20% LED reduction 
applied + 
reallocated to Hg 
90 tonnes 
LED 
40.5 tonnes 40.5 x 0.8 = 
32.4 tonnes 
 
Allocate 8.1 
tonnes saved to 
Hg market 
share. 
0 tonnes 
LED 
0 tonnes 0 tonnes 
 
 
10 tonnes 
Hg 
4.5 tonnes 4.5 + 1.35 =  
5.85 tonnes 
50 tonnes 
Hg 
22.5 tonnes 22.5 + 6.75 = 29.25 
tonnes 
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The following table summarises the impact on obligated tonnages for Producer A 
and Producer B compared to a standard 45% POM target.  
Producer obligation 
based on: 
Producer A obligated 
tonnage 
Producer B obligated 
tonnage 
45% POM obligation 45 22.5 
45% POM obligation with 
reallocation method: 20% 
LED reduction 
38.25 29.25 
 
Weighting Mechanism –Further Points of Discussion 
Does it meet Article 8.2? 
One of the primary points of discussion regarding the weighting mechanism is, 
‘does it meet Article 8.2’?   
Clearly it is not possible for the IPR WG to give a legal judgement on this.  It will 
also be affected by the calculation used to define producers’ obligated tonnages 
(i.e. Step 1).  There was no consensus within the IPR WG on whether the 
weighting mechanism, if applied to market share or a specified collection target, 
meets the letter of Article 8.2.  Some felt that it does because it adjusts the costs 
paid by producers to reflect the EOL costs of their own EEE being put on the 
market.  Others felt that it didn’t because it alters the obligated tonnages, and that 
this goes against the requirements of Article 8.2.  If comprehensive criteria are 
developed over time, it is fair to say it would represent a significant step towards 
Article 8.2.  Given its application is primarily administrative (i.e. it does not involve 
any major changes to collection or infrastructure investment by producers) it also 
leaves the door open to a true ‘payment for own WEEE’ model in future.  
Weighting Mechanism Criteria – How to set the product differentials 
Arguably the most significant disadvantage of the weighting mechanism is the 
need to devote time and resources to investigate key product differentials which 
affect EOL and transpose these into accurate criteria with associated weightings.  
There are two elements to this discussion: 
1) What should be taken into consideration when developing criteria to ensure they are 
effective and minimise additional data burdens for producers; 
2) What process should be used to set the product differentials initially and to review them 
on a regular basis; bearing in mind the need to minimise time and resource implications. 
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Key requirements for product differentials and criteria 
The key requirements for the product differentials are that each criterion 
identified: 
a) Has a significant impact (positive or negative) on the cost of re-use, repair, 
refurbishment or recycling within a particular product group; and 
b) Has no substantial trade-offs or unintended consequences in terms of 
other environmental impacts which cannot be addressed via other policy 
measures.  To give a hypothetical example, a type of backlight within a 
display product is cheaper to recycle but not as energy efficient as others 
on the market.  Identifying this backlight technology as a differentiator 
and applying a reduction on the basis of its recycling cost may be 
acceptable if other policy measures e.g. minimum energy efficiency 
requirements were in place to address the trade-off; 
c) Can be easily and definitively measured i.e. yes a product meets the 
criterion or no it does not.    
The aim of the weighing mechanism is to move towards meeting Article 8.2.  To 
meet this aim it is important that the scope is limited to point (a) and that the 
percentage allocated is an accurate reflection of the differences in EOL costs.  
The IPR WG recommend that whilst the weighting should take into consideration 
any trade-offs in terms of product environmental impact, it should not become a 
wider policy tool at this time. 
Secondly, criteria will be both more effective and less burdensome if they are 
consistent with other policy instruments and harmonised with similar criteria 
relating to EOL impacts e.g. within the French bonus malus, European Green 
Public Procurement or UK Government Buying Standards, EU Eco-label, EPEAT.   
Criteria could be written to enable a default ‘no pain’ option to minimise data 
burdens on producers.  If a producer (e.g. importer of multiple, frequently 
changing brands) cannot easily access the product information required to report 
against the specified criteria, they could report against the ‘default’ category.  
This would mean that they did not receive any incentive or benefit, but were not 
overtly penalised for being unable to report POM data against a sub-category.  
The benefit is that it reduces data burdens on such producers, the disadvantage 
is that it reduces the DfRR impact. 
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Development and Agreement of Criteria 
There are a number of options for how criteria could be developed, several of 
which could be combined.  Each will have different implications in terms of the 
level of time and resources required and from whom16.  Possible options aree:  
 Request that producers and waste management companies agree 
proposals for criteria within each product category, along with supporting 
evidence.  These would be reviewed by a central authority (e.g. DEFRA), 
organisation (e.g. WRAP) or steering committee.   
 Establish a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to develop the criteria 
and consult with relevant stakeholders where required; 
 Request that the Market Transformation Programme develops initial 
proposals for review by DEFRA, BIS and WRAP; 
 Commission a consultancy study including stakeholder consultation and 
these reviewed by central authority or TAC or consultancy study and 
consultation.   
Applying the weighting mechanism – Simple Multiplier or 
Reallocation? 
There are two options for applying the weighting mechanism as illustrated in the 
worked examples above. 
 Under the reallocation examples, the application of the differential makes 
no change to the total volume of WEEE which is treated.  As any reduction 
is reallocated to the non-DfRR product share.   
 In comparison, if a simple increase was applied, this would mean that 
some producers would have a higher obligated volume and there is an 
increase in the total volume of WEEE which is treated. 
The decision on whether to apply a reallocation or a simple increase/decrease 
could be based on the current volumes of WEEE available within a category and 
what level of change is feasible (the reallocation method would result in faster 
market change if technologically/economically feasible). 
 
                                            
16 IPR WG members who didn’t favour this option were concerned about the level of time and 
resources which could be incurred in setting the criteria and percentages.  
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ANNEX E 
IPR – Working Group 
Aims and Terms of Reference  
Aims 
To provide BIS and the Minister with a report comprising:- 
1. Views from the sector on IPR, and;   
2.  An analysis of the benefits and consequences of implementing IPR in the UK, and;  
3.  A recommendation if, and if so, how, IPR could be practically and realistically 
implemented in the UK. 
Terms of Reference 
 
Background 
The UK, along with a number of other Member States of the EU, has not transposed all 
aspects of Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive; and therefore full individual producer 
responsibility is not possible in the UK. The current system for Household WEEE 
compliance in the UK is based on collective producer responsibility within which 
producers are apportioned the end of life cost of their products based on their market 
share. Similar ‘collective’ producer responsibility systems have been chosen by other 
Member States in implementing the WEEE Directive. 
IPR, as originally envisaged, was intended to “create an economic incentive for 
producers to adapt the design of their products to the prerequisites of sound waste 
management.  IPR was seen as a means of encouraging the design and production of 
electrical and electronic equipment which takes into full account and facilitates the repair, 
possible upgrading, reuse, disassembly, and recycling of WEEE”. 
With collective producer responsibility there is no differentiation of the recycling costs 
according to how easy the product is to recycle.  The costs are based upon the market 
share of the producer. Therefore the costs of recycling will be the same for a product that 
has been designed to be easier to recycle, and a product that is much more difficult to 
disassemble and recycle.  Therefore collective responsibility -does not provide an 
incentive to a producer to design products to be easier to recycle. 
Introduction 
Article 8 of the WEEE Directive distinguishes between ‘future’ and ‘historic’ WEEE.  The 
Directive states that producers should be collectively responsible for financing historic 
WEEE that is products put on the market before 13th August 2005.  This is because it is 
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not possible for producers to influence the design of products that have already been 
produced.  This establishes a market share responsibility for historic WEEE. 
For ‘future’ WEEE, design changes can make products easier to disassemble, more 
recyclable and less harmful to the environment.  Therefore Article 8.2 of the WEEE 
Directive establishes an Individual Producer Responsibility for ‘future’ WEEE, obliging 
producers to finance the costs of recycling their own products.   
There is a common misunderstanding that IPR is the same as establishing an individual 
recycling system.  This is not the case.  Table 1 illustrates this difference.  The WEEE 
Directive requires that for products placed on the market after 13 August 2005, 
producers are financially responsible for their own products, rather than collectively 
financing these costs (i.e. based on market share).  However to fulfil IPR, producers 
have a choice between establishing individual or collective recycling systems. 
Individual Producer Responsibility 
(Article 8.2) 
For products put on the market after 13 
August 2005, each producer shall be 
responsible for financing the operations 
referred to in paragraph 1 relating to the 
waste from his own products. The 
producer can choose to fulfil this 
obligation either individually or by joining 
a collective scheme 
Individual Recycling Systems 
 
An “individual recycling system” is a 
recycling system managed by only one 
producer. An “individual recycling system” 
is not equal to “individual producer 
responsibility”. 
Collective Producer Responsibility 
(Article 8.3) 
The responsibility for the financing of the 
costs of the management of WEEE from 
products put on the market before the 
date referred to in paragraph 1 (historical 
waste) shall be provided by one or more 
systems to which all producers, existing 
on the market when the respective costs 
occur, contribute proportionately, e.g. in 
proportion to their respective share of the 
market by type of equipment. 
Collective Recycling System 
 
 
A “collective recycling system” is a 
recycling system organised by several 
producers working together to manage 
WEEE. A “collective recycling system” is 
not equal to “collective producer 
responsibility”. 
 
 
IPR, in accordance with Article 8.2, has been implemented for a limited number of 
product categories, in some EU Member States and elsewhere around the world, notably 
Japan some States in the USA, the Netherlands and South Korea. IPR could work 
alongside other regulatory and non-regulatory initiatives to ensure a true life cycle 
approach is taken.     
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Terms of reference: 
The objectives of the Group are to: 
1. Seek and obtain evidence (including relevant case studies) from a wide range of 
external stakeholders, including IPR experts about IPR systems and how they 
currently operate across the world.  
 
2. Review the evidence (including any case studies) for IPR and consider how a system 
could work within the UK, to help meet Article 8.2 of the WEEE Directive.  
 
3. Bring forward recommendations for how IPR could be practically, realistically and 
fairly implemented in the UK.  
 
IPR Business Case 
The business case for IPR must satisfy the following four imperatives which must be 
specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and tangible. 
 Commercial Imperative 
 
 Does it make good business sense from a producer’s perspective17, for 
example; to generate competitive advantage and reward producers that 
invest in sustainable product design? 
 Does it provide an option for the better management of future compliance 
costs? 
 Does it quantify any potential for additional costs to be passed on to the 
consumer? 
 Does it provide an option for predicting/measuring WEEE arisings and 
thereby helping businesses plan the required infrastructure investments 
(encouraging UK market development and employment opportunities)? 
 Does it have the potential to stimulate more end market development?18 
 
 Environmental Imperative:  
 
 Does IPR improve the environmental performance of the WEEE Directive? 
 Does IPR help the WEEE Directive to improve the life cycle performance of 
products19? 
 Does IPR help to increase the percentage of end-of-life products returned via 
and measured by the WEEE system for re-use, recycling and recovery? 
 
                                            
17 Producers may also be SME’s which will have a potential impact on IRP deliverability 
18 New products and/or services aligned with economic and social benefits 
19 Consider EU Raw Materials initiative 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=894&userservice_id=1 
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 Political Imperative: 
 
 IPR must be capable of being delivered within a desirable policy and/or 
regulatory framework. 
 
 Consumer Imperative: 
 
 Supports the development of a societal culture in which activities such as re-
use and recycling are encouraged, to maximise resource efficiency. 
 Supports, through incentivising eco-design, increased availability of 
sustainable products. 
 Continues to support a collection infrastructure which is widely accessible 
and straight forward for consumers to understand and access. 
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Annex F: Approved Authorised 
Treatment Facility (AATF) – 
Operational Aspects 
Visit summary: By Peter Calliafas. 
 
We have already commented on the potential benefits of upstream approaches in 
respect of EEE placed on the market in so far as IPR approaches are concerned. 
To enable us to understand the potential benefits of downstream approaches in 
respect of WEEE arising at an AATF, Viridor kindly hosted a visit to their St 
Helen’s AATF20. 
The role of an AATF 
An AATF is an authorised treatment facility (ATF) that is approved by the 
Environment Agencies21 to issue evidence notes for the re-use, or treatment and 
recycling of WEEE. 
The principal streams of WEEE that are handled and processed by this AATF, 
include: 
 Cooling appliances (e.g. Fridges); 
 Small Domestic Appliances (SDA) e.g. toasters, electrical toys; 
 Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) from TV’s and Computer Monitors. 
It is important to note that this demonstrates one example of how an AATF 
operates, there are many different formats for recovery of WEEE material 
streams.  
Automated Processes: 
There are two mechanical processing lines at the facility that are fully automated. 
The technology employed is MeWa. The controls are preset to handle and 
process a certain mix of WEEE materials at any given time although it is possible 
to change the settings/adjust process parameters if required. The plant works 
more effectively on a continuous basis as opposed to a batch basis. 
                                            
20 http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/metals/viridor-opens-state-of-the-art-st-helens-weee-facility 
21 http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/topics/waste/32084.aspx 
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These processing lines handle the following WEEE materials: 
 Cooling appliances. Given the requirement to remove the refrigerant gases 
and related oils before further processing, all cooling appliances are handled 
in the same way because of the challenges and difficulties encountered in a) 
identifying brand type and b) distinguishing between cooling appliances 
containing CFC’s and those containing pentane. 
 Small Domestic Appliances. To ensure that the processing line operates 
efficiently, staff are employed in a picking line to remove items that present a 
risk to machinery, by way of examples, gas bottles and CRT’s. 
 
Manual Processes: 
 Cathode Ray Tubes22. Processing CRTs requires a labour intensive process: 
firstly involving manual disassembly followed by the mechanical removal of 
the fluorescent coated section under controlled conditions. This is to prevent 
breakage and uncontrolled release of fluorescent coatings / leaded dust. 
 
AATF – Commercial Considerations 
An AATF is a relatively high fixed cost business. These fixed costs include 
business rates, headcount, capital employed and related financing costs 
(whether internal or 3rd party from the likes of a bank). 
For these reasons, the return on capital employed and profit generation of the 
facility is predicated on achieving a) sufficient volume throughputs during the 
financial year and b) an appropriate margin contribution per tonne of input. 
Product Categories and operational impacts 
One of the key reasons behind the visit was to understand the impact of product 
innovation and design and the operational impacts that these give rise to. 
A number of products were discussed and the practicalities seen at the St 
Helen’s facility. These include: 
                                            
22 http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/WEEE_treatment_external_flyer.pdf 
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1. Flat Screens: Flat screens in terms of model type can include a) plasma, b) 
LCD and more latterly c) LED. Flat screens that are LCD contain a mercury 
backlight which is hazardous under EWC categorisation. Because of this, the 
LCD flat screens have to be manually separated23 and sent to a specialised 
treatment facility which can strip down the flat screen and recover the mercury 
backlight under sealed conditions. 
 
2. Free standing oil filled electrical radiators: This is due to the oil content within 
the radiator which is, in itself, hazardous. 
 
3. Scanners and photocopiers: Specifically, those containing a mercury 
backlight. 
 
4. Smoke Detectors: Most common smoke detectors contain a small amount of 
americium-241.  Although smoke detectors are not considered a risk to human 
health during use, smoke detectors do present a significant problem for an 
AATF given the radioactive content.  
 
5. PV solar panels: Whilst not an immediate problem, these products will 
materialise in the waste stream in the short to medium term. In traditional PV 
solar panels, the two halves containing pure silicon crystal are coated with 
two different dopants (e.g. arsenic, gallium, aluminium, phosphorus).This will 
render them hazardous. 
6. WEEE containing batteries: It is not possible to shred and process WEEE 
containing batteries given the risks that this presents. It is even more 
challenging when the batteries are sealed within the product itself (e.g. single 
use disposable cameras).As such, an additional intervention is required. 
7. Product size: There is a trend to smaller and more compact EEE being placed 
on the market (e.g MP3 player, tablet computers etc. Smaller sized products 
need to be re-circulated through the plant several times before they are split 
open. 
AATF – Return Share approach 
The concept of a return share approach was discussed during the visit to the St 
Helen’s facility. The principal sources of WEEE arisings handled at the facility are 
post consumer, collected and delivered from a number of Designated Collection 
Facilities (DCFs), managed under contract by one or by a number of different 
Producer Compliance Schemes (PCSs).  
                                            
23 Provided the back case to a flat screen is intact, this will state whether the flat screen is a plasma, LCD or LED type. 
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Note the facility has a commercial contract in place with a major producer 
whereby they will process their single branded WEEE products. These WEEE 
products consist of a) factory defects, b) warranty returns and c) WEEE arisings 
from their own take back arrangements. 
It would be possible to separate out particular brands from a DCF bulk load 
arriving subject to the following factors: 
1. That the brand can be identified. The product itself may have been damaged 
either at the DCF or in transit to the AATF. 
2. Separation will be labour intensive as there are no equivalent mechanical 
processes that can accomplish this outcome in widespread use.  
3. Cost implications. In normal circumstances, an AATF charges the PCS a gate 
fee of £x per y tonne of WEEE product category delivered. This gives rise to 
an individual unit cost of £z per unit in each tonne delivered. Under this 
arrangement, economies and efficiencies apply.  
If brand separation (rather than sampling) was required either by a producer 
or by a PCS, the cost of any labour involved in the brand separation will be 
additional. As a result, there will be an increase in the unit cost to the PCS for 
each tonne of WEEE product category delivered. 
4. Cost allocation to a particular producer could be problematic given that a) the 
manufacturer of the product (the brand owner) might not be the same party 
who placed the product on the market (especially if bought by and then sold 
by a high street retailer). 
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